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Preface
My involvement in the humanitarian crisis response domain started in March 2005, when I
was part of a group of students who worked on projects regarding business continuity and
disaster recovery in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami.
Even a few months after the disaster struck, its devastating impact was noticable all around
the area. Coincidently one late evening during our stay, being at our hotel by the coast,
we witnessed another tsunami “alarm”. We were not warned by an early warning system
or by local people, but found out by accidentally reading a news report when browsing the
internet. As has been extensively reported (Addams-Moring, 2007), we made sense of our
environment and the threat in different ways, and decided to evacuate our hotel and move
land inwards. At first, however, most local people decided not to evacuate their homes,
even though they saw us fleeing to safer grounds. Luckily the earthquake did not cause
a tsunami, because in hindsight we realized that the tsunami would have hit the local
population together with us before we even got to know about the threat. This experience
illustrates the potential and necessity of information systems to improve humanitarian
crisis response, and was an important motivation for me to conduct this research.
The past four years I had the opportunity to conduct research in this highly interesting
and relevant domain. I would never have been able to write this dissertation without the
guidance, advice, and support of many colleagues, friends, and relatives along the way.
First of all I would like to thank Bartel for giving me the opportunity to do this PhD
and supervise me. Bartel has always created opportunities for me to go to many different
conferences and summer schools, to take part in courses, research projects, and exercises,
and to conduct case studies all over the world. Bartel’s mixture of a serious and professional
approach when needed with an informal and sociable approach when allowed for has made
my time as his student highly instructive and enjoyable.
The second person who has been of invaluable help is Gerd. Gerd has been always there
to advise and support me, both personally and professionally. During our joint studies in
Colombo, Brussels, Kinshasa, and Finland I learned from Gerd how to conduct critical
and original research, and was inspired by his approach and perseverance – in particular
to explore highly ambiguous concepts such as Sensemaking. We had a lot of fun and
unforgettable experiences during our trips together.
I would like to thank my committee members, colleagues from the ISCRAM association,
and all those who contributed to shaping my research along the way with useful comments
and feedback. I would like to thank Damir for his contributions in Sarajevo and the co-
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development of the pilot experiment, Cas for his help with z-Tree, Meeri-Maria for the
excellent preparation of and active participation in various case studies, and Ilkka, Risto,
and Juha-Matti for their assistance in a case study.
There are several people who provided me with the opportunities for conducting this
research. I would like to thank Paul Burghardt, Kees Nieuwenhuis, and Martijn Neef for
managing the ICIS project1. I would like to thank CentER and the department of Infor-
mation Management at Tilburg University for providing me with the facilities for carrying
out this research. I would like to thank Kristiina Rintakoski from CMI for organizing the
“Information sharing models and interoperability” project and giving me the opportunity
to take part. Furthermore, I am grateful to Geert Gijs, Ronald Ackermans, and Marc
Devalckeneer from B-FAST for giving me field training and including me in their Triplex
exercise mission, Johan Heffinck, Nigel Snoad, and Gisli Olafsson for giving me the oppor-
tunity to participate in the OSOCC and the needs assessment process during Triplex, and
Erik Kastlander for giving me various opportunities. The insights and experiences shared
by all interviewees and the humanitarian crisis response practitioners Geert, Ronald, Marc,
Johan, Nigel, Gisli, and Erik were invaluable and instructive for me.
There are many friends whom I would like to thank for the great times these four years
in Tilburg; in particular I would like to mention Ben and Michele. Other special thanks go
out to Erwin, Rob, and Wannes, who have been my friends from primary school onwards,
and ever since I could always rely on and have good times with. I would like to thank Akos,
Alerk, Amal, Amar, Amina, Andrea B., Andrea K., Anita, Ard, Bart, Benedikt, Benjamin,
Chris, Corrado, Cristian, DJ, Edwin, Emiliya, Faiza, Flaminia, Francesco, Gabriele, Gema,
Heejung, Jagath, Jeewanie, Jelmer, Jon, Joost, JW, Karen, Katie, Khoa, Kristel, Linde,
Marcel, Marco, Maria, Marina, Michael, Momo, Norma, Oktay, Owen, Paola, Patricio,
Pedro, Piero, Rafiq, Renata, René, Rick, Stefania, Tom, Victor, Wimme, Yan, Yehia, and
all others whom I have not mentioned explicitly for the tiring but fun time in the “Gomor-
rah” futsal team, the mind-boggling but entertaining time at the pub quiz, the successful
evenings and chess/futsal events as “Black Sheep”, the exciting and great “fantacalcio”
rounds, the many social events with the “LG”, nice lunches and dinners, the board-game-
playing and football-watching afternoons and evenings, and all the other great experiences.
I am very lucky and happy to have met and hung out with you all.
There have been some people very close to me who have always been there for me.
I would like to thank my family, and in particular my parents Dagma and Harrie, my
sisters Bianca, Melissa, and Yvette, and our dog King for their wonderful and continuous
support. Last but not least, I would like to thank Cristina. She has been my best finding
during the PhD, and has been of tremendous importance to me – both to complete this
research and personally.
’s-Hertogenbosch, February 2011
1The research reported here is part of the Interactive Collaborative Information Systems (ICIS) project
(http://www.icis.decis.nl/), supported by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, grant nr: BSIK03024.
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The information-processing systems of our contemporary world swim in
an exceedingly rich soup of information, of symbols. In a world of this
kind, the scarce resource is not information; it is the processing capacity
to attend to information. Attention is the chief bottleneck in organiza-
tional activity . . .
Herbert Simon in The Sciences of the Artificial (1996)
1.1 Crucial Stages and Turning Points
The term “crisis” derives from the ancient Greek word κ%ισις (krisis), meaning moment
of decision, judgment, or choice. In Greek tragedies for example, κ%ισεις (kriseis) were
turning points where human choice could make a fundamental difference to the future (Shri-
vastava, 1993). Nowadays we use the term crisis for either “a crucial stage or turning point
in the course of anything”, which reflects the original meaning of the word, or “a time of
extreme trouble or danger” (Gilmour, 2003). In this dissertation we use the term crisis to
describe the latter type of events, when people are struck by disastrous circumstances. As
a consequence of such events, however, people will inherently find themselves at a crucial
stage or turning point in which they do not only need to make decisions on the course of
action they will pursue, but also need to make judgments on what is happening around
them and on what the decision context is.
We mainly focus on “crucial stages” and “turning points” faced by humanitarian actors
who work in crisis situations caused by natural hazards or conflicts. These actors typically
operate in a complex and uncertain environment, under difficult circumstances of high
stress levels, time constraints, and high stakes, and with crises occurring anytime and
almost continuously. Unlike in mainstream environments, the expectation for these actors
is that bad things will happen. Moreover, various types of information problems complicate
the response, such as inaccurate, late, superficial, irrelevant, unreliable, and conflicting
information (Van de Walle and Turoff, 2007; Van de Walle et al., 2009). In sum, actors
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face considerable information processing challenges for decision making on the course of
action to pursue, making judgments on what is happening, and understanding what is
going on in order to decide and act appropriately.
Information and communication play an important role in crisis response and man-
agement (Hale et al., 2005). It has been documented on numerous occasions that com-
munication problems can be the cause of a crisis, as was the case in, for example, the
Mann Gulch fire (Weick, 1993), the Challenger accident (Winsor, 1988), and the Tenerife
air-traffic disaster (Weick, 1990), or further intensify it. Ex-post analyses of such accidents
demonstrate that the underlying cause of these information and communication problems
was that people failed in making sense of the situation at hand.
1.2 Sensemaking
The main theoretical concept underlying this dissertation is Sensemaking1, a meta cogni-
tive framework that can be used to obtain a grip on the equivocal external environment
and its proneness to multiple interpretations. Sensemaking is usually triggered by a sudden
loss of meaning, described by Weick as a “cosmology episode,” in which “both the sense
of what is occurring and the means to rebuild that sense collapse together” (Weick, 1993).
When people experience a cosmology episode, they are being thrown into an ongoing, un-
knowable, unpredictable streaming of experience (Weick et al., 2005) and try to make sense
of things and make things sensible (Weick, 1995, p.16) by addressing the questions, “what
is happening out there?”, “why is it taking place?”, and “what does it mean?” (Choo,
2006; Dervin, 1983; Weick, 1995). Sensemaking is thus about how people give meaning to
what is happening in order to reduce the equivocality and ambiguity that surrounds them
(Weick and Meader, 1993). These meanings “are constituted and reconstituted through
the dynamic, reciprocal, and iterative processing of environmental information” (Sutcliffe,
2001).
Sensemaking has been studied in various disciplines, such as in organizational stud-
ies (Weick, 1995), library and information science (Dervin, 1999), command and control
(Grant, 2005), software engineering (Selvin et al., 2010), and intelligence analysis (Pirolli
and Card, 1999). In this dissertation we approach Sensemaking from Weick’s organizational
studies perspective.
Organizational and management scholars have defined and used the concept of Sense-
making in different ways. March and Olsen related Sensemaking to experiential learn-
ing (Choo, 2006, p.77), as “individuals and organizations make sense of their experience
and modify behavior in terms of their interpretations” (March and Olsen, 1976, p.56).
Huber and Daft (1987) talked about Sensemaking as the construction of sensible and sens-
able events. From Starbuck and Milliken’s perspective, “Sensemaking has many distinct
aspects: comprehending, understanding, explaining, attributing, extrapolating, and pre-
1In line with Van Den Eede (2009), we distinguish the concept of Sensemaking discussed in this dis-
sertation from the colloquial “sense making”, and therefore use this spelling. To avoid any confusion we
capitalize Sensemaking throughout the dissertation.
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dicting, at least. (...) What is common to these processes is that they involve placing
stimuli into frameworks (or schemata) that make sense of the stimuli” (Starbuck and Mil-
liken, 1988). This broader notion of Sensemaking is also acknowledged by Thomas et al.
(1993), who view information seeking, processing, creating, and using to be central activi-
ties of Sensemaking. This means that Sensemaking is not a noun, but a verb; that it is a
process, with sense as its product (Muhren et al., 2008b).
Sensemaking encompasses intuitions, opinions, hunches, effective responses, evalua-
tions, and questions (Savolainen, 1993). Sensemaking deals with omnipresent discontinuity
in continuously changing situations. “To understand Sensemaking is also to understand
how people cope with interruptions” (Weick, 1995, p.5). Dervin labeled this “gappiness,”
meaning that people are continuously confronted with dissonance, ill-structured problems,
ambiguity, and equivocality (Dervin, 1999). Situations in which gappiness is most evident,
such as crisis situations in which discontinuity is the rule and continuity the exception,
are therefore settings in which Sensemaking is particularly relevant (Van Den Eede et al.,
2004). We use Sensemaking similar to Weick (1993) to describe and understand how
actors process information in crisis environments.
In the following subsections we discuss the properties that characterize Sensemaking (Sub-
section 1.2.1) and Sensemaking’s different levels of analysis (Subsection 1.2.2).
1.2.1 Sensemaking properties
We heavily rely on Weick’s extensive work on Sensemaking (Weick, 1985, 1988, 1993; Weick
and Meader, 1993; Weick, 1995, 2001, 2005; Weick et al., 2005). He matured the concept
of Sensemaking in organizations, among others by defining its underlying properties in his
groundbreaking work on information processing in organizations (Weick, 1995). Although
they might not be fully exhaustive nor exclusive in the scientific sense, they still are a
grand attempt to render the way people deal with interruptions more tangibly (Muhren
et al., 2008b). Weick (1995) defines seven different properties of Sensemaking. They can be
captured by the acronym SIR COPE: Social context, Identity construction, Retrospection,
Cue extraction, Ongoing, Plausibility, and Enactment (Muhren and Van de Walle, 2009;
Muhren et al., 2008a,b, 2009; Nathan, 2004; Weick, 1995, 2001, 2005). Below we briefly
discuss them.
Social context
“People learn about events when they compare what they see with what someone else sees
and then negotiate some mutually acceptable version of what really happened” (Weick,
1985). Cognitive and social aspects of Sensemaking are inextricably linked. People need
social anchors and a form of social reality (Weick, 2001), because what we say or think
or do is contingent on what others say and think and do. Sensemaking requires talking,
interaction, conversation, argument, and dialog with others (Muhren et al., 2008a).
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Identity construction
Depending on who the Sensemaker is, the definition of what is happening will also change.
What the situation means is defined by who one becomes while dealing with it or what and
who one represents. “The Sensemaker is himself or herself an ongoing puzzle undergoing
continual redefinition, coincident with presenting some self to others and trying to decide
which self is appropriate” (Weick, 1995, p.20). An organization seeks to discover what it
“thinks” and “knows” about itself and its environment. This construction of identity is
the basis for imparting meaning to information within the organization and, eventually,
determining what problems must be solved.
Retrospection
“Sensemaking is influenced by what people notice in elapsed events, how far back they
look, and how well they remember what they were doing” (Weick, 2001). Weick et al.
(2005) point out that answers to the question “what’s the story?” emerge from retrospect,
connections with past experience, and dialog among people who act on behalf of larger
social units. Answers to the question “now what?” emerge from presumptions about the
future, articulation concurrent with action, and projects that become increasingly clear as
they unfold.
Cue extraction
Sensemakers decide what to pay attention to (Nathan, 2004). Sensemaking is influenced by
both individual preferences for certain cues as well as environmental conditions that make
certain cues figural and salient (Weick, 2001). Sensemakers notice some things and not
others. When making sense, people pay attention and extract a particular cue and then
link it with some other idea that clarifies the meaning of the cue, which then alters the
more general idea to which the cue was linked on an earlier moment, and so on. Extracted
cues enable Sensemakers to act, which increases confidence and confirms faith in earlier
cues (Muhren et al., 2008a).
Ongoing
Sensemaking has neither a beginning nor a formal end. Instead, it “takes place in a
continuing and dynamic fashion as events unfold and Sensemakers continuously seek to
understand what events mean in relationship to organizations” (Nathan, 2004). Most of
us at any given time find ourselves “in the middle of something.” As we move from one
situation to another, we make and revise assumptions and beliefs along the way. For
Sensemaking it is important to maintain an ongoing understanding of events. Once you
cannot keep pace with the action, you lose context, information, situated cognition, and
tools made meaningful by actual use (Weick, 2005).
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Plausibility
“Sensemaking is about coherence, how events hang together, certainty that is sufficient for
present purposes, and credibility” (Weick, 2001). Looking for what is plausible is often of
more practical help than finding accuracy (Nathan, 2004). Totally accurate perception is
not needed, which is good because what is needed is that which is plausible and reasonable.
Plausibility helps us explore what we see and energizes us to act; the search for accuracy
can de-energize us as the search drags on and on.
Enactment
People often do not know what the “appropriate action” is until they take some action,
guided by preconceptions, and see what happens (Weick, 1988). “Action is a means to
gain some sense of what one is up against, as when one asks questions, tries a negotiating
gambit, builds a prototype to evoke reactions, makes a declaration to see what response
it pulls, or probes something to see how it reacts” (Weick, 2001). Action determines the
situation, as it creates an orderly, material, social construction that is subject to multiple
interpretations (Weick, 1988). The basic premise is that there is no objective environment
out there separate from one’s interpretation of it. Thus, the organization creates or enacts
parts of its environment through selective attention and interpretation.
Weick et al. (2005) formulate a gripping conclusion on what the seven Sensemaking prop-
erties are all about: “Taken together these properties suggest that increased skill at Sense-
making should occur when people are socialized to make do, be resilient, treat constraints
as self-imposed, strive for plausibility, keep showing up, use retrospect to get a sense of
direction, and articulate descriptions that energize. These are micro-level actions. They
are small actions. But they are small actions with large consequences.”
1.2.2 Sensemaking levels of analysis
Weick (1995) and Wiley (1988) discuss three levels of analysis in Sensemaking: (1) the
individual level, (2) the intersubjective level, and (3) the generic subjective level. The
individual level of analysis is the most basic level, but as the social context always plays an
important role in Sensemaking, one easily transfers to the intersubjective level of analysis.
During times of stability, “some level of shared understanding needs to exist for coordinated
activity to occur,” and there is an “enacted reality at group level in the form of routines,
rituals, systems, norms, assumptions and beliefs,” (i.e., the level of generic subjectivity)
(Balogun and Johnson, 2005). However, when individuals face change, generic subjectivity
breaks down into intersubjectivity and takes the form of face-to-face conversations, in-
teractions, exchanges, and continuous communication (Weick, 1995; Wiley, 1988; Balogun
and Johnson, 2005). “Only by virtue of continuous communication are the exchanges and
interpretations of intersubjectivity, and the shared understandings of generic subjectivity,
developed and maintained” (Weick, 1995, p.75).
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Most previous research does not explicitly mention the level of analysis, but is mostly
focused on the individual and intersubjective level. Lately, the notions of “group Sensemak-
ing” (Nosek and McNeese, 1997; Lee and Abrams, 2008) and “collaborative Sensemaking”
(Qu et al., 2009; Paul and Reddy, 2010) have made their appearance, which refer to the
Sensemaking level of generic subjectivity.
Many studies in “collaborative Sensemaking” base their work on Russell et al. (1993),
who view Sensemaking as “the process of encoding retrieved information to answer task-
specific questions”. In this view, Sensemaking is perceived as a process of analyzing a large
amount of data and filtering out the information needed for a task. This is however similar
to the notion of interpretation which Weick contrasts against Sensemaking: “When people
discuss interpretation, it is usually assumed that an interpretation is necessary and that
the object to be interpreted is evident. No such presumptions are implied by Sensemaking.
Instead, Sensemaking begins with the basic question, is it still possible to take things for
granted?” (Weick, 1995, p.14).
Nosek and McNeese (1997) were one of the first to discuss group Sensemaking and define
it as “the elicitation and creation of group knowledge relevant to an emerging situation.”
We view group Sensemaking as a process that is broader than merely socially constructing
meanings and generating a shared understanding among group members. As Weick (1995,
p.42) explains, “Sensemaking is also social when people coordinate their actions on grounds
other than shared meanings as when joint actions are coordinated by equivalent meanings,
distributed meanings, overlapping views of ambiguous events, or nondisclosive intimacy”.
In sum, there is scarce research on the group Sensemaking level when viewing Sense-
making from Weick’s perspective. In this dissertation we will examine both the combined
individual/intersubjective level of Sensemaking and the – largely unexplored – group Sense-
making level.
1.3 Supporting Interpretive Information Processing:
Towards Sensemaking Support Systems
A work system is a system in which human participants or machines use information, tech-
nologies, and other resources to perform processes for producing products or services for
internal or external customers (Alter, 1999). Information Systems (IS) constitute a special
case of work systems in which the processes performed and products and services produced
are devoted to information, including activities such as information processing, communi-
cation, Sensemaking, decision making, thinking, and physical action (Alter, 2002). IS can
affect the extent to which one gets a better picture of the environment (Sutcliffe, 2001;
Muhren et al., 2008a; Weick, 1985), which is particularly needed in the hectic circumstances
of crisis situations where actors face numerous information and communication challenges
(Bartell et al., 2006; Maiers et al., 2005).
The intersection between IS and crisis management has been studied by, for exam-
ple, Housel et al. (1986), Calloway and Keen (1996), and Turoff et al. (2004). Research
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and practice have nevertheless shown that current crisis management IS are long overdue
in practice (Van de Walle and Turoff, 2007).
Actors in crisis response could benefit from IS support in making sense of what is going
on. Although noted some time ago, Weick’s observation that IS are not really designed to
support how people make sense of their environment is still valid: “[IS] contain only what
can be collected and processed through machines. That excludes sensory information,
feelings, intuitions, and context — all of which are necessary for an accurate perception
of what is happening. (. . . ) To withhold these incompatible data is to handicap the
observer. And therein lies the problem” (Weick, 1985).
In the following subsections we discuss more in detail why there is a need for more Sense-
making support by IS (Subsection 1.3.1) and what our starting point is to examine the
design of such systems (Subsection 1.3.2).
1.3.1 Information systems and Sensemaking support
Similar to Weick, we view Sensemaking as a process broader than the analysis of infor-
mation or the creation of an end-product such as situational awareness. Sensemaking to
us is an interpretive information process, for which the information itself is important,
but also the information sources, people, organizations, information carriers, communi-
cation media, information systems, and intangibles such as the context, tacit knowledge,
organization culture, experience, and intuition, and it is a process without an end.
Modern management and IS design have been heavily influenced by Herbert Simon et
al.’s rational decision making schemes (March et al., 1958), suggesting a scientific deduc-
tive decision making with an almost complete knowledge of all relevant variables and from
which an optimization can be made. For this reason, most IS are aimed at either storing
and retrieving information in order to reduce uncertainty, such as database management
systems and document repositories, or at analyzing and processing large amounts of in-
formation in order to reduce complexity, such as decision support systems (Van de Walle
and Turoff, 2008). However, this might not always be helpful when coping with a variety
of potential meanings, as is commonly experienced when trying to make sense of what is
going on. Traditional, more computational information processing perspectives “tend to
neglect the more interpretive aspects of information processing or the idea part that orga-
nizational information processing necessitates the creation of meaning around information
in a social context” (Sutcliffe and Weick, 2008). Most IS currently even seem to replace
or suppress the possibility to make sense of situations. For example, heavily inspired by
Herbert Simon et al.’s work, IS research and practice use structured data as a substitute
for information (Boland, 1987). However, information is not a commodity; it is a skilled
human accomplishment. Information is meaning resulting from a person’s engagement
with data (Davenport and Prusak, 1998). IS should thus be designed to take dialog, inter-
pretation and an individual’s search for meaning as sacred (Boland, 1987). Even though
the role of more intuitive information processes was inherent to the work of Simon from
the start (Frantz, 2003), the way management was conducted and IS designed has been
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based on rationalistic models ever since.
Lindblom (1959) was one of the first to challenge this view on decision making –
and hence also the consequences for information processing – by a “science of muddling
through”. Ratio became complemented by intuition in the sense that Lindblom acknowl-
edged the importance of among others previous experiences and progress through “incre-
mentalism” (Lindblom, 1979). Weick’s work on Sensemaking shares many similarities with
Lindblom’s concept of “muddling through” (Turoff et al., 2009) and is particularly use-
ful because it offers an analytical tool – i.e., the Sensemaking properties – that makes it
possible to name and understand information processing activities which go beyond the
rationalistic decision making schemes. Inspired by Weick’s work on Sensemaking, we take
an interpretive information processing perspective on crisis management and humanitarian
response in this dissertation.
Interesting and substantial research exists on Sensemaking and crisis situations (such
as Weick, 1993), but relatively few studies use Sensemaking as an analytical lens for the
design of information technology (Weick and Meader, 1993), and there is scarce research on
how IS can support information processing challenges – specifically related to Sensemaking
– in crisis management (see Landgren, 2005, for a notable exception).
We use the term Sensemaking Support Systems (SSS) (Weick and Meader, 1993; Weick,
1995; Muhren et al., 2008a) to denote systems that should be designed to support Sense-
making. As Weick (1995, p.179) put it, “we need to understand more about Sensemaking
Support Systems as well as Decision Support Systems, which means we need to know more
about what is being supported”. The processes that need to be supported, the interpretive
and less explicit information processing mechanisms, are commonly designated as “intu-
ition,” “experience,” or “gut feeling” and are considered a “black box” (Savolainen, 2006).
Our research focuses on this black box and aims to identify the implicated information
processes, in order to design better supporting systems. For this purpose we use the seven
previously mentioned Sensemaking properties as building blocks in our research.
1.3.2 Design of Sensemaking Support Systems
Similar to Calloway and Keen (1996), we define IS support for crisis response as a multi-
disciplinary concept including not only information technology, but also social networks
of response actors and organizational designs. An organization’s design can increase or
reduce the information processing requirements and affect capacity (Sutcliffe and Weick,
2008). We take an interpretive information processing approach to organization design by
stressing the importance of facilitating the Sensemaking properties in organization design
and in particular IS support for the organization design.
The seven Sensemaking properties mentioned previously “have an effect on the will-
ingness of people to disengage from, discard, or ‘walk away’ from their initial story and
adopt a newer story that is more sensitive to the particulars of the present context” (We-
ick, 2001). Weick (2005) argues that an organization is more effective in accomplishing
this when the context is created in which the Sensemaking properties are supported rather
than inhibited. In Table 1.1 we summarize for each Sensemaking property (first column)
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how Weick (2005) argues that it is supported (second column) or inhibited (third column)
by the organizational form. Hence, in order to direct IS design to support Sensemaking,
IS should aim to support the organizational supporting forms listed in Table 1.1 and avoid
the organizational inhibiting forms. If well supported, the Sensemaking properties become
important resources for Sensemaking.
Paraphrasing how Weick (2001, 2005) defined the organization form should support
Sensemaking, we argue that SSS should:
• encourage conversation (support social resources);
• give people a distinct, stable sense of who they are and what they represent (support
defined identity);
• preserve elapsed data and legitimate the use of those data (support backward notic-
ing);
• enhance the visibility of cues (support equivocal cues);
• enable people to be resilient in the face of interruptions (support continuous flow of
events);
• encourage people to accumulate and exchange plausible accounts (support possibility
as criterion for narratives);
• encourage action (support enactive as form of action).
Table 1.1: Sensemaking properties and their organizational supporting and inhibiting forms
(Weick, 2005)
Sensemaking property Supported by Inhibited by
Social context Social resources Solitary resources
Identity construction Defined identity Vague identity
Retrospection Backward noticing Forward noticing
Cue extraction Equivocal cues Confirmed cues
Ongoing Continuous flow of events Episodic flow of events
Plausibility Possibility as criterion Probability as criterion
Enactment Enactive as form of action Reactive as form of action
1.4 Problem Statement and Research Questions
Section 1.3 has emphasized the need for better Sensemaking support systems in humani-
tarian crisis response. Consequently, our problem statement reads as follows.
Problem statement. To what extent can we lay the foundations of Sensemaking Sup-
port Systems for humanitarian crisis response?
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As a guideline to answer the problem statement, we formulate eight research questions.
These research questions can be divided into three themes.
First, we need to gain more understanding of Sensemaking in the broader field of crisis
management. We need to investigate how actors process information in crisis management,
and understand the role of Sensemaking. To gain more understanding of Sensemaking,
there is need for an examination of the different Sensemaking properties. Moreover, we
need to investigate how information processing in general and Sensemaking in particular
can be supported by IS in crisis management. The first, second, and third research question
therefore read as follows.
Research question 1. How do actors process information in crisis situations?
Research question 2. Can we validate the seven Sensemaking properties in crisis ac-
tors’ information processing behavior?
Research question 3. What can we learn from crisis actors’ information processing be-
havior for the design of Sensemaking Support Systems for crisis
management?
Second, we need to gain more understanding of Sensemaking in humanitarian crisis
response and how it can be supported by IS. Because we expect that communication is
important for Sensemaking, and communication is a more concrete process to observe,
identify, grasp, and support than the Sensemaking for which it intended, the fourth and
fifth research question read as follows.
Research question 4. How does communication play a role in the Sensemaking pro-
cesses of humanitarian actors in a crisis environment?
Research question 5. How can information systems support Sensemaking in humani-
tarian crisis response from a communications perspective?
Third, we need to examine the relationship between Sensemaking and information shar-
ing, as the latter is another important information process in humanitarian crisis response.
Furthermore, we need to investigate whether the important role that Sensemaking has ac-
cording to theory can be validated in practice, and gain more understanding of the influence
of Sensemaking support by IS on performance. For this reason we first need to quantify
the attainment of Sensemaking. As humanitarian crisis response is mostly conducted by
teams, we continue by examining Sensemaking on the group level. Therefore, the sixth,
seventh, and eighth research question read as follows.
Research question 6. Can we measure group Sensemaking attainment in humanitarian
crisis response?
Research question 7. How are Sensemaking and information sharing related to each
other in humanitarian crisis response teams?
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Research question 8. Does Sensemaking attainment influence performance in human-
itarian crisis response teams?
The answers to these eight research questions will allow us to formulate an answer to
the problem statement.
1.5 Dissertation Outline
This dissertation is a collection of four essays, Chapters 2–5, which collectively attempt to
lay the foundations of SSS for humanitarian crisis response. Figure 1.1 provides an overview
of how we built up our research to attain this goal and answer the problem statement. The
top part of the figure illustrates the triangulation of research methods that characterizes
our research. We first used qualitative methods (interpretive case study research, obser-
vation, and participant observation) which enabled us to gain a better understanding of
the concepts under study. Second, we employed quantitative methods (survey research
and experimental research) to test specific hypotheses on the concepts we gained under-
standing of. As can be seen in the second row of blocks in Figure 1.1, through these
different types of research we have (1) obtained a better understanding of Sensemaking
in humanitarian crisis response, (2) studied and validated the physiology of Sensemaking,
(3) applied the Sensemaking properties to communication, (4) managed to measure Sense-
making, (5) related Sensemaking to group decision making and information sharing, and
(6) demonstrated its importance. Throughout the essays we relate Sensemaking to infor-
mation processing challenges, decision making, communication activities, and information
exchange. As illustrated in the third row of blocks in Figure 1.1, we integrate Sensemaking
into different well-established IS streams of research: emergency response management IS,
media synchronicity, and group support systems. Table 1.2 provides an overview of where
the different research questions (RQs) and the problem statement (PS) are addressed in
this dissertation.
Table 1.2: Problem statement and research questions addressed by the different chapters
RQ1 RQ2 RQ3 RQ4 RQ5 RQ6 RQ7 RQ8 PS
Chapter 2 x x x
Chapter 3 x x
Chapter 4 x
Chapter 5 x x x
Chapter 6 x x x x x x x x x
In Chapter 2 we describe our first progress to understanding Sensemaking. We explore
four information processing challenges commonly experienced in crisis situations, which
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Figure 1.1: Research overview
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report on four case studies we conducted in different crisis situations: (1) a case study
of the sudden crisis of an airplane crash in the Barents Rescue Exercise, (2) a case study
of the yearly recurring forest fires crises in Portugal, (3) a case study of the post-conflict
European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and (4) a case study
of humanitarian aid and development organizations that operate in a complex emergency in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). We explore the difference between Sensemaking
and decision making, two activities that are undertaken to cope with information processing
challenges, and explore them in the first three case studies (in accordance with research
question 1). In the fourth case study, we introduce the theory of Sensemaking as a lens
to observe and analyze the information processing behavior of organizations, and we guide
our analysis by the seven Sensemaking properties and examine whether we can observe
these Sensemaking properties in humanitarian crisis response (in accordance with research
question 2). We discuss design premises for crisis management IS and compare these to
our findings from the four case studies (in accordance with research question 3).
In Chapter 3 we report in-depth on the case study conducted in the DRC, for which
we conducted interviews among senior management of international aid and development
organizations operating in the country’s ongoing crisis situation. In this chapter we rein-
troduce concepts from Sensemaking in Media Synchronicity Theory (MST), and focus on
how media should support synchronicity to fit communication needs when making sense of
a humanitarian crisis situation. We examine the Sensemaking properties from a communi-
cations perspective and analyze our findings from the DRC to this newly developed model
(in accordance with research question 4), and compare our findings to the synchronicity
of media that is suggested to support conveyance processes for establishing an individual
understanding (in accordance with research question 5).
Our focus in Chapters 2 and 3 is on the individual and intersubjective levels of Sense-
making. These are the levels at which the processing of information is mainly undertaken to
reach an individual understanding, especially when cosmology episodes lead to a breaking
down of generic subjectivity. In these chapters we have observed and identified Sense-
making qualitatively. In Chapters 4 and 5 we focus on group Sensemaking, the generic
subjectivity level of Sensemaking, and take a quantitative approach.
In Chapter 4 we describe the approach we took to quantify and measure Sensemaking
(in accordance with research question 6). The measurement of Sensemaking is a crucial
prerequisite to investigating which type of IS support aids or inhibits Sensemaking, but
has not been attempted previously. We discuss Sensemaking statements from theory which
are most applicable to group Sensemaking in humanitarian crisis response, and construct
a reliable scale with survey items to measure this.
In Chapter 5 we apply our group Sensemaking measurement scale to a specific hu-
manitarian crisis response situation in which Sensemaking plays an important role: the
needs assessment process. Due to the growing impact of natural hazards (United Na-
tions, 2004) and subsequently the growing humanitarian needs, there is an even larger
need for efficient and effective deployment of the scare resources. Without accurate and
timely information on the impact of the crisis and the humanitarian needs, humanitarian
assistance might be targeting the wrong areas, providing the wrong relief items, and be
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unnecessarily delayed, with disastrous consequences. Through a laboratory – hidden pro-
file – experiment, grounded on our participant observation experiences in a humanitarian
crisis response exercise (in accordance with research question 3), we investigate the effect
of different types of group support and information processing demands on Sensemaking
and information sharing (in accordance with research question 7), and demonstrate the
importance of Sensemaking for a good performance in humanitarian crisis response teams
(in accordance with research question 8).
Chapter 6 is an overall conclusion to the dissertation and answers all eight research
questions and the problem statement.
Chapter 2
A Call for Sensemaking Support
Systems in Crisis Management∗
The noblest pleasure is the joy of understanding.
Leonardo da Vinci
In this chapter we focus on how actors cope with information processing challenges in
crisis situations to understand better what type of Information Systems (IS) support is
needed in these circumstances. We report on four case studies we conducted in different
crisis situations: (1) an aviation crash in the Barents Rescue Exercise, (2) forest fires in
Portugal, (3) the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
(4) humanitarian aid and development organizations that operate in a complex emergency
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In the first three case studies we examine how
information processing challenges of ambiguity, uncertainty, equivocality, and complexity
are related to Sensemaking and decision making, and observe how actors deal with these
information processing challenges (in accordance with research question 1). In the fourth
case study we examine Sensemaking more in detail and specifically identify and validate
the Sensemaking properties (in accordance with research question 2). We illustrate how
in these four different crisis situations actors’ information processing and decision-making
behavior – identified through interviews and incidentally through observations – motivate
critical design premises for crisis management IS (in accordance with research question 3).
The answers to the research questions are formulated in Chapter 6.
This chapter is outlined as follows. In Section 2.1 we discuss several information pro-
cessing challenges and how they relate to Sensemaking and decision making. We moreover
review IS design requirements for crisis response. In Section 2.2 we discuss the case studies
we conducted. For each case study we describe the methodology used, the findings related
to how actors deal with information processing challenges, and the analyses of the find-
∗This chapter is based to a great extent on Muhren, Van Den Eede, and Van de Walle (2008a) and
Muhren and Van de Walle (2010a)
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ings. In Section 2.3 we discuss implications for the design of crisis management IS, and in
Section 2.4 we present our conclusions.
2.1 Information Processing Challenges and Support
Information related problems cause people to have difficulties in processing information
in crisis situations. Often the terms uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity and equivocality
are used in an attempt to stress the “difficult circumstances” people have to cope with.
However, these terms are mostly used interchangeably, without exactly describing what is
meant. Zack (2007) distinguished these four terms according to two dimensions: the nature
of what is being processed, and the constitution of the processing problem.
The nature of what is being processed is either information or frames of reference. With
information we mean “observations that have been cognitively processed and punctuated
into coherent messages” (Zack, 2007). In contrast, frames of reference (Choo, 2006, p.108)
are the interpretative frames which provide the context for creating and understanding
information. There can be situations in which there is a lack of information or a lack of a
frame of reference, or too much information or too many frames of reference to process.
Table 2.1 shows a breakdown into two dimensions, leading to four different types of
information processing challenges (Zack, 2007): uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity and
equivocality. We describe them briefly below.
Table 2.1: Information processing challenges (adapted from Zack (2007))
Information Frame(s) of reference
Lack of. . . Uncertainty Ambiguity
Variety/diversity of. . . Complexity Equivocality
Uncertainty is a situation in which there is not sufficient information possessed by the
organization to perform the task (Daft and Lengel, 1986; Galbraith, 1977). Complexity
is the second challenge, and arises when there is more information than one can easily
process (Zack, 2007). Although information related problems are not the only type of
problems that lead to complexity, this narrow definition suffices for our present focus
on information-related processing challenges. When there is a situation in which one
does not have a framework for interpreting information, there is ambiguity (Zack, 2007).
Finally, equivocality – or confusion – is a situation in which one has several competing
or contradictory frameworks (Daft and MacIntosh, 1981). Ambiguity and equivocality
may at first sight seem to be synonymous terms, but they are used throughout literature
to distinguish between unclear meaning (ambiguity) and the confusion created by two or
more meanings as in a pun or equivoque (equivocality) (Weick, 1995, p.92).
The four information processing challenges are not mutually exclusive, but often
exhibit a natural hierarchy of difficulty in practice. Ambiguity is the most difficult
2.1 Information Processing Challenges and Support 17
challenge to overcome, since it involves developing a frame of reference when none is
available. When people negotiate their interpretations and share their understandings,
a situation of equivocality can arise as there are multiple conflicting frames of reference.
There is a balance needed for on one side creating new frames of references and on the
other side reducing the frames. Once an appropriate frame is constructed, the situation
may reveal itself to be uncertain, complex, or both. This will determine whether a strategy
of information seeking or information reduction should be adapted.
Next (Subsection 2.1.1), we use this distinction between the different information process-
ing challenges to contrast Sensemaking and decision making with each other. In Subsec-
tion 2.1.2 we review IS design requirements for supporting crisis actors in dealing with
their information processing challenges.
2.1.1 Sensemaking versus decision making
Decision making is traditionally viewed as a sequential process of problem classification
and definition, alternative generation, alternative evaluation, and selection of the best
course of action (Simon, 1976). This process is about strategic rationality, aimed at
reducing uncertainty (Daft and MacIntosh, 1981; Weick, 1993). Uncertainty can be reduced
through objective analysis because it consists of clear questions for which answers exist
(Daft and Lengel, 1986; Weick and Meader, 1993). Complexity can also be reduced by
objective analysis, as it requires restricting or reducing factual information and associated
linkages (Zack, 2007).
On the contrary, Sensemaking is about contextual rationality, built out of vague ques-
tions, muddy answers, and negotiated agreements that attempt to reduce ambiguity and
equivocality. The genesis of Sensemaking is a lack of fit between what we expect and what
we encounter (Weick and Meader, 1993). With Sensemaking one does not look at the ques-
tion of “which course of action should we choose?”, but instead at an earlier point in time
where users are unsure whether there is even a decision to be made, with questions such as
“what is going on here, and should I even be asking this question just now?” (Weick and
Meader, 1993). This shows that Sensemaking is used to overcome situations of ambiguity.
When there are too many interpretations of an event, people engage in Sensemaking too,
in order to reduce equivocality.
Sensemaking is concerned with making things that have already happened meaning-
ful (Boland, 2008) and is more than problem definition, as Weick and Meader (1993)
explain: “to label a small portion of the stream of experiences as a “problem” is only one
of many options. The stream could also be labeled a predicament, an enigma, a dilemma,
or an opportunity. Each of these labels has a different implication for action. If it is a
problem, then solve it; but if it is a predicament, then accept it; if it is an enigma then
ignore it; if it is a dilemma then define it anyway; and if it is an opportunity then exploit
it. To call something a problem is the outcome of Sensemaking”.
People usually enhance their Sensemaking efforts after a sudden loss of meaning, when
they experience a diffuse sense of unease that perhaps something needs to be done, al-
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though no one can say for sure. People then “must make sense of an uncertain situation
that initially makes no sense” (Schon, 1983, p.40) , and try to shape and give definition
to the decision context by processes of Sensemaking (Weick and Meader, 1993). As we
have discussed previously in Subsection 1.2.2, Sensemaking differs from interpretation as
Sensemaking “is about the ways people generate what they interpret” (Weick, 1995, p.13).
Just as the information processing challenges from Table 2.1 are not mutually exclusive,
Sensemaking and decision making cannot be separated but instead operate simultaneously.
Meaning must be established and then sufficiently negotiated prior to acting on informa-
tion (Zack, 2007): Sensemaking shapes events into decisions, and decision making clarifies
what is happening (Weick and Meader, 1993).
The previous discussion does not imply that dealing with information challenges is not
important for Sensemaking. It is not possible to separate the two activities of coping with
information challenges and interpretation challenges. However, the main activity of Sense-
making is ascribing meaning to what is really happening and not gathering information on
a situation. More information does not automatically lead to better Sensemaking (Klein
et al., 2007). The central problem requiring Sensemaking is mostly that there are too
many potential meanings, and so acquiring information can sometimes help but often is
not needed. Instead, triangulating information (Weick, 1985), socializing and exchanging
different points of view, and thinking back over previous experiences to place the current
situation into context, as the retrospection property showed us, are a few strategies that are
likely to be more successful for Sensemaking and will be further explored in the remainder
of this dissertation.
We are now able to make a clear distinction between decision making and Sensemak-
ing. Decision making is about coping with information processing challenges of uncertainty
and complexity by dealing with information, whereas Sensemaking is about coping with
information processing challenges of ambiguity and equivocality by dealing with frames
of reference. This information processing distinction between decision making and Sense-
making has – to the best of our knowledge – not been made previously in literature. We
will apply this dichotomy in the discussion of the case studies in Section 2.2.
2.1.2 Information systems
The problems of managing information and managing frames of reference are “tightly
linked in a mutually interacting loop” and require integration of formalized decision-making
procedures and informal socialization and shared understanding, managing information,
and managing the systems that provide it (Ribbers et al., 2002; Zack, 2007). In Section 1.3
we discussed the limitations of the current design of IS. IS have been generally designed
to overcome the information problems from Table 2.1. Problems of interpretation and the
creation and management of frames of reference, which aids Sensemaking, have generally
not been taken into account when designing IS. In this chapter we investigate how the
information processing behavior of actors operating in different crisis circumstances can be
aligned with the design of IS. We base our study on Turoff et al. (2004)’s important work
on the design of crisis management information systems, in which they propose necessary
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underlying Dynamic Emergency Response Management Information System (DERMIS)
premises.
Turoff et al. (2004) carefully examined the system design requirements for a DERMIS,
an information system designed to support the response to major crises. In their article,
they examined the historical experiences and literature associated with an early system that
was utilized for 15 years in the federal government to handle national emergencies, and
they integrated this with current literature and considerations to propose the requirements
for a new generation of DERMIS that go beyond what is currently available.
In addition to training and simulation and role-based user requirements, DERMIS
design premises focus on information and decision making, as summarized1 in Table 2.2.
These DERMIS design premises refer to the acute response phase of an emergency and
therefore illustrate the support IS can provide to the teams actively involved in the
response to a crisis (Landgren, 2005; Van Den Eede et al., 2006; Van de Walle and Turoff,
2007). While the focus in this chapter is broad and not only on the response but also on
the preparedness phase – this rather eerie phase of continuous caution and anticipation for
the next acute emergency outbreak – the DERMIS design premises remain highly relevant
(Van de Walle and Turoff, 2008). Indeed, during the preparedness phase, organizations (a)
focus on information gathering (DERMIS design premise 1), (b) try to obtain information
from different sources (design premise 6), (c) review and update where needed their
organizational crisis memory (design premise 2), (d) verify the scope and nature of the
crisis (design premise 4) and the validity of information (design premise 5) through intra-
and interorganizational coordination mechanisms (design premise 7), and (e) try to adapt
themselves to this changing situation (design premise 3).
In the following section we discuss four case studies we conducted in different crisis sit-
uations, in which we examined how people handle and process information in crises to
understand how supporting IS should be designed.
1For a more detailed description of the DERMIS design premises, we refer the interested reader to
Turoff et al. (2004)’s original work.
Table 2.2: DERMIS design premises (Turoff et al., 2004)




Those who are dealing with a crisis are flooded by information. There-
fore, the support system should carefully filter information that is di-
rected towards actors. However, they must still be able to access all
(contextual) information related to the crisis as the information ele-




It is important that the system is able to log the chain of events during a
crisis without imposing an extra workload on those involved in the crisis
response. This logged information can be used to improve the system
for use in future crises, but it can also be used to analyze the crisis itself.
Design premise 3:
Exceptions as norms
Due to the uniqueness of most crises, usually a planned response to the
crisis cannot be followed in detail. Most actions are exceptions to the
earlier defined norms. This implies that the support system must be
sufficiently flexible to allow reconfiguration and reallocation of resources
during a crisis response.
Design premise 4:
Scope and nature of
crisis
Depending on the scope and nature of the crisis, several response teams
may have to be assembled with members providing the necessary knowl-
edge and experience for the teams’ tasks. Special care should also be
given to the fact that teams may operate only for a limited amount
of time and then transfer their tasks to other teams or actors. The
same goes for individual team members who may, for example, become




As actions undertaken during crises are always based on incomplete
information, it is of paramount importance that the emergency response
system makes an effort to store all available information in a centralized
database. Thus, those involved in the crisis response can rely on a
broad base of information, helping them making decisions that are more
effective and efficient in handling the crisis.
Design premise 6:
Free exchange of in-
formation
During crisis response, it is important that a great amount of informa-
tion can be exchanged among stakeholders so that they can delegate
authority and conduct oversight. This, however, induces a risk of in-
formation overload, which, in turn, can be a risk to the crisis response




Due to the unpredictable nature of a crisis, the exact actions and re-
sponsibilities of individuals and teams cannot be determined ex ante.
Therefore, the system should be able to support the flow of authority
directed towards where the action takes place (usually on a low hier-
archical level), but also the reverse flow of accountability and status
information upward and sideways through the organization.
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2.2 Case Studies
We conducted four exploratory crisis management case studies (Muhren et al., 2008): the
sudden crisis of an airplane crash in the Barents Rescue Exercise, the yearly recurring
crises of forest fires in Portugal, the post-conflict state building EUPM in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (BiH), and the complex emergency in the DRC. We selected these case studies
on grounds of their differing crisis characteristics, as we wanted to investigate how people
handle and process information and make sense in a broad spectrum of crisis management
situations. In Table 2.3 we show how these case studies differ from each other on six aspects
of crisis management.
Table 2.3: Taxonomy of crisis management case studies
Case study 1: Case study 2: Case study 3: Case study 4:
Barents Rescue Forest fires, EUPM, Complex emer-
Exercise, Finland Portugal BiH gency, DRC
Crisis type Accident Natural disaster Conflict Conflict
Operations Response Prevention & Recovery Prevention, res-
response ponse & recovery
Timing In casu Ex ante & Ex post Ex ante, in casu
in casu & ex post
Focus Operational Strategic Operational Strategic
Time span Short Ongoing, long Medium term Ongoing, long
term term
Predictability Sudden Expected Expected Expected
In Subsection 2.2.1 we describe the common methodology used. Next, (Subsec-
tions 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.2.4, and 2.2.5) we describe the four case studies: an introduction
to each case study, how we conducted it, the findings from the case study, and a discussion
of the findings. For the first three case studies, the findings are organized according to
the nature of the processing of information: the dealing with information to reduce uncer-
tainty and complexity, and the dealing with frames of reference to reduce ambiguity and
equivocality. Literal quotations from interviewees are indicated with quotation marks. As
our focus in the last case study is on the identification and validation of the Sensemaking
properties, the analyses of the findings are organized according to the seven Sensemaking
properties (as introduced in Subsection 1.2.1).
2.2.1 Research methodology
For these case studies we used an interpretive research methodology, and conducted in
total 37 interviews with a common approach and research aim. Appendix A (page 144)
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provides an overview of all interviews we conducted. Interpretive research attempts to
understand phenomena through the meanings that people assign to them (Orlikowski and
Baroudi, 1991). A critique often heard with regard to case study research – and other
qualitative methods for that matter – is that they ostensibly provide for more room for
the researcher’s subjective and arbitrary judgment than other methods. Hence, they are
seen as less rigorous than quantitative research methods. Flyvbjerg (2006) counters this
critique and argues that “the case study has its own rigor, different to be sure, but no less
strict than the rigor of quantitative methods. The advantage of the case study is that it
can ‘close in’ on real-life situations and test views directly in relation to phenomena as
they unfold in practice”. Interpretive methods of IS research take into account the context
in which the information system is used with the particularity that it also acknowledges
the mutual interaction between the system and its context. In order to succeed in the
opening up of these mutual interactions, the researcher has to interact with the research
participants. Klein and Myers (1999) state that the “data are not just sitting there waiting
to be gathered, like rocks on the seashore”. Data are produced in a social interaction of
the researchers with the participants.
For our research design, we drew on Walsham (1995a,b, 2006) and Klein and My-
ers (1999) who have provided comprehensive guidelines on how to conduct interpretive
case study research in the IS domain, and used a semistructured interview technique as
primary evidence generation mechanism (Palvia et al., 2003). On the practical level this
shows itself throughout our research by means of a colorful interviewing style with which we
stimulated our respondents to answer difficult questions related to the Sensemaking proper-
ties (Muhren et al., 2008b), amongst others by using statements, dichotomies, metaphors,
and dilemmas, relying heavily on examples and anecdotes, and calling upon their imagi-
nation to find out the bottom-line. In our interpretive case studies we adjusted our style
to the respondent, such as to his/her language, world view, professional experience, and
personality.
The interviews were semi-structured, in the sense that we knew which topics to touch
upon and had a list of the general points we wanted to find out, related to the seven
Sensemaking properties, but adjusted the questions to how the interview was evolving.
Permission for tape recording was granted for all interviews except for one; only notes
were taken at the interview in which the respondent was not comfortable with the use of
a tape recorder. Confidentiality was guaranteed in all interviews.
We supplemented data and understanding of the case studies with other types of field
data, such as reports, background stories on various websites, press articles, brochures,
and informal interaction at the sites of the case studies. After the initial data analysis and
write-up of our observations, we sent a report of the case studies (Muhren et al., 2008) to
all interviewees. Three interviewees responded and validated our interpretations.
2.2.2 Case study 1: Barents Rescue Exercise
Barents Rescue is a series of field training exercises which are organized and conducted by
the countries within the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC): Norway, Sweden, Finland,
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and Russia. The Barents Rescue 2007 Exercise was held in October 2007 in Saariselkä and
Ivalo, located in the Northern part of Finland. The exercise aimed to facilitate commu-
nication, coordination, and cooperation between countries and civil-military services that
may be involved in crises relevant to the Barents region. The project consisted of a series of
planning conferences, training events, and exercises, of which the Barents Rescue Exercise
in October 2007 was the final and main event.
There are several challenges to crisis response operations in the Barents region. We
mention four of them: big distances between cities, limited infrastructure, limited resources
for rescue operations due to the scarce population, and severe climate conditions in winter.
For this reason, it is important that the countries in the region plan on how to join forces
when responding to a crisis. The Barents Rescue Exercise was aimed at training such
cooperation and improving crisis preparedness.
The scenario for the exercise was an aviation accident. A British aircraft executed
an emergency landing in the uninhabited areas of the Inari municipality. The more than
200 passengers were mainly tourists from the United Kingdom. The reason for the crash
was not immediately clear, but it was very likely that many passengers were injured or
deceased. The scenario involved different stakeholders from the BEAC countries, such
as alarm centers, national rescue services, hospitals, the military, private companies, and
voluntary organizations.
The exercise included three phases with different approaches to crisis management. The
first phase, the alarm exercise, was aimed at exercising the alarming and gathering of pos-
sible resources in the Barents region in case of a major crisis. The second phase, the table
top exercise, was aimed at exercising the practical response in the crisis area, consisting of
a command post exercise, table top exercise, and exercise with utilizing virtual tools. The
third phase, the field training exercise, was aimed at training the capabilities of organiza-
tions and agencies involved in the direct response to a crisis, both on the operational level
and on the strategic level.
Case study implementation
In October 2007 we2 traveled to the Northern part of Finland for the Barents Rescue
Exercise. We conducted four interviews with key people involved in the crisis response
operation: one person working at the On Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC),
one person working at the Local Emergency Management Authority (LEMA), one person
working at the On Site Command Center (OSC), and one person in charge of leading the
medical team. An overview of the interviews is provided in Appendix A.
Besides these interviews, we obtained a good overview of how the actors handle and
process information in the exercise through observations (cf. Angrosino, 2005). As the
table top exercise and the field training exercise were each organized on one location, we
could observe how all the actors dealt with the crisis. These observations were used for
the interviews, as we could ask specific questions on the actions of the observed people
2Gerd Van Den Eede and Willem Muhren
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and what had happened in the exercise. The Barents Rescue Exercise provided a good
opportunity for us to observe a crisis on the operational level, as it is difficult to observe
a crisis in a real-life situation.
Next, we present our findings on how the crisis actors involved in the Barents Rescue
Exercise deal with information processing challenges according to the framework previously
presented in Table 2.1. We will first discuss our findings on how actors deal with the
challenges related to information – uncertainty and complexity – and thereafter discuss how
actors deal with the challenges related to frames of reference – ambiguity and equivocality.
Case study findings: dealing with challenges of information
We observed several information problems in the Barents Rescue Exercise, all leading
to a delay in the crisis response. There were problems of conflicting information when
the air traffic control and the rescue services labeled the accident site with two different
geographical coordinates. Information often arrived late in the alarm exercise, as the
primary communication technology that was used was the fax, the most commonly used
tool at the time the procedures were put in place. Other unnecessary delays were caused in
the field because it was not clear which organization was in charge of the rescue operation.
Moreover, not all actors were informed about the Emergency Rescue Center in Tromsø
as a contact point for the response operation. Another factor delaying the response was
the information provision to the medical team. After the initial alarm, it took 90 minutes
before the medical team received the first information about the victims. The medical team
was only able to determine the kind of assistance that was needed after this information
was received.
Actors deal with these information problems in different ways. People indicated to have
preferences concerning the level of detail of information that is useful to have. Although
most interviewees clearly stated that more detail was better for them, there were also cases
in which actors argued that anything more than essential information was not needed and
in fact distracted them from their job.
People also had different ways for making sure they were communicating as effectively
as possible. For example, one actor started handling the crisis by listing his key contact
persons and phone numbers in order to prepare himself for information exchanges in the
upcoming hectic circumstances.
What happened in practice when people communicated in the crisis, was that messages
were double-checked to make sure that they arrived, as illustrated in radio communications
by the recipient repeating the main words.
The interviewee who was working in the OSC said that “you are forced to trust the
people with whom you are exchanging information, no matter who is on the other side”
when responding to a crisis. He felt that there is not much time to think about whether
the information received from others is right or wrong, and he therefore had to act on the
information that was available.
For the people in the OSOCC, it was important to receive information on what is
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happening on a continuous basis: “We need to get the key cards, to keep being informed”.
The OSOCC and LEMA were operating in two separate but adjacent rooms. A liaison
officer of LEMA was appointed to brief the people in the OSOCC regularly on what was
happening. This briefing was however not sufficiently frequent, especially since LEMA
was quite busy. Moreover, the people in the OSOCC did not use any system to receive
information and communicate with the LEMA.
Case study findings: dealing with challenges of frames of reference
Some people identified experience to be a helpful resource for crisis response while others
felt it to be essential : “From your experience you cannot remember everything, but many
things stay in the back of your head and become a routine.”
For one key actor it was important to create time to think about the situation: “I read
the documents and think about what’s next. And if there is too much noise, I go perhaps
out, take a cup of coffee, and smoke a cigarette. Because when it’s so hectic, you have to
clear your mind and think about what’s going on.”
Most of the interviewees indicated that they value effectiveness over efficiency when
responding to a crisis. For example, they would request more resources than deemed
absolutely necessary, just to be sure to have enough.
In the alarm exercise, actors had different expectations of each other. For example
regarding the procedure to follow, Finnish actors expected a swift response from other
countries while Norwegian actors took their time to find out how many resources were
needed and available.
The comparison of frames of reference on the strategic level by exchanging points of
view and understanding of the crisis was hampered because most of the time the OSOCC
and LEMA worked independently.
Language was an issue of concern in this international exercise. As responders cannot
use their native language when cooperating with responders from other countries, it was
difficult for them to choose the right words to use. Culture is also important, as an
interviewee emphasized: “We [Finnish people], together with the Swedes and Norwegians,
think in the same way and have the same kind of picture in mind all the time. We have
the same kind of systems [structures] in place, and we understand each other. But with
the Russians it’s a bit harder.”
Discussion of the findings
The initial response to an airplane crash should be a rapid response, as surviving passengers
need immediate medical aid. We however observed two types of challenges concerning
information (Table 2.1) delaying the response. First, we observed problems of uncertainty
– a lack of information: the alarm center could not inform actors swiftly due to an outdated
alarm procedure by fax, contact points and focal points for the response operation were
unknown to many actors, and the medical team received information on the victims far too
late. Moreover, the information exchange between LEMA and OSOCC was not good. In
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the future this can be avoided by having LEMA and OSOCC in the same location, or by
using shared IS. In this case the people in the OSOCC are not dependent on briefings but
can actively follow what is going on. Second, we observed problems of complexity when for
instance actors had to determine the accident site, and the IS that were used by various
actors were not interoperable.
Actors tried to cope with uncertainty and complexity in different ways. Interviewees
indicated to have different preferences concerning the level of detail of information, and
consequently either seek more detailed information or refrain from this level of detail. Ac-
tors take precautionary measures against complexity by organizing information in certain
ways, double checking information they receive to avoid having conflicting information,
and acting on uncertain information as it is the only information they have.
Although situations of ambiguity and equivocality are more difficult to observe, these
two types of challenges concerning frames of reference (Table 2.1) revealed themselves in
the interviews. First, concerning ambiguity, interviewees indicated that when they have
no accurate frame of reference, they rely on their experience, take time to think about the
situation, and act according to the (inaccurate) frame of reference they have. Second, we
observed that it was difficult for the actors to cope with equivocality. Communication and
information exchange between actors was not sufficient, due to physical separation and
lack of appropriate systems to support this. Also the international context of response
hampered the discussion and exchange of frames of reference, as actors had different
cultural backgrounds and were speaking different languages.
In Section 2.3 we discuss the implications of how these actors deal with challenges of
information and frames of reference for the design of crisis management IS.
2.2.3 Case study 2: Forest fires in Portugal
Forest fires are a great concern for Portugal, as more than a quarter of the country is
covered by forests, and droughts in summertime increase the likelihood of such crises.
In recent years Portugal has been facing extremely hot and dry summers, with highest
peaks in 2003 and 2005. The fire risk in Portugal has been increased by changes in land
use practices. Rural exodus has left a large area of land uncultivated, where combustible
materials can now unnoted trigger big fires when droughts occur.
The National Authority for Civil Protection (Portuguese acronym ANPC) has the pri-
mary role in planning, coordinating, and implementing the Civil Protection policy. The
ANPC is a central operational service under the direct administration of the Ministry of
Interior. The ANPC maintains its own operational structure, the National Command for
Relief Operations, which ensures the operational command in terms of relief operations
and the integrated operational command of all the fire brigades in accordance with the
legal system. The Integrated System for Relief and Protection Operations is a set of struc-
tures, norms, and procedures which ensures that all civil protection agents act under a sole
command. This integrated system aims at responding to (imminent) crisis situations.
The Portuguese State does not have its own fire brigades. The great majority of the fire
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brigades are volunteer fire fighter associations; others belong to the city councils and private
companies. The Portuguese Forest Services play an important role in the management of
the forests in Portugal, especially in mapping the risks of hazards and in educating people
on how to prevent forest fires.
In 2003, 2004, and 2005 Portugal could not cope with the forest fires themselves, and
therefore requested outside assistance through the European Commission (EC)’s Com-
munity Civil Protection Mechanism. The Community Civil Protection Mechanism was
established in October 2001 and is an operational instrument designed to enhance pre-
paredness and to mobilize immediate civil protection assistance in the event of crises. It
can be activated in case of natural hazards and man-made disasters by any country in the
world, after which one or more of the thirty participating states – the European Union (EU)
member states as well as Liechtenstein, Norway, and Iceland – will try to offer their assis-
tance. The mechanism is coordinated by the Monitoring and Information Center (MIC)
of the EC in Brussels.
Case study implementation
For the Portuguese forest fires case study we conducted interviews using the previously
discussed interpretive approach, interviewing six people who are involved in managing and
preventing forest fires in Portugal, either on the national level or on the international
level through the Community Civil Protection Mechanism. An overview of the interviews
is provided in Appendix A. The interviews were aimed at finding out how these actors
handle and process information related to the Portuguese forest fires.
In December 2007 we3 traveled to Lisbon to interview two people working at the
ANPC and two people at the Portuguese Forest Services, and had the opportunity to
observe the operations center of the ANPC. We4 conducted two follow-up interviews in
February 2008 in Brussels: one interview with a person working at the EC, Directorate
General (DG) for the Environment, who also demonstrated us the MIC, and one in-
terview with a person working at the Civil Protection Unit of the EU’s Council Secretariat.
Next, we present our findings on how the crisis actors involved in the Portuguese forest
fires deal with information processing challenges according to the framework previously
presented in Table 2.1. We will first discuss our findings on how actors deal with the
challenges related to information – uncertainty and complexity – and thereafter discuss how
actors deal with the challenges related to frames of reference – ambiguity and equivocality.
Case study findings: dealing with challenges of information
The Portuguese Forest Services are mainly focused on preventing forest fires. They produce
two kinds of fire hazard maps and share these with the district level and the ANPC: one
structural, not very detailed map with a large pixel size, and one map with a smaller pixel
3Willem Muhren
4Meeri-Maria Jaarva and Willem Muhren
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size. The latter is better suited for teams on the ground and indicates the hazards in
summer; in winter it is used to find areas where the authorities can conduct “prescribed
firing”, which are techniques to manage fuel. Historical information on where the forests
fires took place is important information for producing these maps. Depending on the
tree species, it takes on average five years for a forest to become a potential “problem
situation” when forest fires are a substantial risk, but it takes many more years for a forest
to return to their pre-fire state. The Portuguese Forest Services experience problems of
acquiring up-to-date information for producing the fire hazard maps, as these often have
to be bought and land-use data is very expensive.
Both detection of forest fires and first response to forest fires are important, as the
difficulty of fighting such fires increases nearly exponentially in time. Forest fires can be
detected in three ways: (1) by somebody from the population calling 117 (the dedicated
forest fire emergency phone number) or 112 (the normal emergency phone number), (2) by
a surveillance post, or (3) by a surveillance brigade. The ANPC is responsible for informing
the population, the people who work for civil protection, the media, and the national and
district level command structure. The district command for relief operations is responsible
for the deployment of means, both terrestrial and aerial, and the first intervention. If they
do not succeed, or if the fire crosses the district level, the ANPC is responsible for the
enlarged combat situation. The ANPC then sends more resources to the field, which can
be requested from other districts.
When the crisis is overwhelming and national resources are insufficient, the minister
– advised by the national commander – can activate the Community Civil Protection
Mechanism by sending a message to the MIC in Brussels. The ANPC is permanently
connected to the Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS)
of the MIC. CECIS allows for sharing of current information on the situation as well
as identification of what is needed. Countries can also indicate whether they are able to
provide assistance or not.
Daily briefings take place at the ANPC in summer on the general hazard situation of
the country with representatives from the major stakeholders. The National Guard and
the armed forces have permanent liaison officers stationed at the ANPC. In the case of a
severe crisis, liaison officers from other civil protection agencies are present at the ANPC,
such as officers from the forest department, the maritime authority, the police, the medical
services, and the meteorological institute: “In the daily briefings we bring information from
all the agents who share responsibility in terms of civil protection.” At the end of these
briefings, the ANPC provides all actors with a summary of these briefings in writing. The
national commander takes decisions according to the information shared and the analysis
conducted in the meeting, for example, on whether to increase the readiness level or to
pre-mobilize resources.
The ANPC mainly uses the media to communicate with the population and other
external parties. When a threatening situation arises, the ANPC sends out an alert and
the key players from the media come to the office where they are briefed. The media
outlets then disseminate the message to the citizens, including any measures that should
be taken. The ANPC also organizes a press conference every week on what is happening
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and what the expectations are for the following week. In severe crisis situations there is a
daily press conference.
The ANPC displays information for the citizens on their website, such as information
on where current fires are located and how many fire fighters are working in the area. The
website also advises people on what to do for each level of forest fire risk. The people at
the ANPC realize that it is important to provide accurate information: “We cannot always
tell people that tomorrow will be the worst day.”
There is much redundancy in the sharing of information. When civil protection actors
send out a message, they make sure it arrives by using as many means as possible. At
the ANPC, people are updated on the situation by text messages, and senders usually
immediately call to check whether the message has been received and read. When the
Community Mechanism for Civil Protection is activated, fax messages are sent and phone
calls are made to other countries besides the formal request through CECIS: “In a crisis
situation this is quite normal as you want to make sure the message gets to the person.”
Case study findings: dealing with challenges of frames of reference
Forest fires in Portugal do not only happen during the summer, they also occur in winter-
time. Winter fires are good if they are controlled, since what burns at that time cannot
burn in summer when the fires are mostly not controllable. However, the concept of “good
fires” is new and generally unknown by the population. It therefore is important to inform
the people that fires during winter are not bad if they are managed appropriately. The Por-
tuguese Forest Services promote this idea on their website and have launched a campaign
on television, radio, and in newspapers. Another campaign highlighted that people should
not light fires near forests during summer, and that they should clear all combustible ma-
terials. Besides these nation-wide campaigns, the Portuguese Forest Services have engaged
in direct contact with local shepherds, farmers, and forest owners to try to change their
behavior and spread the word that not all fires are bad.
The ANPC’s main target is currently to educate people. They do this together with
big companies such as supermarket chains. One initiative included printing the phrases
“Portugal without fires depends on everyone” and “You should not use fire on a hot day” on
the supermarket’s plastic bags. The ANPC has also been advertizing in football stadiums
and on football shirts, and has broadcasted their campaigns on television and advertized in
newspapers. “You have to give good and correct information to your population, otherwise
you can have situations as in 2003, 2004, and 2005”, one interviewee said. It has been
successful until now: the number of ignitions has been reduced since the start of these
campaigns.
There have been instances in which the forest fire situation was under control, but
people started to panic as images of the fire were aired on television. One interviewee
stated that the best way to prevent these kinds of situations is to cooperate actively with
the media.
To aid interpreting new information on the hazard situation, the ANPC visualizes
information about the major incidents that are occurring in the country on a Geographic
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Information Systems (GIS) based map. There is a special screen on which the forest fire
situation is projected.
After each big crisis in Portugal, the ANPC invites all the actors that were involved
in the response to discuss the process, what was done and what worked or did not work.
These lessons learned are then incorporated into their procedures.
The MIC has the overall European helicopter view on civil protection. The mechanism
can facilitate and give an “educated hint” as to which country to help, but in the end
the countries themselves decide on whether they want to provide or accept assistance.
Countries do not always accept assistance, because the help that is offered may not be
exactly what they want, or it comes with a price they are not willing to pay.
Notably the use of language in CECIS is not standardized. This sometimes causes
problems in interpreting what is meant by a request or an offer, and has resulted in countries
assisting with resources that were not of use in that crisis situation.
“Nothing helps more in emergency situations than people knowing each other”, many
interviewees mentioned. The Community Mechanism for Civil Protection and the MIC
bring together people from all 30 countries for events like training sessions, workshops,
common exercises, and meetings. Through these types of interaction people become more
familiar with the realities of the other countries: “The more you exchange information, the
more you know where and how to target your request for assistance. And the better you
make your request, the better you get answered.”
Discussion of the findings
In summer the ANPC needs to obtain accurate and timely information on the actual sit-
uation of the forest fires, and needs to provide the actors on the ground and the citizens
with information concerning the forest fires. As forest fires pose a continuous threat to
the country, there are good systems in place for obtaining and providing this information,
such as the different ways a forest fire can be reported, daily briefings with all key re-
sponse actors, and good cooperation with the media. We observed two types of challenges
concerning information (Table 2.1) delaying the response.
The first challenge we discuss is related to complexity. The importance of timely and
accurate information is evident in the behavior of actors when communicating through
the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection, as redundant information exchanges take
place to make sure that recipients have read a message and understood it correctly. This
however might lead to a situation of complexity, as people receive many notifications on
different communication media and might lose track of which message is new for them and
which message is part of a “reminder”.
Second, we observed the challenge of uncertainty. With such yearly recurring crises,
the actors have chosen for a strategy of prevention rather than only response. The Por-
tuguese Forest Services play a leading role in this by mapping the risk of forest fires in the
different areas. They however experience problems of uncertainty as they have difficulties
in obtaining all relevant information for such maps. In the response phase to a forest fire,
informing citizens is important in Portugal’s. The Portuguese Forest Services cooperate
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with the ANPC for prevention campaigns, the ANPC provides information on forest fires
on their website, and there are press conferences in summertime. All these activities are
aimed at removing uncertainty that citizens face.
We also observed the two types of challenges concerning frames of reference (Table 2.1)
when dealing with the Portuguese forest fires. First, some campaigns in Portugal were
aimed at removing ambiguity by providing a frame of reference for citizens to make sense of
what is happening. For example, the concept of “good fires” was unknown to the majority
of people, but after the campaign citizens would better understand the fires that occur
in wintertime. Such educational campaigns could also prevent interpretation problems
leading to panic, such as the broadcast of fires on television at a time when fires are under
control.
Second, we observed that the main strategy to cope with equivocality is to socially
mix and engage in discussion. After a crisis, the key actors discuss their understanding
of what happened and what went wrong, and try to create a common frame of reference
which is then incorporated into their procedures and used to deal with the next crisis.
Moreover, one interviewee mentioned the importance for actors to socially mix between
different country representatives, as it helps civil protection actors to understand the
situation in other countries, how they respond, their concerns, etc. This is useful for
future collaboration and assistance, as the other actors’ frames of reference are then better
understood.
In Section 2.3 we discuss the implications of how these actors deal with challenges of
information and frames of reference for the design of crisis management IS.
2.2.4 Case study 3: European Union police mission in Bosnia
and Herzegovina
Since 1991, the EC has set aside more than e2.5 billion to support Bosnia and Herzegovina
with public administration reform, justice and home affairs-related issues, and improvement
of the investment climate as key target areas. Police reform has been one of the main
obstacles to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s integration in the EU.
International efforts to reform the Bosnian police force started immediately after the
peace agreement when the United Nations (UN) led International Police Task Force (IPTF)
was deployed. The IPTF comprised more than 2,000 international police officers from 43
countries.
On January 1st 2003, the EU launched the EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It
was the first mission initiated under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP),
initially intended to cover a three-year period and included around 500 police officers from
more than thirty countries. On July 1st 2005 the EC concluded that police reform was
the single remaining obstacle to the Stabilization and Association Agreement. Following
an invitation by the Bosnian authorities, the EU decided to establish a continued and
refocused EUPM of 200 international staff members and a mandate of two years, until the
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end of 2008. The EUPM supports the police reform process and continues to develop and
consolidate local capacity and regional cooperation in the fight against organized crime.
In addition to the EU Police Mission, the EU has an European Union Special
Representative (EUSR) and a military crisis management mission, European Union Force
(EUFOR) Althea, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EUSR is in charge of assuring the
coherence of the ESDP activities. The EUSR can offer political advice to the EUFOR
amongst others regarding organized crime, and facilitates coordination between Brussels
and Sarajevo. The EUFOR also has a paramilitary police force under its command. The
EUPM however is the lead in the coordination of policing aspects of the ESDP efforts in
the fight against organized crime.
Case study implementation
In April 2008 we5 traveled to Sarajevo and conducted a total of twelve interviews using
the interpretive approach. An overview of the interviews is provided in Appendix A. We
conducted interviews with EUPM people from the general management, EU Coordination
Office, Security Department, and Press and Public Information Department. Moreover,
we conducted interviews with people who are directly or indirectly involved with the
work of the EUPM: representatives of the EC Department Police Projects, EUFOR,
EUSR, Canton Sarajevo Police Department, Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe, and the Populari think-tank.
Next, we present our findings on how the crisis actors involved in the EUPM deal with
information processing challenges according to the framework previously presented in Ta-
ble 2.1. We will first discuss our findings on how actors deal with the challenges related to
information – uncertainty and complexity – and thereafter discuss how actors deal with
the challenges related to frames of reference – ambiguity and equivocality.
Case study findings: dealing with challenges of information
To support the local police in fighting organized crime, it is important for EUPM to collect
criminal intelligence from everywhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina and analyze it to create a
good situational overview. The main sources of information for EUPM’s headquarters are
the local police, the daily reports from EUPM’s field offices, and the security awareness
working group. EUPM follows the general statistics of everyday crime in the country in
order to notice crime trends that could be part of a bigger picture. Information that
relates to police crime and police corruption is also important. The main source of such
information is not the local police, but the local community. EUPM has informants who
have high positions in society.
EUPM tries to obtain local information on the overall security situation together with
EUFOR through EUFOR’s Liaison Observation Team (LOT) house concept. These are
5Meeri-Maria Jaarva, Damir Durbić, and Willem Muhren
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small groups of military people living in normal houses and liaising with the local popu-
lation. Because people from LOTs are military peacekeepers, they are not always good at
collecting criminal intelligence for EUPM.
The local police are an important source of information for EUPM, but EUPM often
needs to “press out” information from them. This goes back to the time of the former
Yugoslavia when having information implied having power and information would not be
shared unless ordered. This culture of not sharing information with internationals was
partially enforced during the IPTF time.
Traditionally, as effective tools were missing, the writing of many reports was the main
means of analysis for the police after information was gathered, and these reports were
stored in nationwide data systems. After the war there was no money to maintain these
systems, and they were cut into smaller elements. Nowadays the police has to be aware of
the fact that informants from different political parties and criminal groups could reside
in their units. That is why the police do not document much anymore, but rather “store”
important information in the heads of some trusted members of the police agency.
EUPM does not have a central database to retrieve important information from. All
information is stored on local hard drives. There is a need for some kind of web-based
application, but nobody thought of this when EUPM was deployed and now it is too
late to implement something like this. EUPM does have an archive of aggregated reports
that are sent on a weekly basis to the headquarters in Brussels, but these only indicate
trends and not contain any detailed information, as they are intended for member states
representatives and other people in Brussels who “are not interested in details, but that is
exactly what we need here.”
EUPM has experienced difficulties in distributing its message to the citizens: “with
normal press work you fail to communicate with the public”. The local media in the
country are biased, and citizens tend to watch and read their own particular news and
media. Whenever EUPM issues a press release it is reported in three different ways:
from Serb, Croat and Bosnian angles. This means that it is not easy to reach out to
the public. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s television networks are still underdeveloped and
underfunded but constitute the most unbiased media in the country. However, the ratings
are not substantially high. It is also difficult for EUPM to trust local journalists. This
is why EUPM has set up their own relatively large media department, used to distribute
their message to the citizens. EUPM launches their own television programs, does public
information campaigns, organizes round-table discussions, and produces their own radio
programs. An example of a newly set-up television program is the Bosnian version of
“America’s most wanted”. This is a tool for EUPM to distribute police-related or EUPM-
related topics. In addition, EUPM is producing a print supplement, called “Kronika 112”
(112 is the Bosnian emergency phone number).
EUPM has introduced public complaint bureaus throughout the country, where citizens
can report bribe demands or any other suspicious police activities. Once a year EUPM
conducts comprehensive public opinion surveys in which they test the messages that have
been sent out. EUPM also trains press officers of local police forces and police chiefs in
media management.
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In Bosnia and Herzegovina there is a system of liaison officers to communicate and share
information between the different EU organizations. There is a liaison officer dedicated to
EUPM in each EU organization. There are bi-weekly meetings to share security information
between all the international organizations in the so called “security awareness working
group”. That is one of the most relevant tools or systems to share information regarding
the security and safety situation.
Some interviewees complained that few people understand that information sharing
and coordination takes a considerable amount of time: “Sometimes you have some things
which cannot be e-mailed, or which have to be encrypted. All these kind of things take
time and have to be organized.”
Case study findings: dealing with challenges of frames of reference
In a complex country such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUPM needs information to be able
to put police information and crime security information in the right context, interpret it
in the right way, and identify the ways to proceed based on those interpretations. That is
why EUPM collects a large amount of political information. And not only the local and
national Bosnian political information is important, but so too is international political
information such as that related to the situation in Kosovo.
The Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities carried out an organized crime overview and
analysis, but this did not result in an accurate picture of the situation. There are many
reliability problems regarding the information that is gathered and put together by the
public administration because of different legislations, different practices and often an
unwillingness to give out information. This is not necessarily because of corruption, but
mostly caused by political preferences. The kind of information the political decision-
makers are giving out depends on which view of the security situation they want to show.
Every now and then there are some situations that are politically fueled and people are
manipulated.
Other doubts were raised as to whether the international community in Bosnia and
Herzegovina is basing its analysis on the right information. One interviewee was very
critical of the international community, arguing that they do not conduct much field-based
research. The failure of the international community to obtain information from local
people in multi-ethnic areas has led to “a gap between the Bosnian reality and the way it
is presented by the media and policy makers.”
There is a problem within EUPM concerning their institutional memory because of the
high turnover of staff. EUPM does not have information sharing tools within the mis-
sion, causing internal information management to be based on daily, weekly, and monthly
incident reports and the institutional memory to be situated in the heads of “veterans”.
Discussion of the findings
We observed two types of challenges concerning information (Table 2.1) in EUPM. First, to
cope with uncertainty, EUPM engages in different information gathering activities. They
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communicate with the local police, but as they do not have any system in place to store
information and there are cultural differences in sharing information, it is difficult to obtain
information from them. Moreover, EUPM is very active in media outreach to the citizens,
for which they created a big media department, and has installed public complaint bureaus.
Finally, EUPM has informants and liaising teams in place in the local community.
Second, it is difficult for EUPM to deal with complexity as their institutional memory
is not sufficient. EUPM also lacks an IS with a repository function to compensate for this,
which should store all information they receive. This not only leads to loss of details, but
also to problems in interpreting what is going on in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
This leads to types of challenges concerning frames of reference (Table 2.1). First,
EUPM tries to gather all kinds of contextual information, such as political information, to
create a frame of reference and thereby to cope with ambiguity. But the question is how
effective they can be at doing this, if there is no appropriate system in place.
Second, the doubts that were raised about whether the analysis of the situation is
based on the right information, is a question concerning equivocality : there are several
competing or contradictory frames of reference, and there is confusion on the appropriate
frame to use in this situation.
In Section 2.3 we discuss the implications of how these actors deal with challenges of
information and frames of reference for the design of crisis management IS.
2.2.5 Case study 4: The Democratic Republic of Congo’s
ongoing crisis
In the previous case studies we explored both the dealing with information and the dealing
with frames of reference by crisis actors. In this case study we focus on humanitarian aid
and development organizations that operate in the DRC, an African developing country
that is facing an ongoing crisis since many years. Because we conducted more interviews,
and had a chance to go more in-depth in the interviews and therefore gathered richer data,
we choose to analyze the Sensemaking behavior of our respondents through Weick (1995)’s
seven Sensemaking properties discussed in Section 1.2.1.
According to Hale (1997), a situation can be called a crisis when (a) there is a high
consequence or threat to one or more central goals, (b) there is little available time in
which to make and act upon decisions, and (c) there is a low probability of the event’s
occurrence. Organizations operating in developing countries share the first two traits with
a “normal” crisis but not the low probability of occurrence. Clear and present danger
seems to be ubiquitous. As a consequence, these organizations face circumstances that
have no real beginning and no real end, envisage constraints and objectives tending to
change continuously en cours de route, are characterized by changing staff composition,
and are running the risk of fluctuating morale and motivation. Such circumstances are
out of the ordinary and cannot be compared to normal crises. Therefore, from a research
perspective, such crises offer an attractive field laboratory for observing and understanding
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information processing and organizational decision making to the extreme. The DRC is a
quintessential example of a developing country immersed in crises.
The DRC, since the 1990s, is in a permanent state of quasi-collapse (UN Development
Group, 2007), with successive episodes of increasing violence by domestic and foreign armed
forces. The result is 3.5 million people killed and many more displaced (UN Development
Group, 2007) and a collapse of the country’s formal economy, despite the abundance of raw
materials. On the Human Development Index, the DRC ranks 168th out of 177 countries,
making it one of the least developed countries in the world (UN Development Programme,
2007). In the last few years, considerable progress has been made to the stability in
the country. Large-scale military activity ceased in early 2001, foreign forces formally
withdrew in 2002, the UN peacekeeping mission Mission des Nations Unies en République
Démocratique du Congo (MONUC) deployed more than 17,000 troops in the country,
and political stability returned a bit when in July and October 2006 the first democratic
elections were held since the colonial rule. Despite this marked progress towards recovery,
humanitarian needs remain high (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
2007). An estimated quarter of the population has critical food needs, and 71% of the
people live on less than one dollar a day (UN Development Group, 2007). Pillages, arbitrary
executions, sexual violence, torture, and recruitment of child soldiers make millions of
people flee their homes, prohibit access to food and basic health care, and cause continuous
threat of even more exploitation and assaults by the various armed groups (Médecins Sans
Frontières, 2007). In such an ongoing crisis, humanitarian aid workers continuously face
turbulence, even in the capital city of Kinshasa. Two particularly serious incidents in
August 2006 and March 2007 turned Kinshasa into a war zone with regular army troops
fighting opposition leader troops within the city and causing a genuine threat to their lives.
The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Hu-
manitarian Action Plan 2007 (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
2007) identified several constraints to the humanitarian response in the country. The en-
demic instability and insecurity in the DRC is one of the major constraints that hinder
humanitarian access to the most vulnerable people. Besides this, the scale of the country
and the poor infrastructure form a huge constraint to the humanitarian assistance. The
DRC is vast, more than two-thirds the size of Western Europe but lacks reliable trans-
port and communications infrastructure. According to the UN Development Programme
(2007), there are even less than 600 km of paved roads in the whole of the DRC. They
found that of the 10 provincial capitals, one can be accessed by land from the capital city
of Kinshasa, three can be accessed from abroad, and six can be accessed by plane. The
consequences are that there are huge difficulties and high costs involved in accessing parts
of the population and that it complicates communication and the coordination between
the head offices in Kinshasa and the field. The combination of the insecurity situation
and the logistical problems pose humanitarian actors for nearly unbridgeable difficulties in
accessing the affected population.
In the DRC, the common expectation is that bad things will happen. As Choo (2006)
states, “changes in the environment continuously generate signals and cues. Unfortunately
these messages are ambiguous and are compatible with multiple interpretations”. This is
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especially the case in ongoing crisis circumstances when there is no real end to their occur-
rence and their probability of actually happening is always high. Therefore, discontinuity
is the rule and continuity the exception, and organizations working in developing countries
need to deal with these circumstances appropriately. This has obvious implications for the
way these organizations process information and make decisions.
Studying information processing and decision making in high-hazard contexts as in the
DRC is highly relevant. First and foremost, the outcomes of such a study could lead aid
and development organizations in the DRC to establish more effective and efficient com-
munication and decision-making processes, which would ultimately benefit those people
suffering from crises. Second, a better understanding of (inter-)organizational information
and decision processes could leverage a further integration of these organizations towards
cooperation extending beyond the mere exchange of information. In other words, informa-
tion alignment could serve as a catalyst for organizational alignment.
Case study implementation
In August 2007, we6 traveled to Kinshasa, where we conducted 17 one-hour interviews
with senior level key actors in the humanitarian aid and development sector. An overview
of the interviews is provided in Appendix A.
We used the interpretive research approach as described in Section 2.2.1. Our main
purpose was to let the interviewee tell his or her own story. On the basis of what was
said, we followed up with further questions in that direction in a semistructured manner.
The semistructured questions related to Weick (1995)’s seven Sensemaking properties so
that we could better understand how interviewees made sense of their situation in this
protracted crisis context. In particular, we tried to find out how actors reached a decision,
whether they relied on previous experience, whether they relied on members of their team
or other organizations, whether this decision was evaluated during the process, to what
degree the information was accurate, what cues they focused on, etc. The interviews were
conducted in English, though at times parts were in French, the official language of the
DRC, which made the interviewees feel more relaxed. For each interview, permission for
tape-recording was granted and confidentiality was guaranteed.
Case study findings on the seven Sensemaking properties
The interviews we conducted in the DRC confirm that at the base of information pro-
cessing behavior in crises are the different Sensemaking properties by which organizations
continuously are looking to add “sense and sensibility” to assess the situation. Using
selected quotes obtained from these interviews, we illustrate in this subsection how the
organizations’ activities are permeated by the Sensemaking properties.
Social context To obtain the information they need, interviewees indicated that they
will use and contact all sources within their reach.
6Gerd Van Den Eede and Willem Muhren
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“You talk to different type of groups. You talk to the army, you talk to the
civilian authorities, you talk to the local authorities, you talk to the population,
the church, the NGOs . . . a number of parties.”
The interviewees indicated that it was very important for them to have a discussion with
their colleagues within their organization.
“You do not know everything yourself.”
“Very often I meet with the staff members and discuss topics before decisions
are made.”
“In such a big operation, it is important to work with a deputy. The fact that
we work together is very important, amongst others to create new ideas, new
thoughts, and new ways of looking at things.”
Furthermore, sharing information and discussing this with people from other organizations
was also regarded as important.
“Being with many actors, it is very important to exchange the different views
and analyze them. Very often you have a piece of information, the share of it,
so you have to put it on the table and share it with other people. In that way,
you can get some kind of a story.”
Identity construction The following quote is a good example of how the identity
of the organization defines how this actor operates. The concept of maintaining a positive
organizational image is in this respondent’s mind in everything he is doing.
(Talking about the importance of neutrality for his organization): “Maintaining
the brand of our organization is important. Internally, but also outside.”
One of the respondents saw herself as competent, important, and efficient and clearly
transmitted that message to us. Apparently, it is important to her, for her role within the
organization and to the outside world, to have this high self-esteem and act accordingly.
“As any top manager, I handle from routine issues to big issues related to policy
on any number of levels, from provincial to national.”
It was also realized by one interviewee that this has implications for the decisions that are
being made.
“[Decisions that are made] are dependent on the people who make the decisions.
If there were other people to make the same decision, the decision outcome very
well might be different.”
2.2 Case Studies 39
Retrospection When facing situations, people often guide their decisions by looking
back at previous experiences.
“Having seen the system work in Baghdad – or not work in Baghdad – I take
things with a grain of salt. My tendency is to be more cautious after what hap-
pened. So I don’t take what security people tell us at face value, for instance.”
Collective or organizational experience is evidently important for the actors, as two other
interviewees explain.
“Not only the common sense but also the experience we have – unfortunately
from the past, because we had to proceed for evacuation several times here in
Kinshasa – will tell you very rapidly whether we will proceed to an evacuation
or not.”
“Our organization has been around for quite a while, and we have been evacu-
ated on occasions in various countries. So it just becomes a matter of experience
to know when to evacuate.”
An even stronger indication of retrospection can be found in the reference to the “collective
knowledge of the humanitarian community.”
“The key is the quality of your collective knowledge: They are the history of
that war and the patterns that are played out in that war. And then you know
as we know in Eastern DRC, that historically this conflict, this war in Eastern
DRC, has led to considerable forced population displacement. You see patterns
changing a bit here and there but you do know already that what is going to
happen is that you are going to have X-numbers of people being forcefully
displaced. It has happened since 1994, 1996, 1998, and we can continue. That
is what I call collective knowledge of the humanitarian community.”
Cue extraction The actors working in the DRC pay a lot of attention to cues from
the complex environment in which they work. An important cue appears to be anything
related to the security situation. One interviewee explained his continuous search for such
cues.
“You can see a situation developing. We’re constantly monitoring the polit-
ical and military situation, being alert to indicators we’ve established. And
sometimes you just see things. Why did I see five trucks full of heavily armed
soldiers going on my way home today?”
Cues from the environment function as triggers for decision making, as another interviewee
explained.
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“What triggered a number of decisions [during the March crisis] on my part
is the fact that supermarkets and people were just closing down. When, in
Kinshasa, shop owners and taxi drivers stop, then you know it’s serious!”
Determining which information is correct and which can be trusted proves to be a challenge.
“There’s so much talk here. There are so many rumors in this country flying,
you know, at any point. It’s really difficult to know what you can trust, what
information you can trust, and what information you cannot.”
Ongoing It should not come as a surprise when respondents report a broad informa-
tion gathering activity as a basis for understanding what is going on.
“[Information that is important] it’s political, it’s the context, it’s everything.
We use all information that we can get, and assess its applicability to whatever
we’re doing.”
Different sources are consulted.
“On the operational level in the east, each agency has its own frequency and
then there’s a shared channel, and there’s also a UN security channel. Our
radio operators and guards sit there with three FM radio’s each in front of
them the whole time so they can always hear if something is going on on the
UN radio. They can always hear if something is coming through.”
Plausibility The DRC is without doubt a complex environment in which to operate.
“There are so many things happening here and sometimes we cannot respond too fast,” as
one interviewee stated. Due to the large size of the country and its poor infrastructure, it
is difficult to obtain the accurate information that is needed.
“We don’t have the feeling that we get enough information from the field. In a
big country like DRC, you cannot pretend to have all the information coming
from the field.”
This unofficial information was often termed “radio trottoir,” which is the French term for
“news from the street”. Our respondents heavily rely on this unofficial information.
“About 70% of my decisions are guided by officious information.”
“They [local people] are the best advisors, they are from the country. I don’t
run blind; I cross-check information, but I indeed act according to their infor-
mation.”
“[If the official and unofficial information is conflicting], we would give much
more credits to the officious information, to the streets.”
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All the different types of information coming in from different sources lead to information
overload. People tend to rely on their own rules of thumb for dealing with this problem.
“There is information overload. What I do, I make a confession: If a document
contains more than three pages I don’t read it. I never read anything that’s
more than three pages. There’s a lot of information, and I know that I’m
missing out a lot of information.”
Enactment It is evident from the interviews that, especially due to time constraints,
actors do not have time to list all possible courses of action and evaluate them when
decisions have to be made. Instead, they need to act upon the information they have and
thereby shape their situation.
“Sometimes you have to base your decision on uncertain information because
time is more important. In a crisis situation, you should react. You might react
wrongly, but of course you should react in a way that doesn’t harm [talking
about a crisis he faced]. So we shut the embassy to help the local people. If it
wasn’t necessary, what do you lose? A few working hours; it doesn’t cost you
very much, but if you wait it often becomes too late.”
Furthermore, one of the most characterizing observations was that for most of the
interviewees, it is important to visualize the situation in the DRC on a map, reflect on
it by consulting it from time to time, indicating specific operational areas or events, and
highlighting important areas with a marker or inserting flags.
Discussion of the findings
These findings show that the DRC is a developing country suffering from an ongoing
crisis that affects the daily routines of any organization operating in the country. These
circumstances create a precarious environment in which organizations need to conduct
their daily routines and be continuously on guard for any signs of imminent disruption
or increasing threat. As argued before, Sensemaking theory is focused on answering the
question, “what is going on?” (Weick, 1993). Knowing what is going on is an essential
prerequisite for response as otherwise organizations may not know why or how to respond.
The results presented above illustrate that Sensemaking is a critical, ongoing activity
for the actors we interviewed. Moreover, it shows that actors in the DRC also cross
their organizational boundaries to make sense of their situation by making use of the
interorganizational network.
In Subsection 2.1.2 we argued that when operating in an environment of continuous threat
and risk of a new acute emergency, organizations focus on information gathering from
different sources, review and update where needed their organizational crisis memory, and
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verify the scope and nature of the continuously changing crisis situation and the validity
of information they have available through coordination mechanisms in their network.
In the next section we compare our Sensemaking findings from this case and the more
general information processing findings from the previously discussed cases to the premises
underlying the design of crisis management IS.
2.3 Design of Crisis Management Information
Systems
The first three case studies gave us insight into how actors cope with information processing
challenges in various crisis situations, and the fourth case study gave us more understanding
of how Sensemaking works in a crisis. But what can we learn from this for the design of
IS for crisis management? To answer this question, we examine IS design guidelines for
crisis management as developed for a DERMIS (Turoff et al., 2004) to support the response
to crises, and compare these guidelines to our findings on dealing with information and
frames of reference (case studies 1–3) and the presence of Sensemaking properties (case
study 4). Because we focus on the information, information processing, decision making
and Sensemaking aspects of crisis management, we use the seven out of the nine DERMIS
design premises for this discussion which have been illustrated in Table 2.2. As mentioned
in Subsection 2.1.2, we do not include the other two DERMIS design premises on roles and
training in our analysis.
DERMIS’ design premise 1, “information focus”, clearly is about dealing with informa-
tion, specifically on dealing with complexity. On the one hand, IS should enable users to
obtain the full context of what is happening. On the other hand, IS should protect its users
from information overload. In the Barents Rescue Exercise, some actors argued that they
need detailed information, while others just wanted the most relevant information. The
premise on information focus is about filtering out information so actors work with the level
of information that is most suitable and/or preferable to them. The people working for
EUPM experienced the problem that there is much information “out there”, but that there
are no systems in place to make use of that information and analyze it. Design premise
1 also focuses on the importance of creating a good picture of what is going on by giving
actors access to all contextual information. This overview will aid in creating a suitable
frame of reference, as we saw at EUPM where police information, criminal intelligence,
and political information is collected from all around the country and is used as contextual
information to construct good frames of reference for their operations. As we have seen in
the DRC, humanitarian actors face the same trade-off between obtaining the full context
and avoiding information overload. They try to obtain all possible information, but this
has led them to a situation in which there was too much information to process and thereby
possibly important information has not been taken into consideration. Therefore, they are
continuously forced to act on plausible information. The DERMIS premise of information
focus is reflected in the Sensemaking properties of ongoing and plausibility.
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DERMIS’ design premise 2, “crisis memory”, only supports dealing with frames of ref-
erence: by having access to historical information on the situation, actors will have the
foundation for establishing a suitable frame of reference. In the Barents Rescue Exercise,
respondents have explicitly mentioned the importance of experience in crisis situations.
EUPM actors also acknowledge that experience is important, but face problems of crisis
memory due to high staff turnover. The ANPC in Portugal makes sure that the lessons
learned from a crisis are incorporated into their procedures, in order to improve their
response to following crises. The Sensemaking property of retrospection supports the ar-
gument to enable learning from prior experience, as was perhaps most strikingly expressed
by an interviewee’s observation in the DRC on the importance of the collective (crisis)
memory of the humanitarian community.
DERMIS’ design premise 3, “exceptions as norms”, also only deals with managing
frames of reference, as it stresses that almost everything in a crisis is out of the ordinary
and cannot be planned for. Hence, it refers to the fact that there cannot be one frame
of reference for a crisis situation. You cannot know in advance what will happen in a
crisis and how it will evolve over time. Instead, flexible systems are needed that adapt
to the changing conditions and that support changing frames of reference. Planning for a
crisis is therefore difficult, and expectations of other actors – perhaps guided by previous
experiences, agreements, or “common sense” as perceived by one side – are not always met,
as Norwegian and Finnish actors experienced in the Barents Rescue Exercise. As indeed the
exception is the norm in a permanent crisis as in the DRC, our results indicate that actors
are mostly not able to foresee what will happen in such a rapidly changing environment,
and they will continuously try to extract cues from the environment (the Sensemaking
properties of cue extraction and ongoing) to make sense of their situation and are forced to
act upon plausible information (the Sensemaking property of plausibility). IS could assist
actors in this cue extraction with data mining and outlier detection (Song, 2005).
DERMIS’ design premise 4, “scope and nature of crisis”, states that the way of acting
in a particular crisis depends on the type of situation. This design premise is overarching
for our case studies, and is reflected by the different types of management of the crises we
saw in the case studies and the taxonomy shown in Table 2.3. Crises differ in their nature
and their scope, and to counteract this, the associated management of the crisis – either
it is prevention, response or recovery – must be adapted to that situation. According to
Sensemaking, actors are continuously relating their situation to what is happening through
“ongoing” and “cue extraction.” This is also related to the Sensemaking property of
“identity construction”: the Sensemaker is, in continuous interaction with the environment,
seeking to discover what he or she thinks and knows about the crisis situation.
At first sight, DERMIS’ design premise 5, “information validity and timeliness”, only
seems to be about supporting the coping with uncertainty, as it describes the “usual” sit-
uation that there is incomplete information. This point was made by the people in the
OSOCC at the Barents Rescue Exercise, as they stressed the importance of continuous
up-to-date information on the situation. In the Portuguese case study we have seen that
the Forest Services were continuously gathering information on fire risks and were making
it available to everybody by means of fire hazard maps. The importance of information
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validity revealed itself in the observation of redundant information exchange behavior at
the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection. However, design premise 5 is also about
organizing all information available, enabling actors to construct the best possible frame
of reference. In Portugal we have seen the example of the use of media to provide citizens
with timely information that they should be careful with combustible materials and the
use of fire, and the new concept that in winter fires can be good. In Bosnia and Herze-
govina, actors have to be careful for manipulation of their frames of reference through
other parties’ partial or biased information sharing, mostly caused by political preferences.
The Sensemaking properties of plausibility and cue extraction are directly related to our
observations in the DRC that actors base their decisions on information that is available
to them, information that is usually not up to date, inaccurate, incomplete, or incorrect.
We observed that actors base their decisions on an inaccurate picture of what is happening
and use unofficial information, such as “radio trottoir”, in order to understand what is
going on.
DERMIS’ design premise 6, “free exchange of information”, is also intended to support
dealing with both information and frames of reference. Design premise 6 is about the
importance of the social context that is used to gather and exchange information. In the
Barents Rescue Exercise there was no free exchange of information between the important
actors, such as between OSOCC and LEMA. In Portugal, the Forest Services experienced
problems of acquiring up-to-date information for their fire hazard maps. Cultural differ-
ences, fear of political and criminal infiltration, and etnic barriers made free exchange of
information nearly impossible in the post-conflict setting of EUPM. But we also observed
good examples of free exchange of information, such as CECIS which allows actors to share
information on the crisis situation, and ANPC’s use of the media to reach out swiftly to
the citizens. The social context is also used to compare frames of reference. Free exchange
of information for this purpose was hampered in the Barents Rescue Exercise by physical
separation of key actors without sufficient IS support to overcome this, and the involve-
ment of actors using different languages and having different cultures. In the Portuguese
case study we saw interpretation problems arising from a lack of standardized language in
CECIS. There was however an example of a good infrastructure for exchanging informa-
tion in the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection, that led to better familiarity of
the other countries’ problems, resources, and capabilities. In the DRC we also observed
the importance of having access to the relevant information sources and expertise in crisis
situations. However, actors mostly do not know which source to consult or do not have
access to it, due to physical limitations (e.g., lack of IT infrastructure), cultural, or security
barriers. Evidently, and notable through the use of informal contacts, our results show that
people use all information sources they have access to.
Finally, DERMIS’ design premise 7, “coordination”, directly relates to response activi-
ties when a crisis occurs and the responsibilities of various actors. During the preparedness
phase of a permanent crisis, this premise can be understood as the wide array of arrange-
ments and spontaneous actions, both formally and informally, that are made within and
among organizations to make sense of the environment. This is best illustrated in our
results through the presence and abundant use of the social context Sensemaking property.
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2.4 Chapter Conclusions
In this chapter we have explored four common information processing challenges in different
crisis situations. Although all information processing challenges were present in the case
studies, some challenges were more common in specific situations. At the airplane crash
in the Barents Rescue Exercise there were at first many uncertainty related information
problems. As this was a sudden crisis, actors obviously did not know what was happening
in the first stages of the crisis. In the EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina we observed that
the main problem was dealing with complexity, as a lot of information is gathered but
cannot be analyzed and processed adequately due to a lack of systems and procedures.
We observed that the common trend in these crisis situations was that actors at first
focus on information related problems, especially uncertainty problems of acquiring infor-
mation, and then shift to strategies of coping with the complexity of too much information.
This is an interesting finding and needs to be validated in future research. IS traditionally
play a significant role in these areas of information related problems, as they can support
people in storing, retrieving, and analyzing huge amounts of data. This can be considered
to be the realm of Decision Support Systems (DSS).
The dealing with challenges of ambiguity and equivocality was mentioned less often.
For an ongoing crisis situation as the forest fires in Portugal, we saw the importance of
providing citizens with frames of reference. By supporting them in their situations of
ambiguity, more severe forest fires can be prevented as people learn how to handle and
prevent them, and people do not start to panic immediately when they see a fire on
television. Usually, however, the dealing with challenges of ambiguity and equivocality is
not the specific aim of the actors, as they handle them more implicitly. For these challenges
it is less important to search for more information. Rather, people try to manage their
frames of reference for interpreting the information by activities of Sensemaking.
In Sensemaking, we found a theory enabling us to analyze and understand information
processes of networked organizations operating in the DRC where information is often
volatile, frugal, or unofficial and therefore difficult to assess and process for decision making.
Here, Sensemaking gave us insight into the black box of information processing and allowed
us to understand how actors go about with the characteristic gappiness of an ongoing crisis.
In the interviews we conducted, all of the Sensemaking properties could be recognized,
indicating that Sensemaking is deeply rooted within the real life experiences of international
aid and development organizations operating in the DRC.
When we compared our findings to the DERMIS design premises, we found that all
seven investigated premises in some way contribute to the support of the dealing with
frames of reference, and have illustrated that all Sensemaking properties are reflected in the
DERMIS premises for designing IS. If crisis management systems are designed to support
access to all contextual information (design premise 1) and storage of historical information
and incorporation of lessons learned (design premise 2), actors are supported to construct
good frames of reference; if these systems are designed to be flexible during the response
(design premise 3) and adaptable to the nature and scope of the crisis (design premise 4),
actors are supported to update and change their frames of reference. Finally, as general
46 Chapter 2. A Call for Sensemaking Support Systems in Crisis Management
requirements, if systems facilitate interaction and collaboration by supporting timely and
valid information exchange (design premise 5) without any impediments (design premise 6),
enabling effective coordination (design premise 7), actors are supported to create, compare,
update, and change their frames of reference.
Consequently, actors in crises could enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of their
interactions on the condition that they could rely on IS that support the natural cogni-
tive process flow rather than suppress it. For that reason, IS that are designed according
to the premises outlined in this chapter would constitute a leverage for a stronger, more
stable, and more genuine inter- and intra-organizational collaboration in the field of crisis
response. We have argued that such is not unrealistic when network members experience
the advantages of Sensemaking Support Systems (SSS) which enlarge their network, leave
room for their identity construction without the straitjacket of blind accuracy and prede-
fined decision making tracks, have the flexibility to diverge and converge on the fly, and
test small hypotheses taking into account lessons learned (Van Den Eede et al., 2008b;
Muhren et al., 2007).
The results of our exploratory case-based research provide arguments to counter We-
ick’s original and then justified criticism on the lack of Sensemaking support in IS design,
and at the same time demonstrate the continuous struggle for crisis actors to make sense
in practice. We expect our findings to encourage IS researchers and practitioners to de-
velop and implement IS to support the Sensemaking properties and at the same time the
DERMIS design premises.
Chapter 3
Making Sense of Media Synchronicity
in Humanitarian Crises∗
Calamitas virtutis occasio est.
Seneca
The context of humanitarian crises is a particularly fertile soil for communication research.
Processes are magnified because of their ultimate life-saving objective. Moreover, strin-
gent time dimensions offer an interesting perspective because people are often forced to
act immediately. For these reasons, the theoretical and practical relevance of studying
communication in a humanitarian crisis context is high and has important consequences,
particularly for the design of IS aimed at supporting it. Because humanitarian actors face
Sensemaking and communication problems in times of crises and because communication
and Sensemaking seem to be two interwoven processes, both should underlie the design of
supporting IS in humanitarian environments.
Media Synchronicity Theory (MST) matches media capabilities to the relevant commu-
nication processes and can therefore be used to study communication performance (Dennis
et al., 2008). In this chapter, we emphasize the Sensemaking processes underlying MST
and apply these in the context of a humanitarian crisis. For this purpose, we have studied
communication challenges from a Sensemaking point of view in the DRC (in accordance
with research question 4) and show how media capabilities fit a Sensemaker’s communi-
cation needs in the humanitarian environment of the DRC (in accordance with research
question 5). The answers to the research questions are formulated in Chapter 6.
This chapter is outlined as follows. In Section 3.1 we discuss MST. In Section 3.2
we show how Sensemaking provides three important insights for MST, and propose an
integration of both frameworks in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4 we describe the case study we
conducted in the DRC. In Section 3.5 we describe our research methodology. We continue
with the presentation of the data we gathered in Section 3.6, and discuss these data in
∗This chapter is based to a great extent on Muhren, Van Den Eede, and Van de Walle (2009)
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Section 3.7. Finally, in Section 3.8 we formulate conclusions and implications for theory
and practice.
3.1 Media Synchronicity Theory
Literature on the use of media is characterized by many theories, two of which are Media
Richness Theory (MRT) and MST. Below we discuss both of them.
MRT argues that organizations process information in order to manage uncertainty
and equivocality effectively and that communication media should be selected according
to the specific situation at hand (Daft and Lengel, 1986; Daft et al., 1987). Communication
media vary in their capacity to process rich information, with information richness being
“the ability of information to change understanding within a time interval” (Daft and
Lengel, 1986). Two important conclusions of MRT are (1) that rich media (e.g., face-
to-face communication) are better suited to reducing equivocality, and (2) that media of
low richness (e.g., documents) are better suited to reducing uncertainty (Daft and Lengel,
1986). However, studies have not found unequivocal support for MRT when “newer”
media (e.g., computer-mediated communication and video communication) were examined
(Dennis and Kinney, 1998).
MST was initiated by Dennis and his colleagues to overcome the limitations of MRT
(Dennis et al., 2008; Dennis and Valacich, 1999). MST is not a theory of media choice
as MRT is, but rather focuses on communication performance, particularly on the ability
of media to support synchronicity for an improved communication performance. Media
synchronicity is defined in MST as “the extent to which the capabilities of a communication
medium enable individuals to achieve synchronicity,” with synchronicity being “a state in
which individuals are working together at the same time with a common focus” (Dennis
et al., 2008).
In MST, communication is used as a synonym for the development of shared under-
standing in the context of a specific task. MST suggests that supporting media should fit
two fundamental communication processes: (1) conveyance processes leading to individual
understanding and (2) convergence processes leading to shared understanding. Communi-
cation media should not only support the transmission of information, but also the man-
ifestation of meaning (Sutcliffe, 2001; Sitkin et al., 1992). Dennis et al. (2008) introduce
in MST two subprocesses necessary for the conveyance and convergence communication
process: (1) information transmission and (2) information processing. The communication
process shown in Figure 3.1 is based on Shannon and Weaver (1949)’s classical theory of
communication. The process starts with the source, the sender of a message, who uses a
transmitter to encode the message into a signal. The message is sent over a communication
channel (medium) to a receiver, which is used by the recipient (destination) to decode the
signal back to the original message.
Moreover, Dennis et al. (2008) introduce five media capabilities that influence informa-
tion processing and transmission: information transmission is influenced by transmission
velocity, parallelism, and symbol sets, while information processing is influenced by re-




















Figure 3.1: Communication process and media capabilities, adapted from Dennis et al. (2008)
hearsability and reprocessability.
First, the media capability of transmission velocity refers to “the speed at which a
medium can deliver a message to intended recipients” (Dennis et al., 2008). Media sup-
porting a high degree of transmission velocity can approach continuous exchange between
people.
The second media capability is parallelism: the number of simultaneous transmissions,
from multiple senders, that can effectively take place. This influences the quantity of infor-
mation that can be transmitted in a certain time period. The advantage of high parallelism
is that messages can be transmitted and received simultaneously, without having to wait
until the channel is clear or open (Weick, 1990). However, high parallelism can also lead
to information overload, since messages pile up for the recipient to process.
Third, the media capability of symbol sets refers to “the number of ways in which
a medium allows information to be encoded for communication” (Dennis et al., 2008).
Media can allow for natural symbol sets, such as physical gestures, visual signs, or verbal
communication, and less-natural symbol sets, such as written or typed communication.
Although symbol sets also influence the ease with which information can be processed,
they mainly impact the transmission of information (Dennis et al., 2008).
Fourth, rehearsability is defined as “the extent to which the media enables the sender to
rehearse or fine tune a message before sending” (Dennis et al., 2008). By using media with
a high degree of rehearsability, the sender has time to think of how the message can best
be understood by the recipient. This can also be a disadvantage, since carefully rehearsing
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the message creates a delay before the transmission is even started.
Finally, when the message has been transmitted, the media capability of reprocessabil-
ity plays an important role, “the extent to which the medium enables a message to be
reexamined or processed again” (Dennis et al., 2008). With a high degree of reprocessabil-
ity, the recipient has the ability to consult the content of the message either during the
communication process or at a later stage. Therefore, this could lead to delays in decoding
the signal and, consequently, delays in the following transmission of information.
These five media capabilities influence synchronicity for conveyance and convergence
processes (Dennis et al., 2008). As indicated in Table 3.1, transmission velocity and symbol
sets have a positive impact on a medium’s capability to support synchronicity, while paral-
lelism, rehearsability, and reprocessability have a negative impact on a medium’s capability
to support synchronicity. MST suggests that for improved performance of conveyance pro-
cesses, people need low synchronicity media because “conveyance focuses on the transmis-
sion of large amounts of raw information and subsequent retrospective analysis, suggesting
that an individual will have less of a need to transmit and process information at the same
time” (Dennis et al., 2008). In addition, “to transmit information and enable analysis typ-
ical of conveyance, individuals do not need to work together or at the same time” (Dennis
et al., 2008). Conveyance processes require more time for individuals to deliberate and to
come up with their interpretations (Robert and Dennis, 2005). Conversely, Dennis et al.
(2008) argue that “using media with higher synchronicity for conveyance processes (which
require deliberation) may impair development of understanding because individuals will
not have the time required to fully process the information” and that this will “encourage
premature action”. People will therefore only need high synchronicity media for improved
performance of convergence processes, since “individuals will have a greater need to quickly
transmit and process smaller volumes of information to develop a shared understanding”
(Dennis et al., 2008).
Table 3.1: MST’s media capability characteristics for low and high synchronicity
Transmission Paral- Symbol Rehear- Reprocess-
Examples
Velocity lelism Sets sability ability
Low Synchro- Low- Medium- Few- Medium- Medium- Voice mail,
nicity Media Medium High Medium High High documents, fax
High Synchro- Medium- Low- Medium- Low- Low- Face-to-face,
nicity Media High Medium Many Medium Medium video conference
3.2 MST and Sensemaking
In their initial development of MST, Dennis and Valacich (1999) incorporate earlier work
by Weick (1985) and Weick and Meader (1993) on Sensemaking. However, in their most
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recent and most extensive work on MST, they only mention this work circuitously (Dennis
et al., 2008). No reference is made to the more mature work on Sensemaking that has
been developed after 1993, as summarized before. However, the more recent work on
Sensemaking provides three new and important insights for MST.
A first insight of Sensemaking, as we have discussed in Subsection 1.2.2, is that com-
munication is not necessarily undertaken to reach shared understanding. Shared under-
standing can be the objective of Sensemaking by teams (Miranda and Saunders, 2003;
Crowston et al., 2007; Nosek and McNeese, 1997; Kock and Nosek, 2005); however, this is
not necessarily the objective of Sensemaking by individuals who make sense on the level of
intersubjectivity and undertake social endeavors to negotiate their individual point of view,
try to obtain new personal insights, and review their previous personal understanding.
Second, Sensemaking requires a broader view on the communication process than Shan-
non and Weaver (1949)’s classical scheme of the communication process, which starts with
a sender and ends at a recipient. Sensemaking begins when people face an equivocal situ-
ation and have no idea of what is happening. As people struggle to make sense, they will
not know who they should turn to or who will give them an answer to their questions.
Sensemaking starts by defining who the sender is and who the recipient is.
Third, MST suggests that conveyance is a process that is performed from a certain
beginning to an end with individual understanding as the outcome. It also suggests that
people need low synchronicity media to be relatively undisturbed when reaching their
understanding. An interruption of the conveyance process by enactment is considered to
be “premature” (Dennis et al., 2008). Recent work on Sensemaking – as exemplified by
the Sensemaking properties discussed in Subsection 1.2.1 – indicates, however, that con-
veyance is ongoing, with neither a beginning nor an end, and that “premature” acting is a
necessary weapon on a person’s quest for understanding. Conveyance, therefore, does not
take a fixed amount of time but is ongoing in nature and characterized by social interaction
and enactment. Low synchronicity media may not provide for the best support in this case.
This research addresses these newly obtained Sensemaking insights for MST. In the remain-
der of this chapter, we study communication when the objective is individual understanding
rather than shared understanding. Hence, we focus on the conveyance processes. We pro-
vide an integrative view of the communication process through the Sensemaking processes
that underlie MST. We describe the case study in the DRC, touched upon in the previous
chapter but more extensively discussed and analyzed in this chapter. Here, we analyze
communication from this Sensemaking perspective, and we show that low synchronicity
media will not provide for the best support when striving for individual understanding
through conveyance.
3.3 Towards an Integration of Sensemaking and MST
Our objective here is to detail and document the conveyance process of MST by placing
Sensemaking – particularly the Sensemaking properties – in a communication perspective
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and integrating it with MST. As shown in Figure 3.2, we organize the seven Sensemaking














Figure 3.2: Sensemaking communication activities and their main underlying Sensemaking
properties
Noticing is characterized by the Sensemaking property of cue extraction. How do peo-
ple sense what is “out there”? People cannot pay attention to everything that is going
on in the environment. Instead, they focus on specific cues. Noticing is “an awareness of
environmental stimuli,” and communication plays an important role in it (Sutcliffe, 2001).
The process of noticing stimuli can be both through formal and informal communication
channels and either voluntarily or involuntarily performed by the Sensemaker. Environ-
mental stimuli can be noticed through the Sensemaker’s own efforts and observations, or
through other people in the organization who acquire information about the environment
and communicate it to him or her (Sutcliffe, 2001). The Sensemaker can also notice or
observe other people’s communicative events to refine his or her own mental model of the
situation. Since the Sensemaker is mostly only on the recipient side of the information
exchange, the role of communication is more passive in this case.
Interacting, and the inherent communication between interacting people, corresponds
to the social dimension of Sensemaking, as it is through talk, discourse, and conversation
that a large part of social contact is mediated (Weick, 1995). Individual perceptions and
interpretations are influenced significantly by social information processes (Sutcliffe, 2001).
In order to reduce equivocality, people engage in communication to understand what other
people think: “The basic mode of Sensemaking is discourse, for it is through talk that
organizational members find out what others think, and it is through talk that people
persuade and negotiate their points of view”(Choo, 2006, p.77).
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The third communication activity is enacting, characterized by the Sensemaking prop-
erties of enactment and plausibility. As Weick et al. (2005) write, “if the first question of
Sensemaking is ‘what’s going on here?’ the second, equally important question is ‘what do
I do next?’ This second question is directly about action”. People enact the environments
that constrain them (Weick, 1988): “The pursuit of action generates new information and
increases the opportunities for communication that helps executives modify erroneous un-
derstandings and allows them to update previously held inaccurate perceptions” (Sutcliffe,
2001). Moreover, enactment also enables people to understand better their cognitive pro-
cesses: “People in organizations are continually engaged in talk in order to find out what
they are thinking and to construct interpretations of what they are doing” (Choo, 2006,
p.83).
With the activity of interpreting, characterized by the Sensemaking properties of iden-
tity construction and retrospection, we refer to the process of making sense of what is
noticed, socially constructed, and enacted upon: “Communication is critical to the con-
struction of information filters through which information is interpreted” (Sutcliffe, 2001).
The resulting interpretation will heavily depend on who the Sensemaker is and who he or
she strives to be, while keeping in mind the goals and image of the organization. Previ-
ous experiences of the Sensemaker and the institutional memory of the organization – an
important component of crisis management – will play an important role as well and can
take the form of stories and narratives (Weick, 1988).
Since Sensemaking is inherently an ongoing process, we do not attribute the remaining
Sensemaking “ongoing” property to any specific communication activity. As such, we
accentuate that the communication activities of noticing, interacting, and enacting do not
form a linear sequence, but rather are intertwined with each other. Similarly, interpreting
is not a separate activity, but Sensemakers are continuously interpreting while they are
noticing, interacting, and enacting.
The Sensemaking communication activities of noticing, interacting, and enacting re-
quire the transmission of information. Information transmission is, as we know from MST,
supported by the media capabilities of transmission velocity, parallelism, and symbol sets.
Consequently, these media capabilities should also support the Sensemaking communica-
tion activities of noticing, interacting, and enacting. Similarly, we assert that the interpret-
ing Sensemaking communication activity should be supported by the rehearsability and
reprocessability media capabilities, as shown in Figure 3.3. This integrated model will be
analyzed through a case study in the DRC.





























Figure 3.3: Integrated model of MST and Sensemaking
3.4 Case Study in the Democratic Republic of Congo1
Humanitarian environments are characterized by ongoing crises, causing a continuous
stream of cosmology episodes of which organizations need to make sense (Muhren et al.,
2008b). Therefore, the relevance of studying how their information and communication
processes can be improved is high (Bartell et al., 2006; Maiers et al., 2005). We have
conducted a case study in the DRC to investigate how top managers of humanitarian
organizations make sense of their situation and how they can be supported in doing this.
The DRC has a political history of colonization and dictatorship, and has frequently
been torn apart through wars with neighboring countries and internal wars between the
different ethnic communities. Despite being a naturally rich country, with minerals such
as gold, diamond, and copper, the country’s formal economy has virtually collapsed in
the last few decades, from a GDP per capita of US$ 380 (in constant dollars) in 1960,
US$ 224 in 1990, to just US$ 139 in 2006, leaving only nine countries in the world behind
on the measurement of human development (UN Development Programme, 2007; World
Bank, 2007). Furthermore, especially in the east of the country, people are suffering from
conflict.
In 2000, the UN Security Council decided to deploy a peacekeeping mission, MONUC,
1We provided a basic description of this same case in Chapter 2; Here we provide additional background
information, a more in-depth discussion of the research methodology, and a different analysis of the findings.
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to the DRC. There were good hopes that the armed conflict would be halted after the
involvement of the UN, the democratic elections in July and October 2006 (President
Joseph Kabila winning by a small margin over his main challenger Jean-Pierre Bemba),
and the subsequent disarmament process, but fighting between militia groups and the
Armed Forces of the DRC continued.
There are many organizations deployed in the DRC to address the humanitarian needs
of the population. However, the sheer size of the country and its poor infrastructure
increase the difficulty for humanitarian organizations to provide the necessary assistance
to people who need it. Moreover, humanitarian actors continuously face crisis situations in
their work, even in the capital city of Kinshasa. Two incidents characterize this turbulent
and dynamic environment: one incident after the elections in August 2006 and a second
incident in March 2007.
On August 20, 2006, the day the preliminary results of the first democratic elections
after DRC’s colonial period were announced, Jean-Pierre Bemba was on his way to his
television station to deliver a statement when troops loyal to Joseph Kabila started fighting
with Bemba’s troops. Both parties started using heavy weapons against each other in
the center of Kinshasa. The next day the fighting continued, with members of Kabila’s
presidential guard attacking Bemba’s home while he was meeting ambassadors.
On March 22, 2007, violence erupted in Kinshasa again between Bemba’s personal
guards and the national army when Bemba rejected Kabila’s ultimatum to integrate his
guards into the national army. Bemba’s Movement for the Liberation of Congo did not
want to agree to this demand since its members believed that their leader was in danger
and would need protection. Bemba thereafter took refuge in the South African embassy
in Kinshasa.
3.5 Research Methodology
Weick et al. (2005) state that “methodologically, it is hard to find people in the act of
coping with disconfirmations that catch them unawares”. Therefore, in order to understand
how people make sense in a crisis and how they can be supported by IS, the case study
was conducted from an interpretive perspective, drawing on the philosophical stance of
hermeneutics (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Klein and Myers, 1999; Mingers, 1984; Stake,
2005).
Interpretive research has the potential to produce deep insights into IS phenomena as it
is “aimed at producing an understanding of the context of the information system, and the
process whereby the information system influences and is influenced by the context” (Wal-
sham, 1993, pp.4-5). Interpretive research attempts to accomplish this by understanding
phenomena through the meanings that people assign to them, thereby assuming that our
knowledge of reality is gained only through social constructions (Klein and Myers, 1999;
Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991). Interpretive research has a nondeterministic perspective,
intending to increase understanding of phenomena within a specific cultural and contextual
setting (Walsham, 1995a).
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It is not possible to obtain value-free data in interpretive research because data are
socially constructed: “The inquirer uses his or her preconceptions in order to guide the
process of inquiry, and furthermore the researcher interacts with the human subjects of
the inquiry, changing the perceptions of both parties” (Walsham, 1995a). Therefore, re-
searchers should be wary of two commonly occurring shortcomings in interpretive field
research in IS: (1) insufficient attention to critical reflection on how the research materials
were socially constructed through interaction between the researchers and the participants
in the field studies and (2) unwarranted theoretical bias in researchers’ interpretations of
the field data (Schultze et al., 2000; Walsham, 1995b).
In order to minimize these shortcomings, our approach is based on Walsham (1993,
1995a,b, 2006)’s work on interpretivism in IS research and Klein and Myers (1999)’s
principles for interpretive case study research in IS.
The following subsections provide a detailed description of how field data were collected
(Subsection 3.5.1) and analyzed (Subsection 3.5.2).
3.5.1 Data collection
In August 2007, we2 traveled to the capital city of the DRC, Kinshasa, where we con-
ducted 17 interviews with top managers working at the DRC’s national head office of their
respective organizations. We conducted interviews at the UN organizations, governmental
organizations, and nongovernmental humanitarian organizations listed in Table 3.2. Al-
though the ICRC is essentially nongovernmental, its administration does not want it to
be called a Non Governmental Organization (NGO) due to its unique role granted in the
Geneva Conventions. Thus, the second group of organizations in Table 3.2 is labeled “hu-
manitarian organizations” and not merely “NGOs”. All of these organizations work in the
DRC to improve the country’s humanitarian situation.
Throughout the preparation for the case study and the time spent in the DRC in
between the interviews, data and understanding of the situation were supplemented by
other types of field data, such as reports published by humanitarian organizations and the
UN, background stories on websites, press articles on the humanitarian situation in the
DRC, and informal interaction with local Congolese people.
All interviews were conducted in a familiar surrounding for the respondents: either
in their office or in a general meeting room of their respective organization. To get the
respondents to relax and to increase the quality of the interview (for example, in terms of
honesty of response), we initiated each interview by reassuring the respondent about the
purpose of the research and the confidentiality of the interview (Walsham, 2006). In the
first few minutes, we introduced each other and explained the purpose of our visit. Then,
often, the respondents inquired about our experiences so far in the DRC, the people whom
we met thus far, and our plans for cultural activities before leaving the country. This short
informal talk broke the ice and seemed to make the respondents feel at ease. We asked for
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Table 3.2: Overview of organizations in the DRC of which we interviewed senior staff
Organization type Organization
UN organizations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
Mission of the UN in the DRC (MONUC)
UN Development Programme (UNDP)
World Food Programme (WFP)
World Health Organization (WHO)
UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
UN Population Fund (UNFPA)
NGO/humanitarian Association pour la Santé Familiale (ASF)
organizations Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) Belgium
Save the Children
Oxfam GB
Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
Governmental Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)
organizations European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO)
UK Department for International Development (DFID)
Belgian Embassy
permission to tape-record the interview and guaranteed participants confidentiality before
the “real” interview began, and participants granted permission without exception.
In the remainder of the interview, which took on average one hour, we applied a
semistructured interview technique consisting of questions related to Weick’s seven Sense-
making properties as the primary evidence-generation mechanism (Weick, 1995). The main
recurring theme in the interviews was the respondents’ experiences with cosmology episodes
encountered in their work in the DRC, since it was at these occasions that people could
have a sudden loss of meaning and that Sensemaking processes could be most obvious. The
August 2006 and March 2007 incidents were brought up frequently by our respondents.
In the interviews, the focus was mostly on situation-related matters indicating what the
respondents needed and how they acted in a crisis situation, with less emphasis on work-
specific matters, such as which humanitarian projects they conducted in the country and
how they found out where the humanitarian problems were.
We conducted the interviews in a provocative style, using statements, metaphors, and
dilemmas, and mainly letting the respondents do the talking about how they made sense of
their environment. We adjusted questions according to respondent personality, world view,
experience, and language, allowing the respondents to talk from their own phenomenolog-
ical world (cf. Walker, 2006). We conducted most of the interviews in English. Because
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one of the interviewers3 is fluent in French, the official language of the DRC, we had the
flexibility to switch to some of the respondents’ native language, which proved to be useful
to clarify some questions when necessary and to make the respondents feel more comfort-
able. The respondents were actively stimulated to give examples and anecdotes and to call
upon their memory. Credibility, which refers to the “truth, value, or believability of the
findings that have been established,” (Leininger, 1994, p.105) was ensured throughout the
interviews by summarizing and restating key elements of what the respondents said.
We interacted in turns with each respondent. While one of us was in dialog with the
respondent, the other would be able to concentrate on the big picture and think of how
to proceed with the interview. In addition to the tape-recording of the interview, we took
notes on the important points of what was said. Because we conducted the interviews
in pairs, we were able to follow Walsham’s recommendation to undertake a critique of
each others style and sensitivity when deemed necessary after an interview. This method
helped shape the interview approach into a “non-judgmental form of listening” (Walsham,
1995b). Realizing that the humanitarian top managers freed up their valuable time for these
interviews, we also followed Walsham’s advice about being sensitive to time pressures when
fixing a suitable interview time and being especially flexible to finishing early when feeling
that respondents were pressured by time, rather than irritate them by taking too much of
their time (cf. Walsham, 2006). This approach resulted in a rich collection of experiences,
providing for an in-depth analysis of the information and communication needs of the
actors in the DRC.
3.5.2 Data analysis
The analysis of the data consisted of two steps. The first step was to transcribe all relevant
parts of the interviews, in which “relevant” is defined as any sequence in the interview in
which the respondents were describing crisis situations, their use and needs of IS, and
how they make sense of their situation in general and in crisis situations specifically. As
the questions in the interviews were structured around Sensemaking, the field data re-
vealed many examples of how the respondents make sense in their humanitarian response
activities, specifically, when they face a crisis situation.
As our goal was to study the role of communication when making sense of a crisis,
the second step in the analysis phase was to extract all quotations from the transcripts
referring to communication behavior, communication needs, and communication support
in crisis situations. These data were analyzed according to the predefined Sensemaking
communication activities. In order to prevent one of the main pitfalls in interpretive
research, seeing only what the theory suggests, we attempted to “preserve a considerable
degree of openness to the field data, and a willingness to modify initial assumptions and
theories” (Walsham, 1995b). Hence, all the quotations related to a specific communication
activity were grouped together, and new labels were created for groups that did not fit into
one of these types. In case a quotation referred to more than one type of communication
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activity, it was added to the group to which it was considered to be the best fit. The
quotations discussed in this chapter were selected based on their representativeness of the
interviews conducted as well as the richness of the experience they describe.
Since we digitally recorded and transcribed the interviews and because we comple-
mented the interviews with notes, information about the respondents, and pictures of the
interview locations, the ability to confirm evidence from primary information sources (i.e.,
confirmability) was ensured (Leininger, 1994).
3.6 Empirical Data
In the data-analysis process, we identified groups of quotations that refer to the Sensemak-
ing communication activities of noticing, interacting, and enacting. Within the activity of
interacting, we defined five specific subcategories. As the activity of interpreting cannot
be shown explicitly, no specific quotations could be selected for this activity, yet they are
implicitly present in the other communication activities.
While for confidentiality purposes we reveal here no information that could potentially
identify the source of the quotation, we indicate whether the source of each quotation
is a respondent from a governmental organization [GOV], a UN organization [UN], or a
nongovernmental humanitarian organization [HUM], as previously categorized in Table 3.2.
In Subsection 3.6.1 we present quotations that refer to the Sensemaking communication ac-
tivity of noticing. In Subsection 3.6.2 we present quotations that refer to the Sensemaking
communication activity of interacting, grouped according to five newly defined subcate-
gories. Finally, in Subsection 3.6.3 we present quotations that refer to the Sensemaking
communication activity of enacting.
3.6.1 Noticing
The respondents use many different information sources when sensing the environment.
The most obvious sources are their interorganizational contacts.
“There’s a security tree among the international NGOs. . . . In terms of the
information gathering, basically everybody does what they can on their side,
and then they pass it on through the security tree. . . . Whichever point you get
the information in, you pass it on to the one before and the one behind, and if
one of those doesn’t reply, you go one down.” [HUM]
“There’s a lot of talking, there are meetings. . . and going to these meetings
weekly there’s information that is passed, phone calls, text messages. . . . You
get the general feeling that the message passes.” [HUM]
“Since we are in DRC from 1984, we have well-established contacts with the
Congolese Secret Service [for information provision].” [HUM]
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Besides the more formal interorganizational sources, personal contacts also play an impor-
tant role.
“Words from our friends at the UN were important to know what was going on
[in the crisis].” [HUM]
“We have friends with the embassies. . . . They give you as much information as
they can. . . and it works now. . . . They have contacts within the city, to have
kind of a what’s going on.” [HUM]
“Here I am far, but when you are in Goma or Bukavu, you know everybody.
Everybody goes to the same pub in the evening. Everybody meets in the
same meeting room twice a week. And of course, when there is an incident,
information is spread quite quickly.” [GOV]
The respondents explained that the news of the street, “radio trottoir” as it is called in
French, plays an important role in getting to know what is going on.
“Radio trottoir, what they call it, is really, really efficient here. It is not always
true, but sometimes it’s incredible.” [GOV]
“I [unlike a Congolese] don’t know what the people say in the city, what they
think, what the atmosphere is.” [HUM]
“[At the time of the crisis] local people would start hearing things on the street.
And some of our staff had been out and started to hear something as well.”
[HUM]
Local staff members can help international humanitarian actors to understand what is
going on in the country.
“We were warned about the uprising, not only through our different contacts
with different organizations, different NGOs, different UN, but from our local
staff as well: what they were saying, what the mood is.” [HUM]
“For us it’s easier than for the people in the headquarters in MONUC, because
we have a lot of national staff. . . . We get information from them and their net-
works here. Whereas in MONUC there are hardly any Congolese people; most
people work in a vacuum. That’s a common complaint of MONUC staff. . . .
Connections with local people is essential, otherwise you’re in a vacuum.” [UN]
Respondents indicated that they try to diversify their sources and try to have a network of
people and organizations that can provide them with information in specific circumstances.
“The sources I have, I rely on them for specific information. For political
information there are weekly meetings. OCHA is another source of information
for things. And then I have also national staff and friends. So everyone would
3.6 Empirical Data 61
give you their version. So if you’re lucky you might get all this information.”
[HUM]
“The fact that my husband works in MONUC, I have access to an incredible
amount of information that I would not otherwise be privileged to. And I pass
it around.” [UN]
“Our military attaché with his information network was the first one from the
embassy to be informed, and I believe he was informed quite on the spot, by a
telephone call at night at his home.” [GOV]
If the organization does not have a good network in place, they could obtain important
information too late or might be left completely in the dark.
“Here in the DRC we have an intelligence system that works for some and
doesn’t work for others. For example during the crisis in March, the embassies
and private enterprises etcetera, they were receiving reports that something was
imminent, something was going to happen, from early in the day. I have quite
a few examples of people who were advised to take their kids out of school,
etcetera. But nothing was done for the UN. The UN did nothing, nothing.
So, in essence, we were caught with our pants down. And people were blocked.
There were 300 people blocked here in this building, and stayed here for two
days. And without having access to any information, you know. They could
not figure out what was going on.” [UN]
But having so many sources of information can pose problems for people to make sense,
since they will have to keep track of all these parallel channels.
“On the operational level in the East each agency has its own frequency and
then there’s a shared channel and there’s also a UN security channel. So our
radio operators and guards sit there with three FM radios each in front of them
the whole time, so they can always hear if something is going on the UN radio.
They can always hear if something is coming through.” [HUM]
3.6.2 Interacting
Analysis revealed that our respondents engage in five specific types of interacting. First,
our respondents interact to update their understanding of the situation; they actively
consult their network and maintain their contacts to stay informed. The second reason for
interaction is to inquire about specific things they want to know. Third, our respondents
engage in contact with other people to triangulate information and negotiate on what is
going on. Fourth, actors interact to verify information. Fifth, our respondents indicated
that they interact to reflect with colleagues on what to do and the decisions they need to
make.
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Updating
It is important to have regular contact with other people and organizations.
“To get a good coherence of what is happening, the starting point is to share
assessments of humanitarian needs and the security environment. Being with
many actors, it is very important to exchange the different views and analyze
them.” [HUM]
“We interact with others in all cases, in all cases.” [UN]
Our respondents indicated that they keep in touch with many different contacts to stay
informed.
“We talk to different types of groups: We talk to the army, to the civilian
authorities, to the local authorities, to the population, the church, the NGOs,
a number of parties.” [UN]
Many of these contacts are interorganizationally established.
“There is a platform for the donor community that is meeting regularly.” [GOV]
“There are NGO collaboration mechanisms. There is an inter-NGO network.
Back in March there were some security problems, and at that time a lot of
messages were being passed [through this network]. . . . So there are different
mechanisms in place to get information around. This one is strictly NGO-
based, but there are others that are more government related. And the UN
is very good about sharing-especially security-information, and other types of
information relating to the host government issues affecting NGOs. So it’s a
matter of networking, really. But it is ad hoc in many ways.” [HUM]
Personal contact with people is highly valued.
“Teleconferences, I hate them . . . It’s the most horrible way to communicate
. . . because you can’t see other people’s faces. It’s little stuff but . . . you’re not
physically present.” [HUM]
“We have set up special websites, for the humanitarian clusters, where people
are supposed to post information. . . but they’re very rarely used. I don’t use
them myself. I prefer to directly receive documents. I think people need to
have this personalized contact.” [UN]
People do not only use interorganizational contacts to stay informed. Personal-based con-
tacts are very important.
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“We get [security-related] information from our security company. That’s one
route. We also have our head of security, who tries to be connected to the local
scene.” [HUM]
“Part of that [contact with other NGOs in crises] is just networking, knowing
what other people are doing: ‘What are you guys doing?’ And so a lot is
through those types of contacts.” [HUM]
“The UN has regular reports which we cannot always get access to, so we
usually just rely on our friends that work there, so just kind of right through.
The new country representative, her husband works for UNHCR, so he would
have access and would be able to send it much more . . . I mean, we would have
much more of a direct link.” [HUM]
“I exchange information with colleagues at other embassies, I would say in-
formally. But there are also always different types of formal infrastructures.”
[GOV]
Therefore, people build up and maintain their own network of contacts.
“If you have bad relationships with your colleagues on the field, you will miss
a lot of information. Sometimes in a crisis situation it goes fast, so if you don’t
have a good personal relationship with people it will make your work difficult.
[They will not tell you the information they have.] So from time to time, take
one beer, chat with the other partners. It’s very good and helps a lot.” [UN]
“We have meetings between the security officers of the EU embassies . . . due to
the incidents we had here over the last three years, during the whole election
process and the recent violent clashes between Kabila and Bemba. We – several
people from the embassies – happened to learn to work together.” [GOV]
Inquiring
In a crisis, people are in need and search for various kinds of information.
“If there would be a crisis situation, we would be looking for key information
to make sure that our program and our people are safe: where are our people,
where are they going, where is their danger, and how does, whatever situation,
compromise or affect our movements and our activities.” [HUM]
They contact people from their network if they want to know something specific or are in
need of their expertise or knowledge.
“The different staff here, we have different networks. Practically what has
happened: We see the troops are moving so we try to find out what is happening
[by contacting the various contacts].” [GOV]
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“I confer or consult people who have good information of what’s going on out
there.” [UN]
“There are a number of national staff members who have good connections that
I would contact in a crisis situation. And we know socially people who are not
with the UN system, they’re with private industry, who seem to be more aware
of. . . I don’t know, things that are happening, that I would also contact now.
This is from the March incident. These are a few like lessons learned from what
was happening in March. Because they knew much earlier what was going to
happen, and they were able to take proactive action.” [UN]
These inquiries are done on a personal basis. Personal inquiries help actors obtain their
required information in a short amount of time.
“Informal messages go quickly. If I need to have an advice or opinion from the
Ministry, I have to write officially. But I can also contact the secretary of the
‘Directeur de Cabinet.’ It can also resolve the problem.” [UN]
Triangulating
Our respondents said that they rely on different sources and different types of information.
“We used to have a staff member whose husband worked for the Dutch govern-
ment. Apparently the Europeans would get sometimes different information as
well, so we should try to have as many contacts as we can.” [HUM]
“The UN does send out regular reports, but we just try to rely on other stuff
as well. . . you know, try to get the local flavor of what’s going on.” [HUM]
“The head of our staff, she’s actually French with an American citizenship. At
the time of the incident, her daughter was at the French school. She then got
into contact with the French embassy, to see what they’re doing.” [HUM]
To have a better understanding of the situation, they collect all these different kinds of
information and compare them.
“[We knew that the crisis was serious when] we started seeing people flee. Then
people started consulting their contacts in the military. You know, they have
their own personal contacts . . . So we try to put all these pieces together, to
make sure that, you know, everything’s being consistent.” [HUM]
“We have different networks . . . When things happened during the incident, I
mean those of us who have been present, we gather information all the time, to
understand what’s going on. Because you don’t understand what’s going on,
you have to contact all different types of people and organizations or whatever,
and then you would gather information and check if it becomes a pattern, you
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know, to judge what’s going on. And of course our local employees, they are
involved in that, but we also have those different networks that we try to reach.”
[GOV]
As was apparent from the previous quotations, people rely on their network of contacts
to obtain this information. Not having these close contacts could lead to information
problems in a crisis.
“It depends also on your level, you know, if you are in MONUC, you know,
at the level close to the DSRSG [UN Deputy Special Representative to the
Secretary General in the DRC], of course you get more information. But if
you’re not in MONUC, and you are with an agency, again there is a problem.
Anyone you talk to will tell you that there is a problem with communication
in times of crisis, and with information sharing as well.” [UN]
Interaction is also important in situations with conflicting information. Respondents in-
teract with other people to negotiate their points of view and to figure out what is really
happening.
“Usually we talk with a lot of our friends, about what’s going on . . . Typically
there’s about five of us that is here . . . We talk to our friends at UNICEF, we talk
to our friends at USAID, and we talk to whoever else we can . . . We’re always
chatting, seeing what’s related, since people fear different things.” [HUM]
“In our discussion with security leads at the embassy or whoever we would be
sharing information with, we would obviously be: ‘This is what we are hearing.’
You know, trying to see why they are dismissing that information, if they are.
Is it because they don’t have it or is it something else? Trying to confront the
two.” [HUM]
Verifying
Information that is obtained is not always accurate. Therefore, it is important to know
the source of the information.
“Normally we are in the forefront of everything, because we have been in the
DRC for a long time, and people do know; instinctively they come to us. When
I get the first piece of information. . . we immediately look at the source, and
we start the verification process.” [UN]
“They [local people] are the best advisors. They are from the country. I
don’t run blind; I cross-check information, but I indeed act according to their
information.” [HUM]
“Deciding to go for [decide upon] a certain piece of information depends on the
source, where it comes from.” [HUM]
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Our respondents interact to check whether what they noticed is correct and accurate.
“There’s so much talk here. There are so many rumors in this country flying,
you know, at any point. It’s really difficult to know what you can trust, what
information you can trust, and what information you cannot. That’s why I try
to diversify my sources. So I ask a lot of people, and you know, cross-check,
and then ask people who have access to formal channels of communication and
all that.” [UN]
“The local people, they notice things, and then I can check the information
with the internationals.” [HUM]
They also interact to find out exactly what is happening and whether what they noticed
is a threat or not.
“You can see a situation developing. Our job is to maintain staff security, so
we’re constantly monitoring the political and military situation, being alert to
indicators we’ve established. And sometimes you just see things: ‘Why did I
see five trucks full of heavily armed soldiers going on my way home today?’ The
next day I would go to the duty officer and say, ‘Look, I just saw this. What’s
going on?’ And he’ll call. Once I had been downtown and seen hundreds and
hundreds of people marching down the central boulevard. I called our security
officer, ‘What’s going on? There seem to be hundreds and hundreds of people
on the street.’ And he answered me, ‘There’s a demonstration this morning.
People are on strike.’ ” [HUM]
Reflecting
Within the organization, discussions and interaction with colleagues appeared to be im-
portant.
“Normally we [colleagues] have a continuous discussion.” [HUM]
“We work as a team. In a place like DRC, you cannot work alone and take
decisions alone. First of all you do not know everything yourself.” [UN]
“In such a big operation, it is important to work with a deputy. The fact that
we work together is very important, amongst others to create new ideas, new
thoughts, and new ways of looking at things.” [HUM]
“Very often I meet with the staff members and discuss topics before decisions
are made.” [HUM]
Besides their direct colleagues, the headquarters functions as a point of reflection.
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“When I’m not sure what to do, I take my telephone and call the headquarters.”
[UN]
“During March with the crisis it was helpful having internet, because we could
use Skype. It was very convenient to get in touch with our head office.” [HUM]
“Headquarters in Washington, they always have somebody that’s on call,
through cell phone. So that no matter what hour there’s a problem, there’s
somebody that we can get a hold of.” [HUM]
3.6.3 Enacting
People act to acquire more information. But when trying to obtain more information, they
change their own situation and that of the people they contact.
“I would be scared if I didn’t have information. Information gives you safety.
I push people, I call to find out.” [HUM]
“You try to pass around information, you do know that there are certain types
that are more important than others.” [HUM]
Time is an important factor. It forces people in a crisis to act on a plausible account of
what is going on.
“It [taking into account the reaction of other people on your decisions] depends
on how much time you have. If it’s about security, of course sometimes you
can’t.” [HUM]
“Sometimes you have to base your decision on uncertain information because
time is more important. In a crisis situation, you should react. You might
react wrongly, but of course you should react in a way that doesn’t harm.
[Respondent was talking about a crisis he faced.] So we shut the embassy to
help the local people. If it wasn’t necessary, what do you lose? A few working
hours; it doesn’t cost you very much, but if you wait it often becomes too late.”
[GOV]
Respondents were talking about their needs to act in a crisis.
“When it comes down to security issues, text [SMS] is more important than
voice [phone call]. It is easier to get this out to more people.. . . Text messages
are like, ‘Shooting downtown. Stay indoors.’ And it’s sent just like that,
immediately. After that you can call, and then you can listen to the radio. You
should keep the urgent information for the messages.” [HUM]
The communication medium should be easy to use when acting in a crisis.
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“In such circumstances [crisis], what we use is essentially the telephone – be-
cause it is the more easy way of communication – but we also have other means
of communication in case the telephone or the cell phone breaks down: radio
communication and the internet.” [GOV]
And especially the reliability of the medium was considered of high importance when
respondents needed to act.
“It doesn’t matter whether it [the communication medium] is voice or text. It
should be something that works all the time. Now radios are most reliable.”
[HUM]
“We also have satellite phones, that we have, but to tell you truthfully. . . here
in Kinshasa, it’s hard to get them to work, depending what kind it is of an
apartment building. When I try to get it to work, I have to get out in the
middle of my lawn and hold it up in the sky . . . We try to have different options
as much as possible.” [HUM]
“Fortunately, the mobile phone has been working during these incidents and we
also have worked with radio, but that is more of internal use. But fortunately
we have been able to use the mobile phone.” [GOV]
“When in locations where the local communication system is not enough, we
almost always have radios.” [HUM]
Therefore respondents indicated that they use many different communication media.
“The mobile phone system is the most common way to communicate here,
because there are no fixed, no landlines. Then people use SMS. We have radios,
but nobody ever uses their radios . . . Only when things happen, you will see
a higher increase in the use of radios and radio checks, and things like that.”
[UN]
3.7 Discussion
In the previous section we presented our field data in which we found clear evidence of the
three main Sensemaking communication activities (as shown in Figure 3.2) of (1) noticing,
(2) enacting, and (3) interacting, and five specific subcategories within the latter. More-
over, all quotations on communication behavior, communication needs, and communication
support in crisis situations were found to fit into one of these Sensemaking communication
activities. In this section, we discuss how the communication media capabilities (as shown
in Figure 3.3) can support the Sensemaking communication activities (Subsection 3.7.1),
what the implications for the media synchronicity required are (Subsection 3.7.2), and
how the respondents build an infrastructure for their Sensemaking communication activi-
ties (Subsection 3.7.3).
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3.7.1 Sensemaking communication activities and media
capabilities
Our analysis of the Sensemaking communication activity of noticing shows that the respon-
dents make use of a wide variety of sources for their noticing activities, such as interor-
ganizational structures, personal-based contacts, national staff members, and the news of
the streets. Each source can trigger the respondents to notice a cue from the environ-
ment. The respondents also make use of many different communication channels to scan
the environment and obtain relevant information, indicating that they exhibit a high level
of parallelism: they keep an eye on the radio, use mobile phones, engage in face-to-face
conversations, read their email, browse the internet, and so on. By doing so, they rely on
many different kinds of symbol sets: visual signs such as seeing people flee, verbal commu-
nication with their personal contacts and local staff, messages on the radio, rumors that
are “flying around,” written documents such as UN reports and newspapers, and written
communication such as email and SMS. As it is important to find out rapidly what is going
on when it concerns a crisis situation, these various symbol sets must, in MST terms, have
a high transmission velocity. To summarize, noticing is characterized by high parallelism,
many symbol sets, and high transmission velocity. (See Table 3.3)













g Updating High High Many
Inquiring High Low Few
Triangulating High High Few
Verifying High Low Few
Reflecting High Low Few
Enacting High Low Few
One of the most frequently recurring observations from our interviews was the impor-
tance of the social context, as evidenced through a variety of interacting activities. Within
the organization, top managers rely on their colleagues to exchange ideas and opinions,
or they may fall back on advice from their headquarters. There are also organizationally
established, formal mechanisms of interaction with other organizations. But besides this,
most of the respondents emphasized the important role of informal contacts with people
from other organizations. Especially when faced with an acute crisis situation, they relied
on their informal contacts in order to obtain more information.
Since interaction is a means to an end, we made a distinction between the various goals
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of interaction. First, our respondents interact to stay informed. They do this by talking to
their colleagues in their own organization and in other organizations, attending meetings
regularly, and consulting friends. They put a lot of effort into establishing and maintaining
a network of contacts. Second, our respondents interact to inquire and obtain answers to
specific questions. They mostly contact their close colleagues or friends when they want
specific information or want to make use of somebody’s knowledge or expertise. Third,
our respondents interact to triangulate information. To create a better picture of their
situation, they gather different types of information from different sources and compare it
themselves or in discussion with others. Again, they rely on their personal contacts. A
fourth goal of interaction is to verify the accuracy and the implication of the information
they noticed or were informed about. Our respondents stressed the importance of knowing
the source of the information. Fifth, our respondents interact to reflect on their situation
and the decisions they have to make: They contact their colleagues to discuss the situation,
to ask for their point of view, and to ask for advice on what to do. Moreover, they interact
often with the head offices of their organizations.
Our respondents need a high degree of parallelism to keep in contact with the wide
variety of interorganizational, intraorganizational, and informal information sources with
which they interact to be updated on the situation and to triangulate information. How-
ever, when people need to (1) obtain specific information, (2) verify information, and (3)
reflect on their situation, they consult only their closest contacts, the ones they trust and
believe to have the expertise to help them. For these three types of interaction, a low de-
gree of parallelism is needed. The transmission velocity, on the contrary, needs to be high
for all five forms of interacting, as our respondents do not have a lot of time in crises and,
thus, cannot afford to wait for messages to arrive or be delivered. When our respondents
interact to be informed, they use a wide range of symbol sets, as exemplified by face-to-
face meetings, email, and telephone. However, when faced with a threatening situation,
they often turned to a limited number of symbol sets when consulting their sources to (1)
inquire specific information, (2) triangulate information, (3) verify information, and (4)
reflect on their situation and decisions. For these four types of interaction, mostly verbal
communication by radio or telephone is used. The media capability needs for interacting
are summarized in Table 3.3.
Our respondents communicate in crises because they want to enact on their situation
and understand their enacted environment to find out what is happening. They act on
a plausible, rather than an accurate, account of what is going on due to time pressure,
to rapidly assess their situation. High velocity message transmissions are then needed.
In addition, we found that respondents often reverted to a single communication channel
while enacting. Respondents indicated that they would, for example, first send a text
message and engage in verbal communication at a later time. However, what was mentioned
repeatedly in the interviews is the problem of reliability of communication media. People
cannot rely too much on certain media, such as mobile phones, since during a crisis the
mobile network could break down. They therefore make sure other parallel channels of
communication are in place in case the “main” channel fails. This indicates a need for
low, yet reliable parallelism. As for interacting activities, our respondents indicated that
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they revert to easy-to-use symbol sets when acting in crisis situations, such as written and
verbal communication. The media capability needs for enacting are also summarized in
Table 3.3.
Interpreting is the ongoing process of making sense of what is being noticed, socially
constructed and enacted upon and, therefore, is a recurring theme in the other Sensemak-
ing communication activities. As respondents continuously verify what the information
means to them and their organization, messages need to be sent and understood fast when
situations escalate. The least amount of time possible should be spent on encoding and
decoding a message, resulting in low rehearsability and low reprocessability capabilities.
However, in the crucial period before a situation escalates and when time is often limited,
actors need more time to go through their communications to understand what is going on
and to couch a message carefully. Since they sometimes need more time to rehearse and
reprocess messages, we indicate their need for rehearsability and reprocessability as either
low or medium.
3.7.2 Synchronicity of media
MST suggests that the conveyance process should be supported by a low level of media
synchronicity and that this support will be accomplished with (1) low transmission velocity,
(2) high parallelism, (3) few symbol sets, (4) high rehearsability, and (5) high reprocess-
ability (Dennis et al., 2008). Sensemaking, in contrast, suggests that conveyance is an
ongoing process, characterized by social interaction and enactment, which implies that low
synchronicity media will not provide for the best support to reach an understanding.
Table 3.4 summarizes our findings on media capabilities for Sensemaking communica-
tion activities, together with MST’s media characteristics for high and low synchronicity
media. The results in Table 3.4 indicate that our respondents need a high transmission
velocity for all of their Sensemaking communication activities. The degree of parallelism
and number of symbol sets, however, differ across the different Sensemaking communi-
cation activities. People are in need of high parallelism in their noticing, updating, and
triangulating activities; fewer communication channels suffice for inquiring, verifying, re-
flecting, and enacting. Respondents use a wide variety of symbol sets when noticing the
environment and updating themselves about the situation, while for inquiring, triangu-
lating, verifying, reflecting, and enacting activities, they revert back to a more limited
number of symbol sets. This was especially the case when the crisis was apparent. Finally,
for their interpreting activities, our respondents mostly need low-to-medium rehearsability
and reprocessability media capabilities.
To summarize, our findings show that the transmission velocity, rehearsability, and
reprocessability media capability needs for humanitarian managers in the DRC reflect the
need for high rather than low synchronicity media support.
We can further categorize the Sensemaking communication activities according to their
common information transmission media capability needs. For example, noticing and up-
dating share the characteristics of high transmission velocity, high parallelism, and many
symbol sets. Similarly, we can group inquiring, verifying, reflecting, and enacting, while
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Table 3.4: Media capability findings and correspondence to synchronicity of media
Transmission Paral- Symbol Rehear- Reprocess-






















g Updating High High Many x x
Inquiring High Low Few x x
Triangulating High High Few x x
Verifying High Low Few x x
Reflecting High Low Few x x
Enacting High Low Few x x






Low Synchro- Low- Medium- Few- Medium- Medium-
nicity Media Medium High Medium High High
High Synchro- Medium- Low- Medium- Low- Low-
nicity Media High Medium Many Medium Medium
triangulating is solely characterized by high transmission velocity, high parallelism, and
few symbol sets. The common media characteristics of each respective category are la-
beled “scanning media” (referring to the media characteristics of the noticing and updat-
ing Sensemaking communication activities), “triangulating media” (for triangulating), and
“one-to-one media” (for inquiring, verifying, reflecting, and enacting), as summarized in
Table 3.5.





nication Activities Velocity Sets
Scanning media Noticing, Updating High High Many





To illustrate these different media types, consider the following examples. As a scanning
medium, for instance, one could think of a Web 2.0 social networking application such as
Facebook with additional options (e.g., file exchange, voice-to-voice communication, and in-
teraction through webcams). Triangulating media enable actors to consult specific sources
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of information in real time, simultaneously. They allow actors to triangulate information.
(A combined instant messaging and chat room application is one possibility.) Finally, a
rather obvious example of a one-to-one medium is a telephone, when only one symbol set
is used for direct communication between two actors with high transmission velocity.
3.7.3 Building a Sensemaking communication infrastructure
The data reveal that the foundations for the Sensemaking communication activities used in
a crisis are established over a long period of time. Our respondents continuously create and
maintain an infrastructure for their Sensemaking communication activities: They build up
networks of work-related contacts, contacts through their own national background, friends
such as internationals working in private industry, local people, and colleagues. They
maintain these contacts by going to meetings, staying in touch with the embassy, going out
to socially mix among the other internationals working in the DRC, and employing locals
as staff members. Humanitarian actors continuously communicate with many different
stakeholders, such as colleagues, other organizations, headquarters, local people, press,
friends, and military. Trust is critically important in all of these activities aimed at creating
a Sensemaking communication infrastructure (cf. Jarvenpaa and Leidner, 1998).
3.8 Chapter Conclusions
Analyzing communication and Sensemaking data obtained from in-depth interviews shows
that humanitarian actors in the DRC engage in eight different Sensemaking communication
activities: (1) noticing, (2) updating, (3) inquiring, (4) triangulating, (5) verifying, (6)
reflecting, (7) enacting, and (8) interpreting.
Throughout our analysis, we have studied Sensemaking at the level where the goal of
communication is to reach individual understanding rather than shared understanding.
We have also observed that the communication process does not start with the sending
of a message, but incorporates making sense of the situation. Studying communication
processes from a Sensemaking angle therefore provides a holistic view of the communication
process. Our findings also show that social interaction and enactment are vital for actors
in the DRC to reach individual understanding, and that low synchronicity media will
not provide for the best support in achieving this. Instead, actors will rather need high
synchronicity media for these conveyance processes.
We have identified three types of media for supporting information transmission for
Sensemaking communication activities: (1) scanning media, (2) triangulating media, and
(3) one-to-one media.
As a consequence of the continual need to build a Sensemaking communication in-
frastructure, designers of information and communication systems should allow users to
connect with one another. In contrast with how most systems are designed and devel-
oped, designers should not solely focus on institutional information and communication
exchanges, but they should support exchanges in these mostly informal, personal net-
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works. This confirms earlier findings by Turoff et al. (2009) that crisis response actors
could benefit from systems that support their social networks to help alleviate information
overload and assist in collaborative recommending. The scanning media example of social
networking software will, for instance, enable humanitarian actors to create and maintain
their important network of contacts.
The nature of involvement in the interviews and subjectivism in the analysis of the data,
notably the preference for theory-driven interpretation, are shortcomings of our chosen re-
search methodology. We tried to limit these shortcomings by conducting the interviews
and analysis jointly but critiquing each other in between the interviews and giving each
other feedback on the data-analysis process. In order to reduce the theory-driven interpre-
tation, we critically analyzed the data and created new subcategories of the Sensemaking
communication activities to which the data could be meaningfully assigned. As such, we
tried to create a nonjudgmental involvement in the interviews. However, inherent to our
approach, as we were involved in the process of collecting the data and interpreting what
was said, it was not possible to obtain completely value-free data and unbiased analysis.
The focus of this research was on individual Sensemaking: the construction of meaning
by individuals for which the social context plays an important role. How Sensemaking
provides insights for media synchronicity when a group of individuals comes to a shared
understanding remains a matter for future research.
Despite the fact that the positivist notion of statistical, sampling-based generalizability
is often perceived as the only form of generalizability, the nature of generalizations is
different in the interpretivist research tradition (Walsham, 1995b; Lee and Baskerville,
2003). In line with notions of generalizability in interpretive research, we have generalized
our empirical descriptions to theoretical statements of rich insight and specific implications
that may be valuable in other (humanitarian) crisis contexts (Klein and Myers, 1999;
Walsham, 1995b; Lee and Baskerville, 2003).
Chapter 4
Group Sensemaking: The
Construction of a Measurement
Scale∗
All truths are easy to understand once they are discovered;
the point is to discover them.
Galileo Galilei
Sensemaking is a process that is always going on, but is difficult to grasp and identify.
In order to study the effective design of SSS, or how improved Sensemaking leads to
more efficient and effective humanitarian crisis response, we need to quantify the actors’
Sensemaking attainment. For this goal we set up an experimental study for which we
hypothesized that group Sensemaking would play an important role (which is further de-
scribed in the next chapter). From this point onwards we focus on Sensemaking in groups
as opposed to Sensemaking on an individual level, as our focus is on humanitarian crisis
response teams. In this chapter we investigate how to establish a reliable scale to mea-
sure group Sensemaking attainment (in accordance with research question 6). We do so
through a post-experimental survey consisting of different items derived from Sensemaking
literature. The answer to research question 6 is formulated in Chapter 6.
This chapter will proceed as follows. In Section 4.1 we describe our approach to cap-
turing the concept of group Sensemaking. In Section 4.2 we review literature on social
Sensemaking, ongoing Sensemaking, and Sensemaking outcomes, of which we each time
identify statements which can be used to measure that particular aspect of Sensemaking.
In Section 4.3 we describe how we measured Sensemaking. In Section 4.4 we discuss how
we reduced our initial abundance of items to a concise set of items with high interrater
reliability and non-independence, leading to a scale of items which can be filled out by indi-
vidual team members and through which, as we demonstrate with Item Response Theory,
∗This chapter is based to a great extent on Muhren and Van de Walle (2010b)
76 Chapter 4. Group Sensemaking: The Construction of a Measurement Scale
we can reliably order teams according to their Sensemaking attainment. In Section 4.5 we
discuss our findings. Finally, in Section 4.6 we provide our conclusions.
4.1 Capturing the Concept of Group Sensemaking
There are two aspects of Sensemaking which have been qualitatively described in litera-
ture and which we can use to investigate the attainment of group Sensemaking in crisis
management teams. First, among others Weick (1995) has extensively described the char-
acteristics of the Sensemaking process, the seven Sensemaking properties, and this is one
important element of measuring the attainment of Sensemaking. Second, Weick has –
less concretely and more subtly – described what characterizes a “good” and “bad” out-
come of Sensemaking, how this might be identified, and what its consequences could be.
We call these the “Sensemaking outcomes”. In this chapter we entangle the concept of
group Sensemaking by examining and measuring both the Sensemaking properties and the
Sensemaking outcomes.
Research by Van Den Eede (2009) has proven Weick (1995) and Weick et al. (2005)’s
reservations that the seven Sensemaking properties are not exhaustive nor mutually-
exclusive. Weick (1995, p.18) therefore suggested to use the properties as “a set of raw
materials for disciplined imagination”. We follow Weick’s advice and focus on two of the
seven Sensemaking properties: social context (from this point onwards called “social Sense-
making”) and ongoing (from this point onwards called “ongoing Sensemaking”). There are
two reasons why we specifically choose to include these two properties to measure group
Sensemaking in humanitarian crisis response. First, social Sensemaking and ongoing Sense-
making are two of the most important properties for group Sensemaking in humanitarian
crisis response. The social aspect of Sensemaking is of crucial importance in group Sense-
making, which is by definition characterized by social interactions. Ongoing Sensemaking
is particularly relevant in humanitarian crisis response, as responders work in crisis en-
vironments characterized by interruptions, and ongoing Sensemaking is about how actors
are resilient and cope with interruptions. Moreover, as previously discussed and illustrated
in Figure 3.2, social context and ongoing are the only Sensemaking properties for which,
when viewed from an individual perspective, both the Sensemaker and the environment
play a direct role. The second reason is a deductive one: research has demonstrated that
the property of identity construction is focused on the “self”, and the properties of ret-
rospection, enactment, cue extraction, and plausibility are about the cognitive, personal
“scheme” (Van Den Eede, 2009). These five other properties would therefore be influenced
by the personality of the individual Sensemakers, which is beyond our present scope.
We realize the measurement of group Sensemaking by establishing a scale of survey
items, through which individuals can indicate their group’s Sensemaking attainment. This
scale will comprise two different types of items, all derived from literature: (1) items mea-
suring the Sensemaking properties of social Sensemaking and ongoing Sensemaking, and
(2) items measuring Sensemaking outcomes. Our approach to measure group Sensemaking
is presented in Figure 4.1.












Figure 4.1: Our approach to capturing the concept of group Sensemaking
4.2 From Theory to Items
In this section we extensively examine the literature on social Sensemaking (Subsec-
tion 4.2.1), ongoing Sensemaking (Subsection 4.2.2), and Sensemaking outcomes (Subsec-
tion 4.2.3) from a Weickian perspective of Sensemaking. In each subsection we summarize
relevant theory and formulate a set of statements which can be used as items to measure
group Sensemaking.
4.2.1 Social Sensemaking
The social dimension is important for Sensemakers, as they try to find out what other
people think and understand, and take into account other people’s reactions when they
act: “People learn about events when they compare what they see with what someone
else sees and then negotiate some mutually acceptable version of what really happened”
(Weick, 1985). Cognitive and social aspects of Sensemaking are inextricably linked. People
need social anchors and a form of social reality (Weick, 2001), because what we say or think
or do is contingent on what others say and think and do. Sensemaking requires talking,
interaction, conversation, argument, and dialog with others (Nathan, 2004), and teams offer
a place for the talking, arguing, and interpretation that is necessary for making sense of
things (see Chapter 3 and Ashmos and Nathan, 2002). As Weick (1993) explains, “perhaps
it’s more important that you have a partner than an organization when you fight fires. A
partner makes social construction easier. A partner is a second source of ideas. A partner
strengthens independent judgment in the face of a majority. And a partner enlarges the
pool of data that are considered.”
Sensemaking is relational (Weick, 2005), as people need social anchors and a form
of social reality (Weick, 2001). Social influences on Sensemaking do not arise solely
from physical presence. Conduct is contingent on the conduct of others, whether those
others are imagined, implied or physically present (Weick, 1995, 2001): “Other people
are integral to our efforts to make sense of things because what we say or think or do
is contingent on what others say and think and do. Even if we are alone, we imagine
the response of others to our actions or thoughts, and adjust our thinking and behavior
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accordingly” (Nathan, 2004). As we have discussed previously in Chapter 3, our study
of humanitarian managers’ Sensemaking activities in the DRC exemplified the necessity
of the presence of other people for Sensemaking. The study showed that people need a
network of (informal) contacts, with whom they interact to stay informed, to inquire and
obtain answers to specific questions, to triangulate information, to verify the accuracy
and the implication of the information they noticed or were informed about, and to
reflect on their situation and the decisions they have to make. With a higher presence
of other people, particularly in the case of requisite variety when there are people
with diverse experiences, the variety of measures used by the group to make sense
of equivocal events can increase (Weick and Meader, 1993). Moreover, with a higher
presence of others there is more opportunity to learn vicariously of others’ experience
(Nathan, 2004), as the Sensemaking property of retrospect highlights. When there is
a low presence of others, when social anchors disappear and one feels isolated from a
social reality of some sort, one’s grasp of what is happening begins to loosen (Weick, 2001).
Summary : for social Sensemaking it is important
1. to be able to fall back on other group members for information, questions, feedback,
and reflection;
2. to use a communication medium which encourages discussion between group mem-
bers;
3. not to lose social anchors and feel isolated from a social reality of some sort.
Sensemaking is interactive (Weick, 2005): talk, discourse, and conversation are important
for Sensemaking, as that is how a great deal of social contact is mediated (Weick, 1995).
Therefore, the organizational form should allow for more conversations (Weick, 2001) and
encourage conversation (Weick, 2001). More active participation by group members allows
for more discussion of contrary views: It brings contrary interpretations to the surface,
which can then make the group’s interpretation more stable and implementable once it is
constructed (Weick and Meader, 1993). Aids that discourage conversation undercut the
social foundation of Sensemaking (Weick and Meader, 1993).
Summary : for social Sensemaking it is important
4. to discuss in the group;
5. to allow for as much discussion as possible;
6. for all group members to participate actively.
The quality of interconnectivity within a group affects the quality of representations con-
structed by members, the degree of intelligence manifest by a network of nodes (Weick,
2005). This quality of interconnectivity is about how careful people interrelate different
pieces of information. Weick argues that this should be done heedfully, i.e., more carefully,
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critically, consistently, purposefully, attentively, studiously, vigilantly, and conscientiously
(Van Den Eede, 2009). “The basic idea in heedful interrelating is that a collective mind
capable of varying degrees of intelligence emerges as a kind of capacity in an ongoing activ-
ity stream when activities among people are tied together as contributions that constitute
and are subordinated to a joint system. The mind is more fully developed if those in-
terrelations occur with greater heedfulness” (Weick, 2005). Variations in interconnection
produce variations in the representations that are synthetically constructed, suggesting
that different network forms have different cognitive consequences. Some network forms
may produce ignorance, tunnel vision, and normalizing, whereas other forms may produce
novel insights, original syntheses, and unexpected diagnoses (Weick, 2005).
People learn about an event when they apply several different measures, each of which
has a different set of flaws (Weick, 1985). Therefore, comparison, negotiation, and free
exchange of ideas are important processes for Sensemaking. It is important to increase the
ability of participants to build a common set of linkages, preferences, and interpretations
(Weick and Meader, 1993).
Summary : for social Sensemaking it is important
7. to compare critically different pieces of information to each other;
8. to consider carefully all information inputs;
9. to focus on the contrary views within the group.
4.2.2 Ongoing Sensemaking
Sensemaking is ongoing, and has neither a beginning nor a formal end. Instead, it “takes
place in a continuing and dynamic fashion as events unfold and we continually seek to
understand what events mean in relationship to our organizations” (Nathan, 2004). To
understand Sensemaking is to be sensitive to the ways in which people chop moments out
of continuous flows and extract cues from those moments (Weick, 1995). Most of us at
any given time find ourselves “in the middle of something”. Sensemaking is constrained
not only by past events, but also by the speed with which events flow into the past and
interpretations become outdated. As we move from one situation to another, we make
and revise assumptions and beliefs along the way. Once you cannot keep pace with the
action, you lose context, information, situated cognition, and tools made meaningful by
actual use (Weick, 2005).
Summary : for ongoing Sensemaking it is important
10. that the decision making process is smooth and continuous;
11. to understand from each other in the group what group members are thinking or
doing;
12. for group members to contribute to the discussion when they want to.
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Sensemaking is affected by interruptions, signals that important changes have occurred
in the environment, in the ongoing stream of experience (Weick, 1995). “Whenever an
expectation is disconfirmed, some kind of ongoing activity is interrupted. Thus to under-
stand Sensemaking is also to understand how people cope with interruptions” (Weick, 1995,
p.5). Sensemaking is enhanced if there is more focused attention on interruptions whenever
projects are disrupted; when people lose the ability to focus on interrupting conditions,
they begin to lose their grasp of the situation (Weick, 2001).
“Sensemaking is about labeling and categorizing to stabilize the streaming of experi-
ence” (Weick et al., 2005). Labeling works through a strategy of “differentiation and simple-
location, identification and classification, regularizing and routinization [to translate] the
intractable or obdurate into a form that is more amenable to functional deployment” (We-
ick et al., 2005). Important in this definition is “functional deployment,” as Weick et al.
(2005) explain: “In medicine, functional deployment means imposing diagnostic labels that
suggest a plausible treatment. In organizing in general, functional deployment means im-
posing labels on interdependent events in ways that suggest plausible acts of managing,
coordinating, and distributing”.
What we can understand from this, is that labeling and categorizing ensure “functional
deployment” – plausible acts of organizing – and stabilize the ongoing stream of experience.
On the contrary, if people lose the ability to bound ongoing events or if ongoing events
become more resistant to bounding (Weick, 2001), Sensemaking becomes more difficult.
What we should be careful for, is that resorting to absolute categories may ignore large
pieces of continuity, thereby entrapping us in misconceptions (Weick, 1995).
Summary : for ongoing Sensemaking it is important
13. to pay extra attention to situations in which expectations or beliefs are disconfirmed;
14. to be able to focus the group’s attention to the issues one wants to discuss;
15. to translate an unclear situation into a situation in which it is more understandable
what is going on.
The goal for successful Sensemaking is to stay in the action by means of prompt repair and
recovery after interruption. If instead people pull away and adopt a detached, atomistic
view or analyses after interruption, they lose context, information, situated cognition, and
tools made meaningful by actual use (Weick, 2005). “As we move from one situation to
another, we make and revise assumptions and beliefs along the way. (. . . ) We work at
making sense of past events to develop a story that we understand, and as future events
unfold we revise our story” (Nathan, 2004). Therefore, the organizational form should
enable people to be resilient in the face of interruptions (Weick, 2001). If an interrupting
stimulus is suddenly and unexpectedly removed, positive emotion occurs (Weick, 1995).
In contrast, when people lose the ability to keep pace with ongoing events by means of
continuous updating of actions and interpretations, they begin to lose their grasp of the
situation (Weick, 2001).
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Summary : for ongoing Sensemaking it is important
16. to react swiftly to an unclear situation in order to create a more understandable
picture of the situation;
17. to update actions and interpretations continuously according to new information;
18. for group members not to pull away and adopt a detached, atomistic view or analysis
after an interruption.
4.2.3 Sensemaking outcomes
In Sensemaking literature, there are several indications of the outcome of Sensemaking.
Sensemaking is said to impact what people know, about the situation, what to do, and
what will follow. Weick gives an example of somebody who is successful in Sensemaking,
because “. . . he gives his crew a direction for some indefinite period, a direction which by
definition is dynamic, open to revision at any time, self-correcting, responsive, and with
more of its rationale being transparent” (Weick, 2005). Based on Weick’s work, Nathan
(2004) argues that “the desired end result of Sensemaking is first and foremost that people
would hold a better understanding of the uncertainties they face as they look upon the
future”.
Summary :
19. good Sensemaking outcome is characterized by having a good idea of which direction
to follow;
20. good Sensemaking outcome is characterized by having a good understanding in the
group of the uncertainties that are faced.
Sensemaking has an impact on what people can do. Weick argues that organizations must
be designed to “develop a coherent story of what is going on (. . . ) These effects of design
on resources for Sensemaking, in turn, make it easier or harder to build a common idea of
what is happening and what decisions need to be made” (Weick, 2001).
Summary :
21. good Sensemaking outcome is characterized by being able to develop a coherent story
in the group of what is going on;
22. good Sensemaking outcome is characterized by being able to develop a common idea
in the group of what is happening.
Sensemaking subsequently impacts what people actually do. “These seven properties
affect not only the initial sense one develops of a situation – this initial sense is often
overdetermined by one’s own personal history – but more importantly, the extent to
which people will update and develop their sense of the situation. (. . . ) These properties
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have an effect on the willingness of people to disengage from, discard, or ‘walk away’ from
their initial story and adopt a newer story that is more sensitive to the particulars of the
present context” (Weick, 2001). But the actions come with further consequences, as is
apparent from Weick (1985), “if people stick to one view [of what they made sense], their
lives may be momentarily more soothing, but also become more susceptible to sudden
jolts of disconfirmation” and Weick (2001), “variations in [the organizational design that
affects] Sensemaking, in turn, affects enthusiasm, the willingness to sustain complex
collaboration, and resourcefulness in the face of setbacks.”
Summary :
23. good Sensemaking outcome is characterized by updating and developing the group’s
initial sense of the situation;
24. bad Sensemaking outcome is characterized by sticking to one view of what is hap-
pening;
25. good Sensemaking outcome is characterized by being resourceful in the face of set-
backs.
Finally, Sensemaking has an effect on what happens. Bad Sensemaking results in an
“incidence of senselessness” (Weick, 1985), and in which subsequently “one’s grasp of
what is happening begins to loosen” (Weick, 2001). This impacts how one feels, and is
an important goal of Sensemaking: “The feeling of order, clarity, and rationality is an
important goal of Sensemaking” (Weick, 1995, p.29).
Summary :
26. bad Sensemaking outcome is characterized by experiencing a total lack of meaning
of what is happening;
27. bad Sensemaking outcome is characterized by losing the group’s grasp of what is
happing;
28. good Sensemaking outcome is characterized by having the feeling of order, clarity,
and rationality.
4.3 Research Methodology
All 28 statements were transformed into survey items, with the resulting 28-item survey
presented in Appendix B (page 145). We labeled each item with an “itemID”, which will
be referred to in Section 4.4. All items have answer options on a 5-points Likert scale,
in decreasing order of agreement to the respective statement: “Strongly Agree”, “Agree”,
“Neutral”, “Disagree”, and “Strongly Disagree”. In order to minimize response-set bias,
some items are negatively worded and others are positively worded.
The items were tested on 144 international students who participated in a group deci-
sion making experiment at Tilburg University in Spring 2010. More information on this
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experiment is given in the next chapter. To understand the context surrounding the survey,
we briefly mention the most important details of the experiment. Students were assigned
to 48 random groups of three, and worked for about an hour on a floods crisis response
case in which they had to reach an agreement in their group on which district to provide
first (priority) humanitarian assistance to. The participants each received different sets
of needs assessment information on the affected districts, and had to discuss their find-
ings and compare it with the other team members’ information. After the participants
had reached a group decision, group members were asked to answer the survey with the
Sensemaking items, which they had not seen before, in a separate cubicle, and were not
able to communicate with their group members when responding to the items. The survey
was programmed with Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments (z-Tree),
software for experimental economics. Because we programmed all items as required fields
in z-Tree, we do not have any missing data.
4.4 Data Analysis
The responses to negatively worded items are reversed so that a positively-oriented score
is obtained for all items: a higher score implies a higher Sensemaking attainment. The
descriptive statistics of the (reversed) survey responses are listed in Table 4.1, where the
descriptive statistics of the individual responses are displayed on the left, and the descrip-
tive statistics of the three individual responses aggregated for each group are displayed on
the right. The most difficult item (i.e., least popular) is ongoing9 with a mean value of
0.910, and the easiest item (i.e., most popular) is social6 with a mean value of 3.285.
As we wish to use the aggregate responses to compare groups according to their Sense-
making attainment, the first step in the analysis is to find out whether individual responses
can be used to say something about the group’s behavior. When each individual in a group
rates their group’s behavior, it is logical to assume that the aggregate of the individual
responses provide for a more reliable measure of the group’s behavior than each individual
response, as the aggregate measures may increase the ability to measure subtle group phe-
nomena (Bliese, 2000). In multilevel modeling and analysis, in which data on lower and
higher levels are compared to each other, it is a commonly investigated question whether
it is justified to aggregate individual responses. This is assessed by exploring the inter-
rater reliability and non-independence of the individual responses in Section 4.4.1. In
Section 4.4.2 we investigate whether we can establish a set of items through which groups
can be ordered according to their Sensemaking attainment.
4.4.1 Interrater reliability and non-independence
The Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC)(1) estimates the effect size, indicating the
extent to which individual responses are attributable to group membership. The measure
of this effect size is accompanied by an F-test, which tests whether the between-group
variance of the responses is significantly greater than the within-group variance of the
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of the Sensemaking survey items
Sensemaking Individual responses Responses aggregated by
item (N=144) group (N=48)
Min. Max. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std.Dev.
social1 0 4 2.938 0.910 1.67 4.00 2.938 0.570
social2 0 4 2.639 1.075 0.33 3.67 2.639 0.690
social3 0 4 2.917 1.119 1.33 4.00 2.917 0.672
social4 0 4 2.840 1.001 1.33 4.00 2.840 0.603
social5 0 4 1.951 1.118 0.00 3.33 1.951 0.734
social6 0 4 3.285 0.808 2.00 4.00 3.285 0.510
social7 0 4 3.174 0.814 2.00 4.00 3.174 0.451
social8 0 4 2.743 1.029 0.67 3.67 2.743 0.646
social9 0 4 2.757 0.970 1.33 4.00 2.757 0.540
ongoing1 0 4 3.042 0.900 1.33 4.00 3.042 0.625
ongoing2 0 4 2.938 1.032 1.33 4.00 2.938 0.647
ongoing3 0 4 3.278 0.848 1.67 4.00 3.278 0.488
ongoing4 0 4 2.736 0.975 1.00 3.67 2.736 0.571
ongoing5 0 4 2.736 1.003 1.33 3.67 2.736 0.523
ongoing6 0 4 2.903 0.822 1.33 3.67 2.903 0.456
ongoing7 1 4 3.056 0.707 2.00 4.00 3.056 0.420
ongoing8 0 4 3.208 0.747 1.67 4.00 3.208 0.427
ongoing9 0 4 0.910 0.756 0.00 2.33 0.910 0.433
outcome1 0 4 3.278 0.733 2.00 4.00 3.278 0.442
outcome2 0 4 3.007 0.789 2.00 4.00 3.007 0.427
outcome3 0 4 3.049 0.769 2.00 3.67 3.049 0.446
outcome4 0 4 2.549 1.133 1.00 4.00 2.549 0.696
outcome5 1 4 3.181 0.665 2.00 4.00 3.181 0.456
outcome6 0 4 2.500 1.024 1.00 3.67 2.500 0.611
outcome7 0 4 2.229 1.114 0.33 3.33 2.229 0.722
outcome8 0 4 2.389 1.025 0.67 3.33 2.389 0.699
outcome9 1 4 2.625 0.678 1.67 3.33 2.625 0.387
outcome10 0 4 3.132 0.847 1.00 4.00 3.132 0.574
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responses. For more information on how ICC(1) values and related F-tests are calculated,
the interested reader is referred to Appendix C (page 151). For the interpretation of effect
sizes, Murphy et al. (2009) recommend adhering to the usual convention that an effect size
< 0.01 is a small effect, and an effect size between 0.01 and 0.05 is a small to medium
effect. Bliese (2000) typically sees values in his U.S. Army data between 0.05 and 0.2, and
would be surprised to find ICC(1) values greater than 0.30 in most applied field research.
Table 4.2 lists all ICC(1) values and related F-tests for our survey items. The ICC(1)
values we observe for the Sensemaking items range from -0.091 (ongoing5) to 0.222 (ongo-
ing1), with an average of 0.055. One item has a small effect (ICC < 0.01), 6 items have a
small to medium effect (0.01 < ICC < 0.05), 5 items have a medium effect (0.05 < ICC
< 0.1), and 7 items have a relatively large effect (ICC > 0.1). We also note that 9 items
have a negative ICC(1) value, indicating that the between-group variance is smaller than
the within-group variance. Although these so-called “frog-pond situations” might be of
theoretical interest to some researchers (Bliese, 2000), it is not of interest to our objective
of establishing a Sensemaking measurement scale in which individuals can meaningfully
indicate their group behavior.
More interestingly than the ICC(1) values itself, is the F-test for the different items
which indicates whether the between-group variance is significantly greater than the within-
group variance. Remarkably, with p < 0.05, we can see in Table 4.2 that only five items
meet our criteria for which we can reject the F-test’s null-hypothesis (defined in Appendix
C): social5, ongoing1, outcome5, outcome8, and outcome10 are the only items for which
the variance within groups is significantly smaller than the variance between groups. In
other words, we can state that group membership affects individuals’ responses for these
five items, but not significantly for all other items. As group membership should play
an important role in individuals’ responses to items concerning group behavior (group
Sensemaking), we can only continue our analysis with the social5, ongoing1, outcome5,
outcome8, and outcome10 items.
4.4.2 Item response scale analysis
To design and analyze a reliable measurement scale for Sensemaking we use Mokken
(1971)’s Model of Monotone Homogeneity (MHM) from Item Response Theory (IRT),
commonly used in psychometrics to assess unobservable mental abilities and mental at-
tributes. Mokken scale analyses is a nonparametric probabilistic version of the Guttman
scalogram (Guttman, 1950), with which one can create a scale to order people on a spe-
cific latent ability or latent trait. The success probability for a fixed item depends on the
person’s ability or trait level and is called its Item Response Function (IRF). It is assumed
that this IRF increases if the person has more of the latent ability or latent trait. Our
objective is to investigate whether all or a selection of the remaining Sensemaking items
fit Mokken’s MHM, which will enable us to order teams according to their Sensemaking
attainment. In other words, group Sensemaking is our latent trait, on which we want to
rank order the groups. The interested reader is referred to Appendix D (page 152) to read
more about IRT and Mokken’s nonparametric MHM scale analysis.
Table 4.2: ICC(1) values and related F-tests for all Sensemaking survey items
Item ICC(1)
F-test for true value 0
Value Significance
social1 0.087 1.287 0.149
social2 0.118* 1.401 0.083
social3 0.041 1.128 0.306
social4 0.044 1.140 0.291
social5 0.146** 1.512 0.045
social6 0.097 1.321 0.126
social7 -0.039 0.887 0.671
social8 0.090 1.297 0.142
social9 -0.034 0.901 0.649
ongoing1 0.222*** 1.855 0.005
ongoing2 0.089 1.293 0.144
ongoing3 -0.004 0.989 0.507
ongoing4 0.014 1.043 0.422
ongoing5 -0.091 0.749 0.863
ongoing6 -0.038 0.889 0.668
ongoing7 0.029 1.089 0.356
ongoing8 -0.009 0.974 0.530
ongoing9 -0.007 0.978 0.524
outcome1 0.045 1.141 0.290
outcome2 -0.061 0.828 0.762
outcome3 0.003 1.009 0.474
outcome4 0.065 1.210 0.214
outcome5 0.202*** 1.761 0.010
outcome6 0.034 1.105 0.335
outcome7 0.128* 1.442 0.066
outcome8 0.196** 1.730 0.012
outcome9 -0.012 0.964 0.546
outcome10 0.188** 1.696 0.015
*** F-test is significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed)
** F-test is significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed)
* F-test is significant at the 0.1 level (one-tailed)
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We use the “MSP5” software package for our scale analysis, which is the only program
available to run Mokken’s nonparametric MHM scale analysis. The aim of our analysis
is to verify whether the five remaining items can form one scale to measure one latent
trait: group Sensemaking. The ICC(1) analysis has revealed that the individual responses
to these five items are influenced by group membership, and that it is therefore allowed
to aggregate the individual responses to construct the group responses. The drawback of
MSP5 is that the program only accepts integers from 0 until 9 as responses to each item.
The average is therefore not a good aggregate measure to use in this analysis for the group’s
responses, as in many cases we would need to round the group responses to integers of 0
until 4. If we take the sum score as the aggregate measure for the group’s responses, the
response range is from 0 until 12. We examine the distribution of the responses for the
latter strategy, which can be found in Table A.1 of Appendix E (page 154). If we want to
take the sum score as the aggregate measure, we need to join four response categories into
one across all items. As the data are skewed more towards higher sum scores, we investigate
what happens when we join the four lowest response categories. The new distribution of
responses can be found in Table A.2 of Appendix E. Because the distribution of responses is
only slightly changed, the MHM assumption that the answer categories of the items need to
have a meaningful order representing increasingly higher levels of the latent trait still holds.
Moreover, the interpretation of the responses remains intuitively easy to understand (the
lowest response category represents groups who had the lowest score for that particular
item). Therefore, we choose to continue the MHM analysis with the sum score of the
groups as represented in Table A.2 of Appendix E.
Sijtsma and Molenaar (2002) designed a goodness-of-fit analyses based on Mokken
(1971)’s work, with which one can derive observable consequences from the mathematical
formulation of the MHM. The MHM is based on three important assumptions.
• Local independence: there should be no learning or any other kind of development
relevant to item performance during test taking;
• Unidimensionality: the items in the test are driven by one latent trait only;
• Monotonicity: people, or in our case groups, are expected to produce higher scores
the higher their latent trait level.
The MHM requires the data to comply with these assumptions, and there are three
observable consequences to check whether these assumptions hold in the data. The first
observable consequence of the MHM is that the covariances between items should be non-
negative. Second, each Item Step Response Function (ISRF) that is estimated from the
data should be non-decreasing. Third, the quality indices for MHM scales – the scalability
coefficients Hi, Hij, and H – should be checked.
The first part of our MHM analysis is to check the covariances between all item pairs,
as presented in Table 4.3. Mokken (1971) proved that if the assumptions of local inde-
pendence, unidimensionality, and monotonicity hold in the data, all pairs of items are
non-negatively correlated. All covariances between item pairs appear to be nonnegative.
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Table 4.3: Bivariate Pearson correlations of all item pairs
social5 ongoing1 outcome5 outcome8 outcome10
social5 Correlation 1
Significance
ongoing1 Correlation 0.272* 1
Significance 0.061
outcome5 Correlation 0.107 0.579*** 1
Significance 0.468 0.000
outcome8 Correlation 0.430*** 0.509*** 0.244* 1
Significance 0.002 0.000 0.095
outcome10 Correlation 0.298** 0.788*** 0.566*** 0.431*** 1
Significance 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.002
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed)
Next, we analyze the data with MSP5, of which the most important output is presented
in Appendix F. We have verified that there are no significant decreases in the ISRFs, which
supports the assumption of latent monotonicity. Because this is a technical discussion, we
refer the interested reader to a further clarification in Appendix F.
For the last part of our analysis we examine the scalability coefficients. From a theo-
retical point of view, the scalability coefficients are not allowed to be negative under the
MHM, and any item, item pair, or scale with a nonnegative H-value is acceptable (Sijtsma
and Molenaar, 2002, p.36). However, small H-values indicate positive but weak discrimina-
tion power. Therefore, practically, item scalability coefficients greater than 0.3 are required
(Mokken, 1971, p.185). In the “overview final scale”, as presented in Table 4.4, we can ob-
serve that none of the items have negative H-values, that all item H-values are significantly
larger than 0, and that all item H-values are larger than the lowerbound criterion of 0.3.
This indicates that all items are good indicators of the underlying construct, and supports
the MHM. Because we observe that all H-values for the item pairs are nonnegative, and the
scale H-value is 0.46, we may consider these five items to form a medium to strong scale
for accuracy of ordering persons by means of total sumscore on one latent trait (Sijtsma
and Molenaar, 2002; Mokken, 1971), which is in our case group Sensemaking.
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Table 4.4: Item coefficients from MHM scale analysis
Item ID Item Mean Item H-value Z-score
social5 I would have wanted to discuss more 2.98 0.32 3.97
than we actually did.
ongoing1 The decision making process in our 6.12 0.56 7.12
group was smooth and continuous.
outcome5 In our team, we updated and developed 6.54 0.39 4.98
our initial sense of the situation.
outcome8 In our team, our grasp of what was 4.19 0.44 5.64
happening sometimes began to loosen.
outcome10 In our team, we had the feeling of 6.40 0.56 6.96
order, clarity, and rationality.
Scale coefficient H = 0.46
Scale Z-score = 9.02
4.5 Discussion
We started the construction of our measurement scale with 28 items grounded in Weick’s
Sensemaking theory to measure group Sensemaking in crisis management. Out of these
28 items, nine items were specifically aimed at measuring social Sensemaking, nine items
at ongoing Sensemaking, and ten items at measuring Sensemaking outcome. However, we
had to exclude most of these items after our intraclass correlation analyses of reliability
and non-independence. An important question to answer is why many items had to be
eliminated in this shift. We present several reasons for this.
ICC(1) values are not biased by either group size or the number of groups in the sample
(Bliese, 1998; Bliese and Halverson, 1998), which makes them directly comparable across
studies. However, the significance of the F-test for ICC(1), which we used to determine
whether there is a significant group effect, is influenced by the number and size of the units
in a sample (Klein et al., 2000), as the degrees of freedom for the F-statistic are sample
dependent (McGraw and Wong, 1996; Shrout and Fleiss, 1979). When compared to other
studies, such as by Ostroff on the influence of satisfaction on turnover intentions with data
collected from 13,808 teachers from about 350 schools (Bliese, 2000), or the influence of
work hours on psychological well-being with data collected from 7,382 respondents from
99 U.S. Army Companies (Bliese and Halverson, 1998), we may consider our study with
144 individuals in 48 teams a relatively small sample. In our case one individual can cause
a relatively large within-group variance of the team, and this can cause a non-significant
group effect for a particular item if this happens in a few teams concerning the same item.
In search for other explanations of the rejection of most of the items, we refer back to
the ICC(1) calculations. Low ICC(1) values are the result of low consensus within groups,
low consistency, or both (LeBreton and Senter, 2008). For most of the items, the ICC(1)
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value was not significantly larger than 0, and in some cases even negative, indicating a large
degree of variance within groups and/or a great deal of homogeneity in group means. This
implicates that either (1) there was a large degree of difference between the individual
perceivements of the group’s behavior, or (2) the item was not suitable to discriminate
between the different group behaviors.
In the first case, the problem could have been that the wording of the items was
not clear or that it was too difficult for individuals to relate the question to their group
process. Although it is possible that either one of these reasons was the problem for some
of the items, the most reasonable explanation is that many items were too subjective to
represent the behavior of the group. Although we excluded the most subjective properties
of Sensemaking in the construction of this scale, the items remain subjective in nature. We
required the respondents to give their subjective view on the group process, and apparently
individuals within groups did not always consistently rate their Sensemaking behavior.
This is a more general problem of trying to measure subjective criteria, and is possibly
resolved when using larger group sizes.
In the second case, the mean group responses were too homogeneous, indicating that
the item might characterize an aspect of Sensemaking which was either good for most of
the teams, or bad for most of the teams. This concurs with a closer look at the standard
deviations of the aggregated items, as shown in the right part of Table 4.1. The average
standard deviation of the mean for the nine items with negative ICC(1) values (Table 4.2)
is 0.459 and for the seven items with small to medium ICC(1) value it is 0.538, while the
average standard deviation of the mean for the five items in the final scale is 0.618. The
between-group variance of the rejected items appeared to be too small to compensate for
the within-group variance.
Because the ICC(1) value measuring effect size is reasonably large for social5, ongo-
ing1, outcome5, outcome8, and outcome10, and significantly greater than 0, aggregation of
individual responses to these items into group responses is warranted (Bliese, 2000; Klein
et al., 2000; LeBreton and Senter, 2008). Because the observable consequences of the MHM
were satisfied in the data, we may include all five items in our final group-Sensemaking-
in-humanitarian-crisis-response measurement scale. The final 5-item scale is presented in
Table 4.5. These five items represent the (1) effective use of social resources, (2) flow of
the group process, (3) elaboration on initial situation awareness, (4) control of situation,
and (5) perceived comprehensibility. We recommend using the average group responses as
an aggregated measure for each item. The descriptive statistics of our aggregated item
responses can also be found in Table 4.5. If these averages of all five items are summed to-
gether, one can reliably order groups according to their Sensemaking attainment (Cronbach
α = 0.768).
If we subsequently apply this scale to our data of 48 teams, we obtain a scale in which
the lowest group Sensemaking attainment in the experiment is rated with a score of 6.667
and the highest 17.333, with a mean of 13.694 and a standard deviation of 2.251 (see
Chapter 5).
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Table 4.5: The five group Sensemaking in humanitarian crisis response measurement scale vari-
ables, with the descriptive statistics of the aggregated responses
Group Sensemaking variable Mean St.Dev. Min. Max.
Effective use of social resources
I would have wanted to discuss more than we
actually did.
1.951 0.734 0.00 3.33
Flow of the group process
The decision making process in our group was
smooth and continuous.
3.042 0.625 1.33 4.00
Elaboration on initial situation awareness
In our team, we updated and developed our ini-
tial sense of the situation.
3.181 0.456 2.00 4.00
Control of situation
In our team, our grasp of what was happening
sometimes began to loosen.
2.389 0.699 0.67 3.33
Perceived comprehensibility
In our team, we had the feeling of order, clarity,
and rationality.
3.132 0.574 1.00 4.00
4.6 Chapter Conclusions
Sensemaking is usually abstractly used in literature and practice, and consequently difficult
to get a grasp of and to quantify. In this chapter we presented a five-item scale to measure
group Sensemaking in crisis management, based on Weick’s perspective of Sensemaking
and tested in student teams after a humanitarian crisis response experiment. This scale
can form the basis of a new era in research on Sensemaking in humanitarian crisis response
teams, as it is the first attempt to measure Sensemaking. By using this scale, teams can be
rank ordered according to their Sensemaking attainment, and researchers can study this
Sensemaking attainment either as dependent or independent variable.
There are two limitations of this research. First, although we have verified that the
observable consequences of MHM are satisfied in our data, it does not prove the model to be
correct. If these observable consequences are not satisfied in the data, the model is rejected,
but our analysis only supports the model. Second, there is a need for validation of our
scale, preferably in real-life crisis management teams. Future research should ideally use a
larger sample size and larger group sizes in an attempt to validate our rejected Sensemaking
items. An important direction for future research is the study of how information systems
can optimally support Sensemaking attainment in humanitarian crisis management teams.
With our group-Sensemaking-in-humanitarian-crisis-response measurement scale, research
can be concretely directed at designing SSS in these contexts.

Chapter 5
Group Sensemaking: The Hidden
Factor in Group Decision Making∗
No amount of experimentation can ever prove me right;
a single experiment can prove me wrong.
Albert Einstein
This chapter presents an experimental study on group decision making in humanitarian
response teams, for which we quantitatively examine the role of Sensemaking. The setup
of the experiment is largely grounded on the authors’ participant observation experiences
in a humanitarian response exercise. The aim of the chapter is to find additional answers
to research question 3 and to answer research question 7 and research question 8. The
answers to the research questions are formulated in Chapter 6.
The chapter is outlined as follows. In Section 5.1 we describe the reality of humanitarian
crisis response teams, including our observations of information management procedures
and Sensemaking support during the Triplex exercise on which the experiment is based.
Section 5.2 is dedicated to discussing theory on group decision making and information pro-
cessing, as is relevant to our experimental study. In Section 5.3 we present our conceptual
research model and formulate research hypotheses. In Section 5.4 we describe the method
of research, the hidden profile experimental study designed according to our experiences in
the Triplex exercise, including the results of two pilot experiments which we conducted. In
Section 5.5 we continue with the presentation of the results and their implication for the
different hypotheses. In Section 5.6 we finalize the chapter with discussion and conclusions.
∗This chapter is based to a great extent on Muhren and Van de Walle (2009) and Muhren and Van de
Walle (2010c)
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5.1 Information Management in Humanitarian Crisis
Response: The Triplex Exercise
In response to large-scale humanitarian crises, UN OCHA has the mandate to mobilize,
direct, and coordinate international assistance1. The United Nations Disaster Assessment
and Coordination (UNDAC) system is part of OCHA and is designed to assist the UN in the
coordination of incoming international relief at the site of the emergency and in providing
information during the first phase of a sudden-onset emergency (United Nations, 2006). In
the last 15 years, UN OCHA deployed an UNDAC team to around 200 missions, recently,
among others, to the earthquakes in Haiti and Pakistan, the floods in Nepal, Honduras, and
Panama, and the cyclone in Myanmar. UNDAC does not deliver humanitarian assistance,
but provides support through on-site coordination, emergency assessment, and information
collection and dissemination (United Nations, 2006).
In situations combining a high number of humanitarian actors and a rapidly evolving
emergency situation requiring a high degree of coordination, the UNDAC team sets up
an OSOCC for the coordination of the operational activities undertaken by humanitarian
organizations, including UN agencies, the government, and NGOs. Information manage-
ment is a core activity in UNDAC missions. In the UNDAC Field Handbook, the task of
information management is defined as to “compile and analyze the information input from
outside sources (. . . ) and convert it into appropriate output format for dissemination to
stakeholders” with the expected result of “provision of timely output of analyzed informa-
tion in appropriate format” (United Nations, 2006, Chapter E, p.18). Among others this
information management aspect of UNDAC missions is exercised at Triplex.
Triplex is a biennial humanitarian exercise organized by the International Humanitarian
Partnership, a voluntary international cooperation which provides support for international
humanitarian operations. In September 2008 the Triplex exercise took place during three
days in the border area of Norway and Sweden.
The exercise was based on a floods scenario, which affected both Eastlandia and
Westlandia – two countries which had been created for the purpose of the exercise.
In reality, Westlandia corresponded to Østlandet region in Norway and Eastlandia
corresponded to Värmland County in Sweden. Westlandia and Eastlandia were two very
different countries: Westlandia was a medium developed and peaceful country with high
involvement of international organizations, while Eastlandia was an autocratic and low
developed country, engaged in internal conflicts and generally hostile to foreign assistance.
The area bordering Westlandia and Eastlandia was inhabited by Morokuliens, a minority
and economically less-developed group in both countries. The scenario combined both
seasonal flooding and flash flooding. Triplex was organized as realistically as possible,
with participants staying in an actual base camp and using vehicles and communication
equipment as in an actual field operation. Moreover, Norwegian and Swedish municipal-
ities were actively participating in the exercise by playing their role as local authorities
and affected population.
1United Nations General Assembly GA Resolution 2816 (XXVI) of 14 December 1971
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In Subsection 5.1.1 we describe the research methodology we used at the Triplex exer-
cise. Next (Subsection 5.1.2), we present our observations of humanitarian information
management practices at the Triplex exercise, specifically regarding the needs assessment
process. Finally, in Subsection 5.1.3 we discuss our findings from a Sensemaking support
perspective.
5.1.1 Research methodology
During the Triplex exercise we2 were embedded in Belgian First Aid and Support Team (B-
FAST). Together with another B-FAST team member we were delegated to join the
UNDAC team as information managers in the OSOCC. We had the task to evaluate
the new joint needs assessment process that was tested in this exercise. For this reason
we were working in the OSOCC and always present at the debriefings of the assessment
teams. To get an accurate picture of the assessment process we also joined a team to
conduct assessments. This gave us the opportunity not only to observe the phenomena
we were interested in, “the fundamental base of all research methods in the social and
behavioral sciences” (Angrosino, 2005), but also to conduct a specific form of observation:
participant observation (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002). Participant observation originated in
cultural anthropology and is now a commonly used method in social sciences to “collect
data in naturalistic settings” by researchers who “observe and/or take part in the common
and uncommon activities of the people being studied” (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002, p.2).
By taking notes and pictures of our experiences, and studying various internal and external
documents such as the UNDAC Handbook (United Nations, 2006), we are able to provide
an accurate account of the information management activities that took place. For this
study we take a particular emphasis on the needs assessment process, but will also describe
the information management processes that took place in general.
5.1.2 Observations
There were four important information management processes taking place in the exercise:
(1) information gathering, (2) information sharing, (3) information presentation, and (4)
information dissemination. Important information on the humanitarian response, such as
which humanitarian organizations were working in the area, who would be the contact
person of the organization, to which cluster would they belong, and who should be the
cluster lead, was gathered and registered in the OSOCC. Whenever humanitarian organi-
zations would have information that was relevant to the OSOCC, they would be able to
visit or contact the OSOCC through telephone and e-mail. One UNDAC staff member was
in charge of gathering and documenting information from all possible sources, such as me-
dia, e-mail, internally shared information, information from humanitarian organizations,
information from local authorities, information from the clusters, and information from the
2Bartel Van de Walle and Willem Muhren
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Humanitarian Coordinator, who is the senior-most UN official in a country experiencing
a humanitarian crisis. However, the most important input of information for the OSOCC
was the needs assessment process, which will be described further on. The OSOCC had
a special communications room where people were constantly monitoring the radio traffic
on the designated channels, in particular when assessment teams went out to conduct an
assessment.
All gathered information was internally shared between UNDAC staff through Microsoft
Groove. Microsoft Groove provides a platform with virtual workspaces through which
groups of people can collaborate both online and offline, enabling UNDAC members to
work jointly on the same documents, create, share, and store information in workspaces,
and communicate both synchronously and asynchronously. The designated information
gatherer was continuously documenting the incoming information in Groove, scanning
Groove for any updates in the folders, and making sure that the right people would receive
the information (which would mostly be the UNDAC staff in charge of the operations).
Besides this internal information sharing, UNDAC chaired general coordination meetings
on a regular basis in which information was shared with the larger international community.
Usually UNDAC would organize a meeting every morning and every evening with delegates
from all international humanitarian organizations. In these meetings the actual situation
was discussed, and a plan of action was made on how to continue the relief. UNDAC also
facilitated meetings with the cluster leads.
There were several ways in which UNDAC presented available information to visitors
and to their own team members in order to facilitate the making sense of the situation.
The OSOCC maintained a log book in Groove of all telephone and radio messages received
or sent with action taken, which was updated by anyone who received or sent a message.
UNDAC displayed information maps on a wall of the OSOCC which showed the area of
the floods. Different types of information were indicated with post-it notes on the map
displaying the most actual situation, such as the location of the assessment teams, key
logistics features such as airfields and/or railway stations, and the security incidents in
the area. The contact details were published next to the information maps, showing the
phone numbers of people from the local authorities, UNDAC staff, team leaders from all
humanitarian organizations, and the cluster leads. There was a screen projected on the wall
with a display of the email inbox, so that all UNDAC staff could notice incoming emails.
A so-called “pigeon hole” was created, where hardcopies of the assessments, minutes of
meetings, and all other incoming information were stored at a central location. UNDAC
maintained a directory with a data sheet on each humanitarian agency, indicating their
contact points and areas of operation. A notice board was placed just outside the OSOCC,
on which humanitarian organizations could leave notices regarding relief operations and
coordination meetings, and on which UNDAC could display key information relevant to all
humanitarian organizations, such as a general meeting schedule and contact information
of the cluster leads. Finally, UNDAC made sure that stakeholders could get hardcopies of
the information available in the OSOCC, such as situation reports and contact lists.
UNDAC would disseminate information through so-called “situation reports”, which de-
scribed a short overview of the current situation, the assessments that had been conducted,
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and the response that had been initiated. These situation reports were then distributed
through Virtual OSOCC3, a web-based information platform on which crisis information is
exchanged by relief actors working in all parts of the world, to the international community,
which needed this information to make decisions on providing humanitarian assistance.
One of the information managers in the OSOCC was continuously disseminating informa-
tion through VOSOCC and scanning it for relevant information, such as relief planned by
various international humanitarian organizations.
The most important input of information for the OSOCC was the needs assessment pro-
cess. As we base our experimental study on this process, we provide a detailed description
of how this worked in practice below.
The UNDAC staff did not conduct assessments themselves, but coordinated the joint
needs assessments that were conducted by NGOs, UN agencies, and other international
responders. The focus in the exercise was on rapid initial assessments, which should help
determine the extent of a crisis and its impact on the population as well as needs for
international assistance during the immediate relief phase.
During the exercise usually five teams would go out to conduct an assessment each
day, to different locations, and each team would comprise around five people from different
humanitarian organizations. Teams would be equipped with fixed radio in their cars and
standard assessment forms for each individual. Radios were mostly just used for security
reasons; teams had to report their location at different time stamps, and could use the
radio in case of an emergency. The assessment forms were structured according to seven
different themes of information that had to be assessed at each location: “demographics”,
“health”, “water, sanitation, and hygiene”, “food and nutrition”, “shelter and non-food
items”, “protection”, and “logistics”. Most of the teams assigned team members to one
or two of these specific themes. The different team members would prepare themselves
for the assessment by thoroughly reading through the questions in the relevant templates.
When arriving at the crisis area, the assessment was mostly conducted by small groups
of people, but each team member made sure that the team gathered information on their
assigned sectors.
The rapid initial assessments were conducted through observation and semi-structured
interviews. Observation gives a “feel” for the situation through sounds, smells, and visual
impressions. More specific information was obtained by interviewing survivors, represen-
tatives of the survivors, and key officials, and that information was cross-checked with
observations. In this information gathering phase, the assessment teams would not consult
the assessment forms but would ask for information with the questions in the back of their
head while making notes on a notepad. After the information gathering phase – in the
car and back at the camp site – the teams would discuss the situation, what they had
observed and heard, and would fill in the assessment form stating the outcome of their
discussion. UNDAC staff debriefed the assessment teams when they completed the form,
and shared this vital information as quickly as possible with the other UNDAC members
in the OSOCC.
3http://ocha.unog.ch/virtualosocc/
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5.1.3 Discussion of observations from a Sensemaking support
perspective
In Subsection 1.3.2 we discussed that the Sensemaking properties should become resources
in order to support Sensemaking optimally in humanitarian crisis response teams. Based
on our observations in the Triplex exercise and Weick’s suggestions listed in Table 1.1, we
reflect below on how IS can improve support for Sensemaking by needs assessment teams.
We do so for each Sensemaking property.
Social context
Microsoft Groove supports conversation in the OSOCC, but conversation with assessment
teams is not supported yet. If IS support real-time communication between the OSOCC
and the assessment teams, the latter will be able to receive important feedback on the
situation and what to do, as the UNDAC staff has an overview of the situation as a whole.
This will improve the assessment process: teams receive the latest information on crisis
sites, affected people and the relief process, can obtain hints on other nearby areas to
assess, and can much faster give important assessment findings back to the OSOCC.
Identity construction
Assessment team members and UNDAC staff all have their own identity, as they are
working for various different humanitarian organizations but are delegated to these
teams when a crisis strikes. When they go out to a mission, and people from various
humanitarian organizations form teams to conduct assessments, they change their identity.
IS could support assessment team members and people who communicate with them in
the OSOCC to feel part of the same team with the same shared mission. This can be
achieved when the assessment team members and people in the OSOCC use the same
system; in this way, the teams will have the same defined identity.
Retrospection
After conducting the assessment individually, team members sit together to review what
they saw and come to a shared assessment. However, there is a time gap between the
actual assessment and the discussion and writing down of the final result. IS could help
in capturing accurately what they assess, so they can review it whenever they need it:
when constructing the final assessment by the team, and for transferring the assessment
to the OSOCC. IS can assist this process by enabling digital capturing of information
(e.g., pictures, digital notes instead of pen-and-paper ones), which will secure a faster and
more accurate process.
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Cue extraction
IS can assist actors in focusing on cues by indicating which cues are important in
a certain setting according to historical data. When assessment teams are able to
review previous assessments, they have a point of reference and can compare it to their
own situation. IS could enable the teams to indicate some key features of the crisis
(such as type of crisis, climate characteristics, type of relief needed, etc.) to obtain
best-practice advice on what to pay attention to in that type of situation. The same
feature can be applied to the OSOCC. As UNDAC is now using Microsoft Groove in
their missions, information from previous missions can be consulted. There is, however,
no time to go through all documents of previous missions. Moreover, through an IS in
which assessment teams and the OSOCC are connected, UNDAC staff can give on-the-
spot advice on which cues to pay attention to as they have the overview of what is going on.
Ongoing
As assessment teams are literally “thrown into the middle of things and forced to act
without the benefit of a stable sense of what is happening” (Weick, 2001), they could be
supported in continuous updating of the situation in order to make their experience and
actions seem ongoing rather than an interrupted series of events. Again, communication
with the OSOCC is important in this since it enables assessment teams to be continuously
updated on the situation in the crisis area, giving them a stable sense of what is going on.
Plausibility
The focus in the assessment process is currently too much on probability than on
possibility. Assessment team members make observations at a crisis site and conduct
interviews, then negotiate their points of view with each other, only after that –
when the most accurate picture is crafted – to communicate an assessment with the
OSOCC. IS could again stimulate reflection in earlier stages of the assessment process
between OSOCC and assessment teams, in which the assessment team members report a
plausible account of what is going on, and on which the OSOCC can give relevant feedback.
Enactment
IS could stimulate action as a means of gaining more understanding of the situation. As
we have seen in the previous discussion, IS can support various types of actions in these
processes. Examples of action taken by assessment teams are interaction on what is going
on and exchange of plausible accounts. The UNDAC people working in the OSOCC act
when they actively engage in the assessment process and share their interpretation of the
situation.
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5.2 Group Decision Making and Information
Processing
In humanitarian crisis response, as in other decision making settings, group members share
certain kinds of information but not other kinds. This unshared information may arise
either by chance or by design (Stasser and Titus, 1987): delegating specific sectors to
different group members in the needs assessment team results in unshared information by
design, and the fact that group members use different sources of information and visit
different places results in unshared information by chance.
A hidden profile task is a laboratory tool (Hollingshead, 1996) for investigating
information processes in group decision making, in particular concerning situations of
unshared information, and is therefore a good tool for us to study the support, effect, and
impact of Sensemaking on information sharing and performance in humanitarian crisis
response. A hidden profile exists when group members individually have possession of
only a part of the information required to reach an optimal decision or solve a problem,
so the group needs to pool and process this information to solve the problem or reach the
optimal decision (Choo, 2007). Stasser and Titus (1985, 1987) make a distinction between
information that before discussion is shared (common information) and unshared (unique
information). Because the common information supports a suboptimal alternative,
individuals in a group need to pool the unique information to obtain perfect information
(cf. van den Herik et al., 2002) as a group and find the optimal alternative – the hidden
profile.
In the following subsection (Subsection 5.2.1) we discuss hidden profile studies more in
detail, specifically regarding information sharing. In Subsection 5.2.2 we argue for an in-
clusion of Sensemaking in hidden profile studies. In Subsection 5.2.3 we discuss group
support systems as they relate to humanitarian needs assessment. Finally, in Subsec-
tion 5.2.4 we discuss information load as an important independent variable to take into
account in a hidden profile study simulating humanitarian crisis response.
5.2.1 Information sharing
Groups have the potential to make better decisions than any individual in the group,
because groups have the ability to pool the available information held by all individu-
als. However, (hidden profile) studies have revealed that groups consistently fail to pool
their available information, achieving distinctly suboptimal decisions (Dennis, 1996; Ligh-
tle et al., 2009; Stasser and Titus, 2003; Rutkowski et al., 2006). Stasser and Titus (1985),
the founders of hidden profile tasks, discovered that groups tend to exchange, discuss,
and use information that is known to all the members at the expense of information that
is known to a single member when jointly making a decision. Common information will
also be brought up more repeatedly during discussion (Stasser and Stewart, 1992). Early
experimental results (e.g., Stasser and Titus, 1987) reveal that much of the discussion is
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devoted to reiterating already-exchanged information.
The first bias that causes the large focus on shared information in group decision
making is the informational bias, which emerges because individual group members are
given partial sets of information that do not reflect the balance of available supporting
arguments for the various decision alternatives in hidden profile studies (Stasser and Titus,
1985). The second bias is the preference bias, meaning that individuals are biased in their
preferences as they prefer alternatives at the onset of discussion that they would not prefer
if they had complete information (Stasser and Titus, 1985). These two biases lead to a bias
in the content of the discussion, which tends to reflect but not correct biases introduced by
the distribution of information over group members before discussion, resulting in unequally
discussion of common information as opposed to the group members’ unique information
(Stasser and Titus, 1985).
Other reasons for the focus on shared information besides the previously mentioned
biases are that an item of information is more likely to enter discussion if it is shared
rather than unshared and if it favors rather than opposes the existent preferences of group
members. Group discussion is often thematic and consensus confirming, as it tends to
focus on supporting an existing or emerging consensus, and group members will actively
advocate their preferred alternative during debate (Stasser and Titus, 1985).
In order to make use of the group advantage and make better informed decisions than
any individual would be able to make, groups need to pool their unique information.
The focus in groups has to be redirected from common information discussion to unique
information discussion. Effective pooling of unique information involves three dimensions
of discussion: unique information has to be (1) mentioned, (2) reconsidered, and (3) focused
on (Stasser and Stewart, 1992). Mentioning of unique information in itself is not sufficient,
as previous studies have indicated that the group’s attention tends to redirect swiftly to
the common information. Unique information has to be repeated and form a significant
proportion of the group’s discussion.
5.2.2 Sensemaking
Stasser (1988) found that even if group members do not advocate their preference and
are unbiased in their contribution of information, they would fail to discover the hidden
profile. Stasser and Birchmeier (2003) interestingly note that group decision making is
inherently a convergent process and seems to be the antithesis of group creativity. The
information sharing construct embodies this convergent behavior, for which members share
different pieces of information and narrow down the decision alternatives to reach a best
decision. But there is more to good performance – managing and responding to a crisis,
finding the hidden profile – than effective information sharing per se. What is needed is
a construct which embodies the more cognitive, information processing and creative be-
havior of groups. To take the example of humanitarian crisis response teams: The sharing
of information is not the only characteristic of their group decision making process which
influences performance. More information sharing is important, but it is also important
how they cope with interruptions, and how they create and maintain an infrastructure for
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their Sensemaking communication activities of noticing what is going on in the environ-
ment, updating their understanding of the situation, more specific inquiring, triangulating
information and negotiate on what is going on, verifying information, reflecting with team
members, and enacting to gain understanding of their situation (see Chapter 3).
We believe that the group’s Sensemaking attainment is an important mediating factor.
In this chapter we investigate whether and how Sensemaking plays a role. We focus on
social Sensemaking, ongoing Sensemaking, and Sensemaking outcomes, as these are previ-
ously argued to be of most significant importance in group Sensemaking in humanitarian
crisis response (see Section 4.1).
5.2.3 Group support systems
Our observations of the needs assessment process suggest that the current communication
process – radio communication while assessing the needs and subsequently face-to-face
group discussion to establish a single assessment which is handed over to UNDAC – has
potential to be improved. Previous hidden profile studies (Stasser and Titus, 1985, 1987;
Stasser, 1992) also seem to suggest that face-to-face discussion seems poorly suited to
discovering hidden profiles. As Stasser puts it, “face-to-face discussions are not social
systems that facilitate the airing of unshared information” (Stasser, 1999).
Group Support Systems (GSS) provide groups with several benefits over face-to-face
collaboration, such as the ability to communicate in parallel with each other, the removal of
barriers to communication, increasing equality of participation, the possibility of storing all
contributed information in an automated, digital group memory, and tools and structures to
coordinate group processes, thereby increasing the quality of decision making (Turoff et al.,
1993; Shirani, 2006). Moreover, GSS can enable a collaborative learning environment that
facilitates the acquisition of knowledge (Muhren et al., 2009). GSS not only offer benefits
to group decision making. Nunamaker et al. (1991)’s distinction between process gains
and process losses of group work using GSS makes it possible to more specifically identify
the pros and cons of GSS usage. There has been a substantial number of hidden profile
studies in which face-to-face groups were compared to GSS supported groups, such as by
Dennis (1996), Hollingshead (1996), Shirani (2006), and Kerr and Murthy (2009). There
seem to be large differences in the results of these studies. In some instances, computer-
mediated groups tend to suppress information compared to face-to-face groups, make fewer
comments, are unable to process information effectively due to lack of immediate feedback,
and take longer to reach decisions (Hollingshead, 1996; Kerr and Murthy, 2009). When
in other studies groups supported by GSS share more information (Dennis, 1996; Shirani,
2006), the unique information was often not exploited in the decision making process and
consequently the probability of discovering the hidden profile did not tend to increase.
In the reality of humanitarian crisis response teams as we have observed, it takes a lot
of time and traveling effort to reach a decision: First every individual team member has
to go out with pen and paper to make an assessment while using basic radio equipment,
they have to convene together to compare and discuss their findings and finally travel
to the OSOCC to debrief UNDAC team members in person. To have assessment teams
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communicate with support of more advanced GSS (e.g., handheld PDAs) would first and
foremost increase time efficiency: They would reach a group decision faster as they would
be better able to communicate when they are physically separated and would not have
to travel to gather face-to-face, and the OSOCC would be sooner informed of the group
assessments resulting in a quicker response of the international humanitarian community to
the crisis affected population. We therefore will compare both these GSS settings to each
other in our research: The “traditional GSS setting” characterized by radio communication
followed by face-to-face communication, and the “new GSS setting” characterized by text-






Figure 5.1: The two GSS settings that are studied
We are obviously interested in whether the effectiveness of the group decision making
process can be increased with GSS. But more advanced GSS support would already signif-
icantly impact humanitarian assistance in terms of time efficiency if it would not “harm”
the decision making process, i.e. if the use of GSS would not lead to a decrease in group
decision making effectiveness.
5.2.4 Information load
Decision tasks may differ in the amount of information available to decision makers (Stasser
and Titus, 1987). Intuitively, it seems rather obvious that the more information groups
have at their disposal, the more informed and thus the better their decisions will be. This
however is not necessarily the case, and would almost be argued for the contrary, as too
much information causes situations of information overload. Information overload (Hiltz
and Turoff, 1985; Rutkowski and Saunders, 2010) is a state in which information processing
capabilities and the information loads encountered are mismatched (Sutcliffe and Weick,
2008). The load of information which responders are exposed to and are able to deal with
plays an important role in crisis response (Van de Walle and Turoff, 2008; Turoff and Hiltz,
2009). Information overload causes groups to restrict their information processing and is
very harmful to reliable crisis response (Turoff et al., 2004).
The problem in situations in which people are struggling to make sense, situations of
ambiguity and equivocality (see Chapter 2), “is not that the world is imperfectly under-
stood and that more information will remedy that. The problem is that information may
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not resolve misunderstandings” (Weick, 1995, p.92). Klein et al. (2006) even call it a myth
that more information leads to better Sensemaking. Sensemaking skills however can make
the seemingly inexplicable and irrelevant load more relevant (Sutcliffe and Weick, 2008).
“The meaning of a particular piece of data depends on what else is going on, what else
could be going on, what has gone on, and [what] the observer expects or intends to happen”
(Woods et al., 2002). When people create a better understanding of the situation, they are
able to link more of the cues with their frame of reference, and less pieces of information are
considered to overload them. Higher Sensemaking attainment should therefore facilitate
the management of excess information load and lead to higher performance, but this does
not necessarily depend on the information load itself.
In humanitarian crisis response teams, high information load could cause problems of
information sharing and information processing. Although we do not expect information
load to influence Sensemaking, it is – as previously discussed – of high practical relevance
to take the load of information that groups are exposed to into account for our study, and
examine its influence on information sharing and performance. Stasser and Titus (1987)
and Stasser (1992) have studied the effect of lower and higher information loads before
in hidden profile studies, and found evidence suggesting that groups may disseminate
information more effectively when decision tasks involve relatively little information.
5.3 Research Model and Hypotheses
Stasser and Titus (1985, 1987) and later other researchers (e.g., Lightle et al., 2009)
focused very much on the effect of different experimental conditions on outcome variables,
especially on information recall which does not play a role in our experiment, and not
on process variables which measure the information that was shared. Nearly all other
hidden profile studies that do include process constructs in the research model, such as
Mennecke (1997), only use information sharing to explain the effect of the experimental
condition(s) on performance. We argue that the group’s Sensemaking attainment is,
besides information sharing, another important mediating construct to determine the
performance of humanitarian crisis response teams. In this study we will test the effect
of the different humanitarian response settings (determined by the group support and
information load) which teams are confronted with on information sharing (the amount
of information exchange in general and the focus on unique information in particular)
and Sensemaking and subsequently performance. The conceptual research model with
hypothesized relationships between the different constructs is presented in Figure 5.2.
In the next subsections we formulate hypotheses on the influences of GSS setting (Sub-
section 5.3.1), information load (Subsection 5.3.2), information sharing (Subsection 5.3.3),
and Sensemaking (Subsection 5.3.4) on the other constructs based on the hypothesized
relationships indicated in Figure 5.2.















Figure 5.2: Conceptual research model
5.3.1 GSS setting
Although face-to-face group decision making settings are not suited for optimal (unique)
information sharing, GSS studies do not provide conclusive evidence for improvement.
Our goal is to study whether a change in support of the group decision making process
will at least be as good as the current communication and decision making procedures.
The difference of our study to traditional hidden profile studies, in which GSS supported
groups are compared to face-to-face groups, is that we include radio communication in
the communication process of the latter (see Figure 5.1) as this reflects the reality of
humanitarian crisis response teams.
Information pooling is a cognitively demanding process, and therefore groups must be
given the resources to make it feasible (Stasser and Birchmeier, 2003). In particular, the
GSS components of parallelism and group memory (Nunamaker et al., 1991) are said to
affect information sharing (Dennis, 1996) and are relevant to our study. Parallelism, the
ability of participants to communicate and enter information simultaneously and in par-
allel (Nunamaker et al., 1991), mitigates blocking caused by participants having to wait
for others to finish before contributing information (Dennis, 1996). Parallelism may also
encourage exchange of different information because more themes emerge and broader dis-
cussion of key issues takes place (Dennis, 1996). Parallelism therefore seems to support the
group’s exchange of information. This is in contrast to what other researchers have found,
who conclude that individuals tend to suppress information when using GSS (Hollingshead,
1996) and exchange less information than face-to-face groups (Hollingshead, 1996; Kerr and
Murthy, 2009).
We think that this contradiction can be explained by the type of GSS that is used,
and more in particular whether GSS supports structured discussions. In Dennis (1996)’
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study, groups were using a GSS in which they could enter their comments in boxes that
were prestructured according to the different topics that could be discussed. This makes
parallel discussion very efficient, as topics are grouped together and it is immediately clear
to what the newly inputted information relates to. In other words, there is no disadvantage
to team members contributing different types of information at the same time. On the
other hand, Hollingshead (1996) and Kerr and Murthy (2009) use unstructured GSS such
as a common message board.
In our case we want to test the effect of newly-introduced GSS support, handheld text-
based communication devices. If team members contribute different types of information
at the same time in a text-based group discussion on a PDA, all information is listed one
after the other, and there is no structure in the discussion. Parallelism therefore has a very
marginal effect on the group discussion, as team members will discuss one topic at a time.
The rehearsability (Dennis et al., 2008) of the communicating medium, on the other hand,
is expected to have a much stronger effect on the information exchanges, as it will take
more time for people to type and carefully craft a message than to verbally communicate
the same information.
Hypothesis 1a. Teams supported by simple text-based GSS exchange relatively
less information than teams discussing through radio and face-
to-face.
Because GSS can store the information that is exchanged, group memory is created, en-
abling participants to review and refer to previous information exchanges later in the dis-
cussion (Dennis, 1996). Moreover, a group memory enables participants to enter or read
information at their discretion, unlike in verbal communication where one has to listen to
the discussion and process information at the same time (Dennis, 1996). Group memory
may also reduce the need for social validation and enhance the acceptance and considera-
tion of unique information (Stasser and Birchmeier, 2003). Group memory therefore seems
to support the group’s focus on unique information. However, the unstructured nature of
our GSS support is expected to restrain this. Because in this unstructured GSS discussion
team members will have to scroll back and search for information that has already been
contributed previously, group memory is expected to have a marginal advantage and will
in practice most probably not lead to an increase in consideration of unique information.
Hypothesis 1b. There is no difference between teams supported by simple text-
based GSS and teams discussing through radio and face-to-face
in their focus on unique information in discussions.
As previously discussed on in Section 4.1, we focus in our group Sensemaking in humanitar-
ian crisis response research on the social Sensemaking and ongoing Sensemaking properties.
First we will discuss the hypothesized impact of the GSS setting on social Sensemaking.
Recall that we previously (see Chapter 3) identified five different communication activities
that actors use in crisis situations which characterize their social Sensemaking, interacting
behavior. Four of these Sensemaking communication activities – triangulating, inquiring,
verifying, and reflecting – seem of high importance in this particular group Sensemaking
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setting; the fifth activity – updating – is more concerned with building and maintaining
a network of contacts in a crisis setting and seems of minor importance to our current
study. In Chapter 3 we used MST (Dennis et al., 2008)’s media characteristics to identify
the media capability needs for these four types of interacting behavior. As presented in
Table 3.3, for triangulating, Sensemakers appeared to be best supported by high trans-
mission velocity, few symbol sets, and high parallelism, while for inquiring, verifying, and
reflecting, Sensemakers would be best supported by high transmission velocity, few symbol
sets, and low parallelism.
In our experimental setup we contrast the traditional GSS setting of radio and face-
to-face communication with the “new” GSS setting of simple text-based communication.
When comparing these settings to MST’s media characteristics, we observe that radio
communication can be characterized as having few symbol sets, high transmission velocity,
and low parallelism; face-to-face communication can be characterized as having medium
symbol sets, high transmission velocity, and medium parallelism; and text-based GSS com-
munication can be characterized as having few symbol sets, medium transmission velocity,
and medium-high parallelism. This would imply that our new GSS condition would be
better suited for Sensemaking’s triangulating activity due to the higher parallelism, while
radio communication and face-to-face communication would be better suited for Sense-
making’s inquiring, verifying, and reflecting due to its higher transmission velocity and
lower parallelism. Thus, when considering social Sensemaking, there is no clear advantage
of either GSS setting.
Second, we want to investigate the impact of the GSS setting on ongoing Sensemak-
ing. Ongoing Sensemaking implies the importance of having a smooth and continuous
communication process, in which the team can communicate without interruptions or can
recover swiftly from occurring interruptions (see Chapter 4). We experienced at Triplex
(see Section 5.1) that radio communication is an unreliable means of communication (Van
Den Eede et al., 2008a), through which it is very often difficult to understand what other
people are saying and which does not lead to a smooth communication process. We there-
fore hypothesize that this communication medium has a negative effect on the team’s
Sensemaking. On the contrary, text-based GSS support enables teams to continuously
type and share their information inputs without interruptions.
This leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Teams supported by simple text-based GSS attain higher Sense-
making than teams discussing through radio and face-to-face.
5.3.2 Information load
In a condition of low information load proportionally more of the information is expected
to be discussed than in a high information load condition (Stasser and Titus, 1987).
Hypothesis 3a. Teams exposed to lower information loads exchange relatively
more information than teams exposed to higher information
loads.
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High information load affects “what is bracketed as being in need of deciding” (Sutcliffe
and Weick, 2008). Information overload can lead to less systematic and less thorough in-
formation search and retrieval, and “a general lack of perspective, an inability to select out
relevant information, and increasing ‘distraction by irrelevant and interfering cues”’ (Sut-
cliffe and Weick, 2008). These are indications that groups exposed to higher information
loads will be less able to identify the importance of unique information and consecutively
will spend relatively less time on discussing unique information than groups exposed to
lower information loads.
Hypothesis 3b. Teams exposed to higher information loads focus relatively less
on unique information in their discussions than teams exposed
to lower information loads.
The suggestion by Weick (1995, p.92) and Klein et al. (2006) that more information does
not necessarily lead to better Sensemaking is very interesting and never examined before.
We will therefore test whether we can reject the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. Teams exposed to higher information loads attain higher Sense-
making than teams exposed to lower information loads.
5.3.3 Information sharing
From our literature study we did not find any indications that information sharing has an
effect on Sensemaking.
The more information groups are aware of, the better their decision will be (Mennecke,
1997). More information exchange leads to more informed group decisions than group
members could make individually (Stasser and Titus, 1985). It also has a corrective func-
tion: groups are able to reach an unbiased, complete picture of the decision alternatives
(Stasser and Titus, 1985). Discussing and identifying different types of information, both
common and unique, will lead to a higher consensus in groups.
Hypothesis 5a. Teams that exchange relatively more information perform better
than teams that exchange relatively less information.
“The information that members bring to the group plus the information that they gain
through discussion are important factors in shaping their individual preferences and their
collective decision” (Stasser and Titus, 1987). Research has shown that a common infor-
mation item is more likely to be discussed than a unique item (Stasser and Titus, 1987).
The discussion of unique information should be particularly persuasive in the context of
group discussions, as it has the potential to change a preference or modify the strength of
a preference. As unique information is biased towards the best decision, i.e. the hidden
profile, and more sharing of this information would lead to a change of preference in favor
of the hidden profile, this leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5b. Teams that focus relatively more on unique information in their
discussions perform better than teams that focus relatively less
on unique information in their discussions.
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5.3.4 Sensemaking
From literature review we did not find any indications that Sensemaking influences the
amount of information being discussed, but Sensemaking could influence the type of infor-
mation that is discussed. Groups with more diversity contribute more differing information
and points of view to a group discussion (Stasser and Titus, 1987). This highlights the
importance of (social) Sensemaking: groups that make more use of their social Sensemak-
ing resources should contribute more differing information and points of view to a group
discussion. In practice that means that a higher requisite variety (Ashby, 1956) will lead
to groups having more unique information to base their decision on. In our hidden pro-
file study, it means that teams using more social Sensemaking resources will manage to
identify and use more unique information. And teams that are better able to cope with
interruptions, who attain higher ongoing Sensemaking, will only be strengthened to keep
their focus on unique information.
Hypothesis 6. Teams that attain higher Sensemaking focus relatively more on
unique information than teams that attain lower Sensemaking.
“Sensemaking that is focused on interpretation and meaning mitigates overload” (Sutcliffe
and Weick, 2008). From our interpretive information processing perspective on Sensemak-
ing, teams that attain higher levels of Sensemaking, such as through making more use of
their social Sensemaking resources and being resilient to cope with interruptions, will be
able to better cope with overload, be able to better ascribe meaning to what is happening,
and hence perform better.
Hypothesis 7. Teams that attain higher Sensemaking perform better than teams
that attain lower Sensemaking.
5.4 Research Methodology
We conducted an experimental hidden profile study to test the hypotheses and the overall
research model, previously presented in Figure 5.2. In Subsection 5.4.1 we present more
information on the participants of our hidden profile study. In Subsection 5.4.2 we present
the task they were given. In Subsection 5.4.3 we outline the procedures of the experiment.
In Subsection 5.4.4 we discuss the two different treatments in the experiment: GSS setting
and information load. Finally, in Subsection 5.4.5 we discuss the different variables we
defined to measure the constructs from our research model (Figure 5.2).
5.4.1 Participants
One hundred forty four undergraduate and graduate students took part in the experimen-
tal sessions in spring 2010 at Tilburg University. Almost half of the participants were
Chinese (68 students), approximately twenty percent were Dutch (29 students), and other
participants came from Indonesia (7 students), Turkey (6 students), Germany (4 students),
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Vietnam (4 students), Bulgaria (4 students), Poland (3 students), Lithuania (2 students),
and single representatives from various other countries across the world. The average age
of the participants was 23 years, and 51% were female. The participants were randomly
assigned to a three-person team, for a total of 48 teams in the study.
5.4.2 Task
Hidden profile studies have hardly ever been applied to crisis management (Mentis et al.,
2009, as a notable exception). As there has not been a hidden profile study before on
group decision making in humanitarian assistance, we developed the case and hidden profile
outline ourselves. The task was based on a floods scenario, developed by UN OCHA for
exercise purposes, and was complemented with the authors’ insights and experiences gained
at the Triplex exercise and other exercises, humanitarian workshops, and case studies
(discussed in the previous chapters).
Following heavy rains in the fictive country of Juliandia, severe flooding severly affected
three districts, all bordering the neighboring country of Emirana: Norktown District, Grotti
District, and Petersted District. The students were told to be part of three-person UNDAC
teams that were deployed to the affected districts to conduct rapid initial assessments. The
role of the team was to advise the UN Humanitarian Coordinator to which district the
international humanitarian organizations need to deploy first.
The team members had to imagine to be traveling through the area separately to
conduct assessments by observing the impact of the crisis and interviewing survivors, school
teachers, priests, and key officials. In reality, each student was seated in a separate cubicle,
and was presented a set of information elements which he or she gathered on his or her
imaginary assessment trip on different sectors of humanitarian assistance: “health”, “water,
sanitation, and hygiene”, “food and nutrition”, “shelter and non-food items”, “logistics,
access, and security”, and depending on the information load condition, “protection”.
Although it was not explicitly mentioned, students were given two types of information for
each of the three affected districts: positive information and negative information. Positive
information indicated that humanitarian assistance was needed for the specific sector of
humanitarian assistance; negative information indicated that humanitarian assistance was
not needed for a specific sector in the specified area.
The students were explicitly told that the international humanitarian community can
respond to all the types of needs listed under the sectors of their assessment sheet, and that
they could consider all sectors to be of equal importance to each other for this exercise.
For example, a need in “health” was said to have the same importance of humanitarian
response as a need in “logistics access and security”. The students were instructed to
discuss the situation according to their assessment results with the other team members
and to give the Humanitarian Coordinator an advice on the order of priority of the three
districts for international humanitarian assistance.
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Hidden profile outline
Unlike in other hidden profile experiments, we made sure that positive and negative items
would cross out each other in order to facilitate the ease for participants to make an assess-
ment of the humanitarian situation. In traditional hidden profile experiments, participants
would for example receive positive and negative information items for student body pres-
ident candidates, and the hidden profile would be the candidate who had in total more
positive aspects than negative aspects. This would be very confusing for our participants,
as they are no experts in humanitarian assistance. We therefore did not ask them to make
judgments of what type of assistance (e.g., food or medical care) is more important in that
particular situation. In their case, they could cross out positive and negative information
items. There would be for instance a positive information item indicating that children
were feeling cold at night in that district, and a matching negative item indicating that
a relief agency was already sending blankets to the affected population in that area. If
all positive and negative items would be crossed out against each other, there would be a
few unmatched negative items for the wrong solutions (extra humanitarian assistance than
deemed necessary) and a few unmatched positive items for the hidden profile (needs of the
affected population that were not addressed yet).
The distribution of the different information items is presented in Appendix G. There
were two different versions of the task: One version with fewer information items (low in-
formation load) and a second version with more information items (high information load).
All team members within the same treatment had an equal mix of common information
(known to all team members) and unique information (known to only one team member).
Information elements were on average 32 words each. In total, there was 50% more positive
(information items in Appendix G with a “+” sign) than negative (information items in
Appendix G with a “–” sign) information for the hidden profile solution, and 50% more
negative than positive information for the other two districts. If therefore all information
is put together, it was obvious that the two “wrong” districts (in Appendix G, the districts
with information items of type A and B) received more humanitarian assistance than was
assessed to be needed, and that the hidden profile district (in Appendix G, the district
with information items of type C) needed more humanitarian assistance than was assessed
to be provided and was therefore the best district to advise the humanitarian coordinator
to first direct resources towards. In accordance with Stasser and Titus (1985), we use the
term best in a very restricted way. The best alternative is the alternative that is supported
by the preponderance of the information that is collectively available to the group, and
is not necessarily the correct alternative. Because we developed the hidden profile task
ourselves, and it is a judgmental rather than intellective decision task (Stasser and Titus,
1985), it needs to be validated. We asked four humanitarian crisis response experts4 to
validate the case. When considering all information items together, all four experts chose
the hidden profile as the worst affected district which needs assistance most urgently5,
4Humanitarian crisis response officers working for UN OCHA, UNDAC/B-FAST, Belgian government,
and NATO.
5Although in real-life such prioritization is not that black and white and interventions related to the
112 Chapter 5. Group Sensemaking: The Hidden Factor in Group Decision Making
confirming that our designed hidden profile is indeed the “best” group decision to make.
Difference to traditional hidden profile studies
In our experiment we did not ask the teams to “pick one right alternative”, which is
commonly done in hidden profile studies (e.g., identify the murderer, the “best” candidate
for president), because in humanitarian assistance – as in many other situations – it is
very difficult to say that there is one right course of action. Instead, we ask the teams to
rank-order (prioritize) the alternatives (cf. Hollingshead, 1996; Mennecke, 1997). This is
more in line with reality, as a decision to send scarce humanitarian relief to the alternative
that is supported by the least amount of arguments is not a bad decision, but one of less
priority. On the other hand, identifying an innocent person as the murderer is obviously a
bad decision.
In most hidden profile studies, participants have to hand in the information elements
after they have read them. In our experiment the participants had perfect recall (Holling-
shead, 1996): we did not ask the teams to hand in the information elements before they
started the group discussion, but allowed them to keep the information elements. This is
more in line with real-life humanitarian assistance, as they write down what they observe
and are able to review their notes when they discuss with their team members or OSOCC,
and it is unlikely that assessment team members will loose information they collected.
Our perfect recall study results in less of a preferential bias than experienced in most
traditional hidden profile studies. Information sampling is biased by the member’s cur-
rent preference, and because in traditional hidden profile studies the members cannot look
back at their information items, they will mostly recall only the items of the alternative
which they preferred (e.g., Stasser and Titus, 1985). Since we feared that the teams would
find the hidden profile easily since they had perfect recall, as happened in one of the few
other perfect recall hidden profile studies (Lightle et al., 2009), we increased the number
of information elements compared to traditional hidden profile studies, even in the “low
information load” condition.
Pilot studies
The task was pilot-tested twice: (1) with a group of 48 undergraduate students in fall 2009,
and (2) in spring 2010 with a group of 18 undergraduate and graduate students.
In the first pilot experiment, as reported on previously (Muhren et al., 2010b,a), stu-
dents of the course “Decision Support Systems” at Tilburg University were participating,
and they had to write an individual assignment based on their experiences in the experi-
ment. We used a similar experimental setup and a similar case, although the district that
different sectors are different, as one expert further clarified. First of all you have to prioritize life-saving
activities, then life-sustaining and preventive activities, followed by early recovery issues. Recently, such
as in response to the 2010 Pakistan earthquake, the international humanitarian community has started
using an indicator-based ranking system of disaster-stricken areas.
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was the hidden profile solution in this experiment was excluded from the final case. No-
tably, none of the sixteen teams managed to uncover the hidden profile solution in this first
pilot. We however observed a difference in information sharing and Sensemaking between
the different treatment conditions.
Because all three individual members of a team were heavily biased against the hidden
profile, almost everybody discarded this district before the group discussion started, and
continued to almost only discuss the two suboptimal districts. The bias that the distribu-
tion of information caused appeared to be too big to overcome. We believe that in this
way, the experiment was not representative for a real humanitarian crisis situation. Based
on their relevant experience, professional humanitarian crisis responders would not a-priori
discard an area for humanitarian response.
Our pilot experiment highlighted the importance of conflict in group decision making,
as noted before by, e.g., Janis (1972) and Fisher (1980): a lack of initial consensus avoids
discussion that uniformly supports one alternative and promotes more extensive and ex-
haustive sampling of the total available information (Stasser and Titus, 1985). When there
is initial consensus, groupthink (Janis, 1972) may cause novel information to be perceived
as threatening when members sense that they are progressing toward a mutually valued
goal and the novel information may impede this progress (Stasser, 1999). Consensus implies
correctness (Stasser and Birchmeier, 2003). In our pilot experiment without conflict there
was often not even much discussion before reaching agreement on the “wrong” decision.
Following the example of Dennis (1996), we therefore created a majority/minority sit-
uation in our final experiment, but we did not have interest in examining the effects of
minority influences per se. We adjusted our case to bias one team member in favor of the
hidden profile, and two team members in favor of the same, suboptimal alternative district.
In this way, the group can still make a better informed decision than each individual group
member, and has the potential of being more accurate than the average of its members
(Hollingshead, 1996), the so-called “assembly effect” (Stasser, 1992).
Before we conducted the final experiment, we once more conducted a pilot study with 18
undergraduate and graduate students. In this pilot we found that the bias we constructed
for each individual team member was not strong enough, as only 28% of the individuals
listed a preference for the district they were biased towards before discussion. Although
it was only a small pilot group, this is not what we intended and considerably lower than
the 74% obtained in a similar hidden profile study (Dennis, 1996). We had given each
team member only one more positive than negative information item for the district they
were biased towards. We redistributed the positive and negative information elements to
increase the strength of each team member’s informational bias in the final experiment,
which resulted in an acceptable rate of 85% of participants’ pre-discussion preferences
intended by the information they received in the low information load condition, and 79%
in the high information load condition.
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5.4.3 Procedures
Enrollment for the experiments was open to all students of the university, but mostly at-
tracted students of the school in economics and management as recruitment e-mails were
sent out to approximately one thousand students who participated in economic experi-
ments in the last few years and who indicated to be interested in participating in future
experiments. Students enrolled to “participate in a group decision making experiment con-
cerning a fictive disaster situation”, and were told that a good command of English would
be essential.
The experimental procedures followed those of traditional hidden profile studies, such
as by Stasser and Titus (1985) and Dennis (1996), unless specified otherwise in Sub-
section 5.4.2. Participants were randomly assigned to a team and were randomly as-
signed a role in their team, namely “Alpha”, “Bravo” or “Charlie”. They used this role
name, which facilitated the ease of group communication and is a North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) standard, throughout the experiment. Participants received a brief
introduction to the case and a brief instruction on how to use their communication medium,
depending on their GSS treatment, and could test it for a few minutes with their team
members using their role name. After they took place in their own cubicles, without hav-
ing the possibility of communicating with their team members, they received their case
description. The case they received consisted of introductory text to the situation, the
flood disaster that had happened, a description of the role that the person and his or
her team had and what was expected, and the information elements (needs assessments
conducted by him or her). In total this comprised three pages of text for individuals in
the low information load condition and four pages for the high information load condition.
All participants also received the same geographic map of the situation, developed by the
humanitarian NGO MapAction6 for a humanitarian crisis response exercise. Participants
got 20 minutes to read the case and take their own, personal notes. Next, they received
a short on-screen survey asking them to list their pre-discussion preferences, after which
group discussion commenced. After 20 minutes of group communication they were asked
to list their personal preference again, before they could start with the last part of the
group discussion. Teams got an additional maximum of 20 minutes in the second part to
reach a final group decision. Thus, in total teams got 20 minutes to read the case and 40
minutes to discuss their findings in the group. When a group decision was agreed upon,
participants received a final and longer post-session individual survey which they had to
fill out – without having the possibility of discussing with their team members – before the
experiment finished. All surveys and GSS tools were programmed with z-Tree, which is
commonly used software for experimental economics. Because we programmed all survey
items as required fields in z-Tree, we did not have any missing data.
Students received e7.50 for participating. Our concern, especially after the pilot ex-
periment which, similar to Stasser and Titus (2003), demonstrated little discussion of all
alternatives, was that students would not take the task seriously and that our results may
not generalize to other populations and group tasks. We therefore announced to raffle
6http://www.mapaction.org/
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3 iPod shuffle (4GB) players among the best performing students. This was foremost to
stimulate the students to do their best effort in the experiments. We preferred such a
raffle to a higher monetary reward for higher performance, which is commonly done in
experimental economics. In this way we would only have to reveal how we defined perfor-
mance and which teams performed best after all the experimental sessions had finished,
and would not have to compromise the hidden profile solution. After reading the case, but
before group discussion had started, participants indicated on a 5-points Likert scale from
0 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree) on average 0.979 (SD = 0.957) that “This case
seems interesting to me”, and on average 1.201 (SD = 1.150) that “I am motivated to do
my best to win an iPod”, both indicating that on average the participants were very eager
to participate in the experiment and do their best effort.
5.4.4 Treatments
The teams were randomly assigned to a treatment condition regarding the GSS setting
and information load. Both treatments simulate possible humanitarian response settings
of needs assessment teams, and are summarized in Table 5.1.












12 teams x 3 subjects 12 teams x 3 subjects
elements total
GSS setting
We wanted to compare the current procedure of group communication during needs assess-
ments, in which teams communicate by radio with each other and then convene face-to-face
to continue the discussion and reach a group decision, with a possible alternative. We pro-
vided half of the participating teams with simple GSS support, such as handheld text-based
communication devices, so teams would not need to convene face-to-face. When simulat-
ing the first GSS setting, called the “traditional GSS setting” from now onwards, we gave
each team member a handheld transceiver with which they could communicate the first
20 minutes. After this they met face-to-face to continue the group discussion and reach a
final group decision.
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In the “new GSS setting”, we simulated the team members’ use of handheld text-based
communication devices with simple instant messaging software, programmed with z-Tree.
The instant messaging (chat) interface was designed using three boxes: the small top part
of the screen showed which role the individual had in the experiment and the remaining
time for discussion, the main and largest part of the screen displayed the group discussion
history, and participants could type in their message in the small, lower part of the screen.
At all times team members were able to consult their own instructions and informa-
tion sheets, though it was not allowed to share their notes or physical information sheets
with their team members during the face-to-face discussions; participants were explicitly
instructed only to verbally discuss, but were allowed to make new group notes.
Information load
For the second treatment we simulated situations with lower and higher information loads.
Appendix G shows the distribution of the information elements for both information load
treatments. In the low information load condition, each team member received 15 common
and 10 unique information elements, for a grand total of 45 different information elements.
Alpha received three more positive than negative information items for a bias towards the
hidden profile district, Grotti District, and slightly more negative than positive information
items for the other two districts. Both Bravo and Charlie received three more positive than
negative information items for the suboptimal, Norktown District, and received slightly
more negative than positive information items for the other suboptimal district and the
hidden profile solution.
In the high information load condition, each team member received 33 common and 14
unique information elements, for a grand total of 75 different information elements. Charlie
received three more positive than negative information items for a bias towards the hidden
profile district, Petersted District, and slightly more negative than positive information
items for the other two districts. Both Alpha and Bravo received three more positive than
negative information items for the suboptimal, Norktown District, and received slightly
more negative than positive information items for the other suboptimal district and the
hidden profile solution.
5.4.5 Measures
The measures in this study were collected at either the group or individual level, but in
the latter case always aggregated to the group level. The variables we used to measure the
underlying constructs from Figure 5.2 are presented in Table 5.2, and discussed below if
they are not previously mentioned.
Information sharing
The group discussion in the radio and face-to-face setting was digitally recorded, and the
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to conduct a content analysis on all the teams’ information sharing behaviors. Each time
a team member would mention an information element accurately, i.e. so that their fellow
team members would be informed on the critical content of that respective information
element, we would register that as an exchanged information item. The first variable we
define for information sharing is “fraction of different information items exchanged”, which
is the number of different information items that have been exchanged by a team divided
by the number of different information items which they received before discussion. As we
knew which information items were common and which ones were unique, we subsequently
define the next two variables: “fraction of different common information items exchanged”
is the number of different common information items that have been exchanged by a
team divided by the number of different common information items which they received
before discussion, and the “fraction of different unique information items exchanged” is the
number of different unique information items that have been exchanged by a team divided
by the number of different unique information items which they received before discussion.
It is also important to measure the teams’ focus on unique information in their discus-
sions. The effect of unique information on the group discussion is not only measured by
counting the number of times unique information was mentioned by the team members.
This information can be ignored or can be overshadowed by the discussion of common
information. We therefore define the “unique item discussion ratio” variable measuring
the degree of unique information sharing, which takes into account all information item
exchanges, including the times that information items are repeated. The unique item dis-
cussion ratio represents the relative amount of discussion that was dedicated to unique
information, and is defined as the ratio of unique items discussed (total number of unique
item exchanges / unique items received before discussion) divided by the total items dis-
cussed (total number of item exchanges / total items received before discussion).
Please note that we use relative values for all information sharing variables, which
depend on the number of information items received before discussion, instead of using
absolute values. In this way we are able to meaningfully compare teams across information
load treatments.
Sensemaking
We measured the “Sensemaking attainment” of teams through Likert scale items in the
survey after the group discussions. The survey started by asking the participants about
their confidence in their team’s decision. The participants were highly convinced that
they found the hidden profile: on average, individuals indicated on a 5-points Likert scale
from 0 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree) on average 0.688 (SD = 0.857) that “I
am confident about our final decision”. It is important to note this positive performance
perceivement, as this implies that practically all teams thought they had found the hid-
den profile and therefore were not “performance biased” in their response to the items
measuring Sensemaking attainment.
As previously discussed in Chapter 4, the interrater reliability and non-independence
analysis by means of ICC(1) of the Sensemaking attainment items resulted in a significant
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group effect of the individual responses to five items, which warranted an aggregation of
these responses by group. Mokken’s nonparametric MHM scale analyses indicated that
these five items constitute a reliable scale (Cronbach α = 0.768). When each team’s
responses to the five items are summed together, it is possible to rank order the different
teams according to one latent trait, their Sensemaking attainment. The five resulting
variables used to measure group Sensemaking in humanitarian crisis response teams are:
(1) effective use of social resources, (2) flow of the group process, (3) elaboration on initial
situation awareness, (4) control of situation, and (5) perceived comprehensibility.
Performance
Performance is measured with one dichotomous variable, which takes value “1” if the
hidden profile was found by the team – i.e. when the team advised the Humanitarian
Coordinator to give priority for humanitarian assistance to the hidden profile district –
and value “0” if the hidden profile was not found.
5.5 Results
Section 5.4.5 presented the variables that we use for the analysis. To test whether higher
and lower scoring teams on a continuous variable have different outcomes on a dependent
variable, we split the sample in half according to the continuous variable distribution, and
define a new dichotomous variable in which the lowest scoring teams on the respective
continuous variable take value “0” and the highest scoring teams value “1”.
Non-parametric data analysis techniques, which rely on fewer assumptions, are used
because of the relatively small sample size of 48 teams. Univariate analyses techniques
are employed to test the bivariate relationships between variables: Mann-Whitney U -test
is used to test differences in the mean of a continuous variable between two subgroups,
and Pearson’s chi-square test of independence is used to test whether higher and lower
scoring teams on a continuous variable (using the newly defined dichotomous variable)
have different outcomes on a dependent variable. Finally, logistic regression is employed
to test the multivariate research model as represented in Figure 5.2.
Table 5.3 shows the descriptive statistics of our sample, and the bivariate correlations
are presented in Table 5.4. What was expected is that on average groups exchange a
greater fraction of common information (M = 0.560, SD = 0.0263) than unique informa-
tion (M = 0.320, SD = 0.207). The bivariate correlations at first seem to be in line with
our expectations. All relationships in our research model show significant correlations,
except for the relationships between GSS setting and Sensemaking, information load
and Sensemaking, and Sensemaking and information sharing (focus on unique information).
We proceed by testing all hypotheses one by one, as shown in our research model (Fig-
ure 5.2) and defined previously in Section 5.3. In Subsection 5.5.1 we test the influence
of GSS setting on information sharing and Sensemaking. In Subsection 5.5.2 we test the
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Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics (N=48)
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum
GSS setting 0.500 0.500 0 1
Information load 0.500 0.500 0 1
Fraction of total items exchanged 0.410 0.221 0.013 0.911
Fraction of common items exchanged 0.560 0.263 0.030 1
Fraction of unique items exchanged 0.320 0.207 0 0.867
Unique item discussion ratio 0.681 0.168 0 0.893
Sensemaking attainment 13.694 2.251 6.667 17.333
Hidden profile discovery 0.313 0.468 0 1
influence of information load on information sharing and Sensemaking. In Subsection 5.5.3
we test the influence of information sharing on performance. In Subsection 5.5.4 we test
the influence of Sensemaking on information sharing and performance. In Subsection 5.5.5
we further investigate the importance of Sensemaking in the discovery of hidden profiles.
Finally, in Subsection 5.5.6 we present a multivariate analysis of our research model.
5.5.1 Influence of GSS setting on information sharing and
Sensemaking
The results of the influence of the GSS setting on Sensemaking attainment and the in-
formation sharing variables can be seen in Table 5.5. A Mann-Whitney U -test is used to
compare the information exchange means of the teams in traditional GSS setting (radio
and face-to-face) to the teams in the new GSS setting (chat). Teams in the traditional GSS
setting exchange a significantly larger fraction of total items (M = 0.543, SD = 0.195)
than teams in the new GSS setting (M = 0.277, SD = 0.158), with a Mann-Whitney
U -statistic of 83.0 and p < 0.01. When further examining the data, we can see that in
the first part of the experiment, teams communicating by radio are already exchanging
a larger fraction of total items (M = 0.203, SD = 0.148) than teams communicating by
chat (M = 0.110, SD = 0.059). In the second part of the experiment, when teams in the
traditional GSS setting could convene face-to-face instead of using radio communication,
these teams exchange an even larger fraction of total items (M = 0.474, SD = 0.177) than
teams communicating by chat (M = 0.187, SD = 0.149).
Similarly, Table 5.5 shows that teams in the traditional GSS setting exchange a signif-
icantly larger fraction of common items (M = 0.708, SD = 0.231) than teams in the new
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0.01. Teams in the traditional GSS setting also exchange a significantly larger fraction of
unique items (M = 0.442, SD = 0.192) than teams in the new GSS setting (M = 0.198,
SD = 0.139), with a Mann-Whitney U -statistic of 89.5 and p < 0.01.
Hence, we cannot reject hypothesis 1a that teams supported by simple text-based GSS
exchange relatively less information than teams discussing through radio and face-to-face.
Furthermore, Table 5.5 shows the Mann-Whitney U -test revealing that there is no
significant difference in the relative amount of discussion that is dedicated to unique infor-
mation (“unique item discussion ratio”) between the traditional GSS setting (M = 0.704,
SD = 0.185) and the new GSS setting (M = 0.658, SD = 0.149), with a Mann-Whitney
U -statistic of 213.0 and p > 0.1. Hence, we cannot reject hypothesis 1b that there is no dif-
ference between teams supported by simple text-based GSS and teams discussing through
radio and face-to-face in their focus on unique information in discussions.
However, Hypothesis 2, stating that teams supported by simple text-based GSS attain
higher Sensemaking than teams discussing through radio and face-to-face, has to be re-
jected. A Mann-Whitney U -test shows no significant differences between the Sensemaking
attainment of teams in the traditional GSS setting (M = 14.236, SD = 1.917) and teams
in the new GSS setting (M = 13.153, SD = 2.463), with a Mann-Whitney U -statistic of
223.0 and p > 0.1.
5.5.2 Influence of information load on information sharing and
Sensemaking
Table 5.6 presents the results of the influence of information load on both mediating vari-
ables. A Mann-Whitney U -test reveals that teams exposed to lower information loads
exchange a significantly larger fraction of total items (M = 0.474, SD = 0.226) than
teams exposed to higher information loads (M = 0.346, SD = 0.200), with a Mann-
Whitney U -statistic of 197.0 and p < 0.1. Similarly, teams exposed to lower information
loads exchange a significantly larger fraction of common items (M = 0.672, SD = 0.236)
than teams exposed to higher information loads (M = 0.448, SD = 0.245), with a Mann-
Whitney U -statistic of 150.0 and p < 0.01, and a significantly larger fraction of unique
items (M = 0.375, SD = 0.227) than teams exposed to higher information loads (M =
0.265, SD = 0.172), with a Mann-Whitney U -statistic of 199.0 and p < 0.1. Hence, hy-
pothesis 3a, indicating that teams exposed to lower information loads exchange relatively
more information than teams exposed to higher information loads, cannot be rejected.
A Mann-Whitney U -test reveals that there is no difference in the relative amount of
discussion that is dedicated to unique information (“unique item discussion ratio”) between
teams exposed to lower information loads (M = 0.686, SD = 0.136) and teams exposed
to higher information loads (M = 0.676, SD = 0.197), with a Mann-Whitney U -statistic
of 287.0 and p > 0.1. We have to reject hypothesis 3b which states that teams exposed
to higher information loads focus relatively less on unique information in their discussions
than teams exposed to lower information loads.
The Mann-Whitney U -test on differences in Sensemaking means, as presented in Ta-
Table 5.5: Mann-Whitney U -tests of the GSS condition
Variable Traditional New
GSS setting GSS setting
N = 24 N = 24
Fraction of Mean 0.543 0.277
total items SD 0.195 0.158
exchanged Mean rank 33.04 15.96
Pairwise comparison: Traditional vs. New
Mann-Whitney U -statistic 83.0***
Significance 0.000
Fraction of Mean 0.708 0.413
common items SD 0.231 0.208
exchanged Mean rank 32.63 16.38
Pairwise comparison: Traditional vs. New
Mann-Whitney U -statistic 93.0***
Significance 0.000
Fraction of Mean 0.442 0.198
unique items SD 0.192 0.139
exchanged Mean rank 32.77 16.23
Pairwise comparison: Traditional vs. New
Mann-Whitney U -statistic 89.5***
Significance 0.000
Unique item Mean 0.704 0.658
discussion SD 0.185 0.149
ratio Mean rank 27.63 21.38
Pairwise comparison: Traditional vs. New
Mann-Whitney U -statistic 213.0
Significance 0.122
Sensemaking Mean 14.236 13.153
Attainment SD 1.917 2.463
Mean rank 27.21 21.79
Pairwise comparison: Traditional vs. New
Mann-Whitney U -statistic 223.0
Significance 0.180
*** Difference in the mean is significant at the 0.01 level
Table 5.6: Mann-Whitney U -tests of the information load condition
Variable Low High
information load information load
N = 24 N = 24
Fraction of Mean 0.474 0.346
total items SD 0.226 0.200
exchanged Mean rank 28.29 20.71
Pairwise comparison: Low vs. High
Mann-Whitney U -statistic 197.0*
Significance 0.060
Fraction of Mean 0.672 0.448
common items SD 0.236 0.245
exchanged Mean rank 30.25 18.75
Pairwise comparison: Low vs. High
Mann-Whitney U -statistic 150.0***
Significance 0.004
Fraction of Mean 0.375 0.265
unique items SD 0.227 0.172
exchanged Mean rank 28.21 20.79
Pairwise comparison: Low vs. High
Mann-Whitney U -statistic 199.0*
Significance 0.066
Unique item Mean 0.686 0.676
discussion SD 0.136 0.197
ratio Mean rank 24.46 24.54
Pairwise comparison: Low vs. High
Mann-Whitney U -statistic 287.0
Significance 0.984
Sensemaking Mean 13.417 13.972
Attainment SD 2.170 2.342
Mean rank 21.98 27.02
Pairwise comparison: Low vs. High
Mann-Whitney U -statistic 227.5
Significance 0.212
*** Difference in the mean is significant at the 0.01 level
* Difference in the mean is significant at the 0.1 level
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ble 5.6, shows that there is no difference in Sensemaking attainment between teams exposed
to lower information loads (M = 13.417, SD = 2.170) and teams exposed to higher infor-
mation loads (M = 13.972, SD = 2.342), with a Mann-Whitney U -statistic of 227.5 and p
> 0.1. Hence, hypothesis 4, that teams exposed to higher information loads attain higher
Sensemaking than teams exposed to lower information loads, has to be rejected.
5.5.3 Influence of information sharing on performance
In order to test the difference between teams that exchange more and fewer information
items, we define three new dichotomous variables with values “0” for the 24 teams with
lowest fraction of (total/common/unique) information items exchanged and values “1” for
the 24 teams with highest fraction of (total/common/unique) information items exchanged.
A Pearson’s chi-square test of independence is performed to examine the relationship be-
tween fraction of information items that are exchanged by the teams and performance, of
which the results are displayed in Table 5.7. The discovery of the hidden profile district
is significantly related to the fraction of total items exchanged, χ2 (1, N = 48) = 11.733,
p < 0.01. The discovery of the hidden profile district is also significantly related to the
fraction of unique items exchanged, χ2 (1, N = 48) = 11.733, p < 0.01. However, the dis-
covery of the hidden profile district is not significantly related to the fraction of common
items exchanged, χ2 (1, N = 48) = 2.424, p > 0.1. Higher information sharing teams,
and in particular teams that exchange relatively more unique information items, are more
likely to discover the hidden profile than lower information sharing teams. More common
information exchange on its own does not lead to a significant increase in performance.
Therefore, we cannot reject hypothesis 5a, that teams that exchange relatively more infor-
mation perform better than teams that exchange relatively less information, but note that
this is only valid for all items together or all unique information items, not all common
information items in itself.
In order to test the relationship between more and less focus on unique information and
performance, we define a new dichotomous variables with values “0” for the 24 teams with
lowest unique item discussion ratio and values “1” for the 24 teams with highest unique
item discussion ratio. A chi-square test of independence reveals that the discovery of the
hidden profile is significantly related to the relative amount of discussion that is dedicated
to unique information (“unique item discussion ratio”), χ2 (1, N = 48) = 4.752, p < 0.05,
and can also be seen in Table 5.7. This shows that teams that focus relatively more on
unique information in their discussions perform better than teams that focus relatively less
on unique information in their discussion. Hence, we cannot reject hypothesis 5b.
5.5.4 Influence of Sensemaking on information sharing and
performance
In order to test the difference between teams that attain lower and higher Sensemaking,
we define a new dichotomous variable with values “0” for the 24 teams with lowest Sense-






































































































































































































































































































































attainment (≥ 14.33). A Mann-Whitney U -test, presented in Table 5.8, reveals that there
is a significant difference in the relative amount of discussion that is dedicated to unique
information (“unique item discussion ratio”) between teams with lower Sensemaking at-
tainment (M = 0.629, SD = 0.194) and teams with higher Sensemaking attainment (M
= 0.733, SD = 0.118), with a Mann-Whitney U -statistic of 190.0 and p < 0.05. Hypoth-
esis 6, stating that teams that attain higher Sensemaking focus relatively more on unique
information than teams that attain lower Sensemaking, cannot be rejected.
Table 5.8: Mann-Whitney U -tests of the influence of Sensemaking on the focus on unique
information
Variable Low Sensemaking High Sensemaking
attainment attainment
(≤ 13.67) (≥ 14.33)
N = 24 N = 24
Unique item Mean 0.629 0.733
discussion SD 0.194 0.118
ratio Mean rank 20.42 28.58
Pairwise comparison: Low vs. High
Mann-Whitney U -statistic 190.0**
Significance 0.043
** Difference in the mean is significant at the 0.05 level
We use the same dichotomized Sensemaking attainment variable to test the relationship
between Sensemaking and performance. A chi-square test of independence, presented
in Table 5.7, reveals that the discovery of the hidden profile is significantly related to
Sensemaking attainment, χ2 (1, N = 48) = 7.855, p < 0.01. From the results we may infer
that teams attaining higher Sensemaking are more likely to discover the hidden profile
than teams attaining lower Sensemaking. Hence, we cannot reject hypothesis 7 that teams
that attain higher Sensemaking perform better than teams that attain lower Sensemaking.
5.5.5 The hidden factor: Sensemaking
Literature already revealed the crucial role of information sharing in the discovery of
hidden profiles. To further investigate the importance of Sensemaking in the discovery
of hidden profiles besides information sharing, we examine whether Sensemaking is the
determining factor for high information sharing teams in finding the hidden profile or not.
For this we use the same dichotomized “fraction of total items exchanged” variable. The 24
teams that exchange most information measured by this variable have a mean value of 0.54
on performance, i.e., 54% of the highest information exchanging teams found the hidden
profile. We expect that Sensemaking plays an important role in this. A Mann-Whitney
U -test reveals that there is a significant difference in Sensemaking attainment between
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teams that exchange a lot of information and do not find the hidden profile (M = 13.758,
SD = 1.814) and teams that exchange a lot of information and find the hidden profile
(M = 15.128, SD = 1.405), with a Mann-Whitney U -statistic of 42.5 and p < 0.1. As
Table 5.9 shows, Sensemaking is the only variable on which there is a significant difference
between finding the hidden profile and not-finding the hidden profile when exchanging a
lot of information. There is no significant difference in GSS setting (Mann-Whitney U
= 42.5, p > 0.1), information load (Mann-Whitney U = 47.0, p > 0.1), fraction of total
items exchanged (Mann-Whitney U = 69.5, p > 0.1), fraction of common items exchanged
(Mann-Whitney U = 62.5, p > 0.1), fraction of unique items exchanged (Mann-Whitney
U = 67.0, p > 0.1), and unique item discussion (Mann-Whitney U = 63.0, p > 0.1). In
sum, we observe that the Sensemaking attainment of teams that exchange relatively much
information, ceteris paribus, determines their performance.
5.5.6 Multivariate analysis: A model for group decision making
in humanitarian crisis response
Until now we have tested the relationship between all variables of our research model
presented in Figure 5.2 separately, as is a common endeavor in IS research. However,
there are several disadvantages and pitfalls to this, such as inflated type I error rates and
non-independence of variables (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007, pp.243-244), which makes it
necessary to validate the model by testing all variables at once. We choose to use logistic
regression because of its flexibility of including different types of variables in the same
model and its non-parametric nature.
Looking back at the bivariate correlations in Table 5.4, we can see that there are high
correlations between several pairs of variables. In those cases where bivariate correlations
are above 0.90 we encounter a multicollinearity problem: variables contain redundant
information which could lead to statistical problems in the analysis (Tabachnick and Fidell,
2007, pp.88-89). According to this definition, the three information sharing variables that
measure the exchange of information show high (> 0.90) and significant (p < 0.01) bivariate
correlations with each other. We therefore have to exclude two of these variables in our
logistic regression, and choose only to continue with “fraction of total items exchanged”
because this captures the overall information exchange.
For ease of interpretation of the odds ratio, which will be discussed later on, we multi-
ply all “fraction of total items exchanged” values by 100%, and proceed the next analysis
with the variable renamed as “percentage of total items exchanged”. We conduct a logistic
regression with “hidden profile discovery” as dependent variable and “GSS setting”, “in-
formation load”, “percentage of total items exchanged”, “unique item discussion ratio”,
and “Sensemaking attainment” as independent variables.
The Wald chi-square statistic tests the unique contribution of each independent vari-
able, holding constant the other independent variables. The first logistic regression analysis
reveals that all variables are significant except for the “unique item discussion ratio” with
χ2 (1, N = 48) = 0.014, p > 0.1. When keeping all other variables constant, the unique
Table 5.9: Mann-Whitney U -tests investigating what leads to high performance for the 24
highest information sharing teams (fraction of total items exchanged ≥ 0.44)
Variable Hidden profile Hidden profile
discovery = 0 discovery = 1
N = 11 N = 13
Sensemaking Mean 13.758 15.128
Attainment SD 1.814 1.405
Mean rank 9.86 14.73
Pairwise comparison: Low performance vs. High performance
Mann-Whitney U -statistic 42.5*
Significance 0.093
GSS Mean 0.091 0.308
setting SD 0.302 0.480
Mean rank 11.09 13.69
Pairwise comparison: Low performance vs. High performance
Mann-Whitney U -statistic 56.0
Significance 0.392
Information Mean 0.273 0.615
load SD 0.467 0.506
Mean rank 10.27 14.38
Pairwise comparison: Low performance vs. High performance
Mann-Whitney U -statistic 47.0
Significance 0.167
Fraction of Mean 0.589 0.604
total items SD 0.111 0.134
exchanged Mean rank 12.32 12.65
Pairwise comparison: Low performance vs. High performance
Mann-Whitney U -statistic 69.5
Significance 0.910
Fraction of Mean 0.788 0.754
common items SD 0.122 0.165
exchanged Mean rank 13.32 11.81
Pairwise comparison: Low performance vs. High performance
Mann-Whitney U -statistic 62.5
Significance 0.608
Fraction of Mean 0.479 0.508
unique items SD 0.125 0.139
exchanged Mean rank 12.09 12.85
Pairwise comparison: Low performance vs. High performance
Mann-Whitney U -statistic 67.0
Significance 0.820
Unique item Mean 0.758 0.787
discussion SD 0.071 0.065
ratio Mean rank 11.73 13.15
Pairwise comparison: Low performance vs. High performance
Mann-Whitney U -statistic 63.0
Significance 0.649
* Difference in the mean is significant at the 0.1 level
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item discussion ratio does not appear to significantly contribute to the prediction of the
hidden profile discovery. We therefore run a second logistic regression analysis, identical
to the first, with the only change made that “unique item discussion ratio” is excluded.
The output can be seen in Table 5.10.
Table 5.10: Multivariate logistic regression analysis
Variable B S.E. Wald χ2 df Sig. Odds ratio
GSS setting 3.904 1.991 3.844** 1 0.050 49.581
Information load 4.641 1.927 5.803** 1 0.016 103.673
Percentage of total items exchanged 0.185 0.069 7.216*** 1 0.007 1.204
Sensemaking attainment 0.773 0.366 4.455** 1 0.035 2.167
Constant -24.844 8.604 8.337*** 1 0.005 0.000
Omnibus Chi-square test of model coefficients (4df) = 34.867, p < 0.01
Hosmer and Lemeshow Chi-square test (8df) = 4.060, p = 0.852
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.726
Note: “unique item discussion ratio” is not included because it is not significant (p = 0.905)
*** Variable is significant at the 0.01 level
** Variable is significant at the 0.05 level
All variables in the equation are tested with a Wald chi-square test with the null
hypothesis that the coefficient equals 0. The null hypothesis must be rejected for all
coefficients, as they all appear to be significantly different from 0, with p < 0.05 (two-
tailed). The overall model (omnibus test of model coefficients) is significant, with a chi-
square statistic of χ2 (4, N = 48) = 34.867, p < 0.01. The Hosmer and Lemeshow chi-
square test, which tests the null hypothesis that there is a linear relationship between the
independent variables and the log odds of the dependent variable, is non-significant, χ2
(8df) = 4.060, p > 0.1, indicating that the data fit the model well. The effect size of the
model, measured by Nagelkerke’s R2 which approximates the variance interpretation of R2
for linear regression (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007, p.460), is 0.726.
First, we interpret the variable coefficients from Table 5.10, and in particular the odds
ratios shown in the last column. The 49.581 odds ratio for GSS setting indicates that
the odds of finding the hidden profile are nearly 50 times larger for teams in new GSS
settings (chat) than in traditional GSS settings (radio and face-to-face), ceteris paribus.
Similarly, the 103.673 odds ratio for information load indicates that the odds of finding the
hidden profile are more than 100 times larger for teams exposed to higher information loads
than teams exposed to lower information loads, ceteris paribus. The 1.204 odds ratio for
percentage of total items exchanged indicates that if a team exchanges one percent more
of the available information items, ceteris paribus, the odds of finding the hidden profile
increases with 20%. Finally, the 2.167 odds ratio for Sensemaking attainment indicates
that a one-unit increase in a team’s Sensemaking attainment, ceteris paribus, results in a
more than twice larger odds for finding the hidden profile.
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To predict the dependent variable for a given value of each independent variable, we can
use the predicted variable coefficients (shown in the second column of Table 5.10, labeled
as “B”) in the following logistic regression equation:
odds = exp(−24.844 + 3.904 ∗X1 + 4.641 ∗X2 + 0.185 ∗X3 + 0.773 ∗X4), (5.1)
where X1 = GSS setting, X2 = information load, X3 = percentage of total items
exchanged, and X4 = Sensemaking attainment. The outcome of this equation is the odds
of finding the hidden profile.
To obtain the probability of discovering the hidden profile from the odds equation, we can





When using the decision rule that teams with a predicted probability of the model larger
than 0.5 are likely to discover the hidden profile, the logistic regression model was able to
correctly classify 73.3% of the teams that discovered the hidden profile, and 93.9% of those
who did not, for an overall success rate of 87.5% (see Table 5.11).
Table 5.11: Classification of predicted performance by logistic regression model
Predicted hidden profile discovery Percentage
wrong decision correct decision correct
Observed hidden wrong decision 31 2 93.9
profile discovery correct decision 4 11 73.3
Overall percentage 87.5
In Figure 5.3 the predicted probability is displayed, along with the related values of the
two mediating variables, Sensemaking attainment and percentage of total items exchanged
(displayed as a fraction in the graph in order to use the same vertical axis on the right
hand side), as well as the actual discovery of the hidden profile by the respective team.
The horizontal axis represents the teams, ordered first by actual hidden profile discovery
and second by predicted performance according to the logistic regression model. The
left vertical axis presents the Sensemaking attainment scores, and the right vertical axis
presents the values of the other variables. As can be seen, increasing trends in Sensemaking
and fraction of total items exchanged causes the predicted hidden profile discovery to
increase. The first 33 teams in Figure 5.3 did not discover the hidden profile. The two
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teams that are predicted to discover the hidden profile as shown in Table 5.11 but that
did not, whose results are displayed just before the steep increase of “actual hidden profile
discovery”, have relatively high values on the two mediating variables. Therefore they
have a predicted probability higher than 0.5 to find the hidden profile. The four teams
that are predicted not to discover the hidden profile but who actually did, whose results
are displayed as teams 34 until 37 just after the steep increase of “actual hidden profile
discovery”, have relatively low values on the two mediating variables. Therefore, they are
predicted not to discover the hidden profile. In general we can observe higher average
values for Sensemaking attainment and fraction of total items exchanged for the teams





















































Figure 5.3: Logistic regression prediction of team performance, along with the respective team’s
scores on the mediating variables and their actual performance
5.6 Discussion and Chapter Conclusions
Through participant observation in the Triplex humanitarian crisis response exercise we
got an insider’s perspective of the humanitarian needs assessment process. We used this
context to base our hidden profile study on. The hidden profile experiment reflected the
practice of specific humanitarian crisis response teams: when making needs assessments,
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they are individually aware of a subset of the total information pool, and form arguments
and tentative preferences and conclusions based on this subset.
Our hypothesis (H5a) that more information exchange leads to better performance is
partly rejected. More exchange of common information items in itself appears not to lead
to better performance, but more information exchange in general and exchange of unique
information items in particular does lead to better performance. This makes sense, as
common information is not information that is new to other team members, and therefore
does not contribute to better informed decisions. In line with this observed importance
of unique information, we are also unable to reject the hypothesis (H5b) that teams with
a higher focus on unique information in the discussions perform better than teams with
a lower focus on unique information. The fact that the unique item discussion ratio is
not significant in the logistic regression model does not mean that it is not an important
variable in our model, but rather that it does not have sufficient added value to predict the
dependent variable when considering all variables together. This highlights the importance
of testing a research model multivariately, as only then it can be assessed whether a variable
has a unique contribution.
Prior research has indicated that more information sharing, ceteris paribus, does not
increase performance in group decision making (Mennecke, 1997). There seemed to be
an unobservable influence on performance besides information sharing, called among oth-
ers “cognitively processing of information that is surfaced” (Mennecke, 1997). Our study
identifies and measures this “mythical” process in group decision making: Sensemaking.
Firstly, we cannot reject the hypothesis (H6) that teams which attain higher Sensemaking
focus relatively more on unique information. We have found further evidence for the im-
portance of Sensemaking, as we cannot reject the hypothesis (H7) that higher Sensemaking
attainment results in better performance. Finally, it appears that a large amount of infor-
mation exchange on its own does not automatically lead to a high performance, but that
Sensemaking is a significant mediating factor, which largely determines success or failure
in these cases. The logistic regression analysis confirms the importance of Sensemaking,
with a more than double increase in odds to find the hidden profile for a one-unit increase
in a team’s Sensemaking attainment. We expect that the effect of Sensemaking will only
be stronger in real-life humanitarian crisis response group decision making, as there is no
set of decision alternatives available for such teams and these alternatives and subsequent
exploration of alternatives by information search, triangulation, and decision making has
to be extensively shaped through processes of Sensemaking.
We investigated the effect of GSS setting on information sharing and Sensemaking
through two different treatments. Information exchange appears to be higher in tradi-
tional GSS settings (with radio and face-to-face communication) than in new GSS settings
(chat communication), and we cannot reject hypothesis 1a. The significant difference in
information exchange is evidently not only caused by the face-to-face discussion, as teams
communicating by radio are already exchanging more information in the first part of the
experiment. This supports our stated expectation that the higher rehearsability that is
needed for text-based communication outweighs the marginal positive effect of parallelism.
As we expected, the unstructured GSS support used by teams in the new GSS setting does
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not lead to positive influence of their potential advantage of group memory usage (H1b).
We also hypothesized (H2) that each of the two GSS settings have advantages and
disadvantages for social Sensemaking, but that the traditional setting is worse for ongoing
Sensemaking than the new setting. We observed no significant difference in Sensemaking
between the two GSS settings. In such a group Sensemaking setting, the social aspect plays
an important role, and we have previously seen (Chapter 3 and Muhren and Van de Walle,
2010d) that social Sensemaking needs different types of support, depending on the type
of interaction that is needed. When needing to inquire, verify, and reflect, Sensemaking
teams benefit from a more direct communication process (higher transmission velocity and
lower parallelism), and when needing to triangulate information, text-based communication
is better due to its higher parallelism. Our findings confirm that Sensemakers are in
need of different types of support, and should be able to switch to the appropriate media
characteristic that is needed at different moments during an ongoing (decision making)
process.
The logistic regression analysis reveals that ceteris paribus teams in new GSS settings
perform far better than teams in traditional GSS settings, with an odds ratio of finding the
hidden profile that is 50 times higher. This means that in the hypothetical situation that
traditional GSS teams and new GSS teams exchange the same amount of information and
attain the same level of Sensemaking, new GSS teams will perform much better. When
considering the univariate analysis it seems however unrealistic to assume that all other
variables can be kept equal, as GSS setting has a demonstrated effect on information
sharing, and teams in traditional GSS settings exchange significantly more information.
Given this fact and our finding that the GSS setting does not have an effect on Sensemaking,
we may conclude that the traditional GSS setting is better for humanitarian crisis response
teams than the new GSS setting for information sharing and subsequently performance.
A possibly new GSS setting will have to be adapted to better support information sharing
and Sensemaking.
We also investigated the influence of lower and higher information loads that teams
are exposed to on information sharing and Sensemaking. Our hypothesis (H3a) that in a
condition of low information load proportionally more information is exchanged cannot be
rejected. There is, however, no evidence for a difference in focus on unique information
between the different information load conditions (H3b). In our higher information load
condition teams are most probably not exposed to a too extremely high information load,
i.e., information overload, for which Sutcliffe and Weick (2008) expected problems in focus
on relevant (i.e., unique) information.
Weick’s suggestion that more information does not necessarily lead to better Sensemak-
ing is confirmed by our rejection of Hypothesis 4. Teams exposed to higher information
loads do not attain higher Sensemaking than teams exposed to lower information loads.
Similarly to the case with the GSS setting, it is not realistic to assume that the me-
diating variables do not change when comparing the different information load conditions
to each other. Because teams in lower information load are able to exchange relatively
more information than teams in higher information load, and information load does not
influence Sensemaking attainment, we may conclude that lower information load facilitates
5.6 Discussion and Chapter Conclusions 135
better information sharing and therefore performance in group decision making.
In practice, however, humanitarian response teams are exposed to high information
loads. Since high information loads lead to relatively less information exchange, the teams’
Sensemaking attainment becomes especially important to determine their performance.
Sensemaking appears to be an exogenous variable in our experiment, as neither information
load nor GSS setting demonstrates a significant effect on it. Interestingly only Sensemaking,
and neither information load nor GSS setting has a significant effect on the focus on unique
information, while this focus has a significant effect on performance. Additionally, we have
found Sensemaking to be the determining factor for high performance when information
sharing is high in a team. For a long time Sensemaking was the hidden factor in group
decision making, unknowingly playing an important role in the discovery of hidden profiles.
Now these steps are made in measuring Sensemaking and identifying its influence, SSS
should be developed to support decision making teams and avoid the failure of missing
hidden profiles in real-life humanitarian crisis response.
5.6.1 Limitations of this research
The usual limitations of experimental research (Shadish et al., 2002) apply to our study.
Laboratory experimental settings are known for their high internal validity but relatively
low external validity and construct validity. Threats to internal validity were reduced by
random assignment of individuals to teams and random assignment of teams to treat-
ments, by following the same protocol across all sessions, and by having humanitarian
crisis response experts validate the case. Threats to external validity and construct va-
lidity were reduced by financially compensating students, rewarding good performance
with iPods, grounding the case on real-life crisis management experiences, and simulating
real-life needs assessment teams in many aspects (such as by using handheld transceivers,
terminology common to practice, maps actually developed by a humanitarian NGO, etc.).
But because undergraduate and graduate students were used with no humanitarian crisis
response experience, working with assumably less passion and motivation than real human-
itarian crisis responders, and working to solve a highly simplified case when compared to a
real crisis, under far less stringent pressure and environmental turbulence, our findings can-
not readily be generalized to real-life settings. Additional research in humanitarian crisis
response settings, such as through a field experiment, is needed to validate our findings.
A further limitation of this research is that the participant observation experiences,
on which the laboratory experiment was based, were gained at a humanitarian response
exercise rather than at an actual humanitarian response mission. Although the Triplex
exercise had all the features of a real mission, the processes that took place (e.g., needs
assessment) were in essence experimented with and simulated. Hence, additional research
is needed in real-life humanitarian crisis response settings to validate our Triplex findings.
Although we had to conclude that teams in traditional GSS settings exchange more
information and hence perform better than teams in new GSS settings, we cannot state that
teams in traditional GSS settings will perform better in real-life. Teams in our simulated
new GSS setting would experience an enormous efficiency gain by using a simple text-based
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communication device throughout their needs assessments, as they do not lose time and
do not have to overcome problematic traveling issues to convene face-to-face. It was not
feasible to take into account this time gain in our experimental setup, but this is expected
to play an important role in practice.
Our study simulated humanitarian needs assessment teams without taking the UNDAC
staff members in the OSOCC into account. At Triplex we observed that OSOCC staff mem-
bers were only briefed of the assessments when the team’s needs assessment process had
finalized. A suggestion towards humanitarian response practice is that IS should connect
both the assessment teams and the information managers in the OSOCC in real-time. This
will support Sensemaking by encouraging conversation and enabling resilience, will enable
prior identification and usage of important unique information, and will facilitate faster
decision making for the international humanitarian response.
5.6.2 Implications for research and practice
In Triplex and other former studies we identified the importance of Sensemaking in real-
life crisis response and hypothesized how Sensemaking could be more effectively supported.
In this chapter we have taken this a step further, and have shown that it is possible to
measure Sensemaking and quantitatively validate its importance in group decision making
and humanitarian crisis response. This achievement can take the study of SSS to the next
level. Information systems designers and developers and policy makers now have a means
to objectively verify whether the systems, organizational structures, and policies they put
in place – in humanitarian crisis response or in other contexts – lead to an increase or
decrease of Sensemaking support for the actors involved.
We have developed a hidden profile study, which can be used by other researchers to
simulate a humanitarian crisis response setting in laboratory and field experiments.
We have moreover identified the importance of Sensemaking in the discovery of hid-
den profiles, which might provide explanations to other hidden profile researchers why
some teams find hidden profiles and some teams do not when they only take into account
information sharing as mediating variable.
Information systems are generally conceived as a “repository of best practice” model
(Boland and Yoo, 2003) which puts an emphasis on data storage. We have however con-
firmed Weick (1995)’s suggestion that more information does not automatically lead to
better Sensemaking. IS should thus be designed to connect people, to stimulate reflection
and the quality of interaction, and to support building the team’s own story line as first
priority rather than the current focus on the search for and storage of information. A
practical implication of this finding is that it could be more important to focus on the
processing of existing information than the collection of new assessment information, also
because in conditions of higher information load relatively less information appeared to
be exchanged. To enable better performance, the usual quantitative information-focused
mindset of “more is better” should be changed into a more qualitative and interpretive
information processing-focused mindset based on Sensemaking.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
Nihil est (. . . ) simul et inventum et perfectum.
Cicero
In Section 1.4 we presented our problem statement and formulated eight research questions
as a guideline for answering it. Based on our findings presented in Chapters 2–5 we answer
the research questions (Section 6.1) and the problem statement (Section 6.2) and thereby
summarize the contributions of this dissertation. Section 6.3 provides suggestions for future
research.
6.1 Answers to the Research Questions
Research question 1. How do actors process information in crisis situations?
The answer to the first research question is derived from Chapter 2. In this chapter
we provided rich insights into how actors process information in crisis situations. These
findings validated our framework that actors’ information processing activities are focused
either on (1) information processing challenges based on information of uncertainty and
complexity, the realm of decision making, or on (2) information processing challenges based
on frames of reference of ambiguity and equivocality, the realm of Sensemaking. In the
different crisis situations we studied, there was a common observation that actors’ activities
focused mainly on obtaining information (dealing with uncertainty) and creating a suitable
frame of reference to interpret the information (dealing with ambiguity) at the onset of
the response to the crisis. In contrast, as the response to the crisis developed over time,
actors focused more on searching for the best ways to manage an overload of information
(dealing with complexity) and choosing which frame of reference out of several to use to
interpret the information (dealing with equivocality). However, the type and extent of
the information processing challenges that need to be addressed depends on the specific
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situation, and the approach of how these information processing challenges are dealt with
depends on the actor.
Research question 2. Can we validate the seven Sensemaking properties in crisis ac-
tors’ information processing behavior?
The answer to the second research question is derived from Chapter 2. In this chapter we
presented our findings on the information processing behavior of crisis actors as studied
in the DRC. Through interviews, and presented in the form of quotations, we could
recognize and thereby validate all seven Sensemaking properties – social context, identity
construction, retrospection, cue extraction, ongoing, plausibility, and enactment – in this
behavior.
Research question 3. What can we learn from crisis actors’ information processing be-
havior for the design of Sensemaking Support Systems for crisis
management?
The answer to the third research question is derived from Chapter 2 and Chapter 5.
In Chapter 2 we found that seven premises for designing crisis management IS – called
DERMIS – contribute to the support of Sensemaking by enabling the dealing with frames
of reference. Crisis management case studies have revealed that if crisis management sys-
tems are designed to support access to all contextual information (design premise 1) and
storage of historical information and incorporation of lessons learned (design premise 2),
actors are enabled to construct suitable frames of reference. If these systems are designed
to be flexible during the response (design premise 3) and adaptable to the nature and scope
of the crisis (design premise 4), actors are enabled to update and change their frames of
reference. Finally, as general requirements, if systems facilitate interaction and collabora-
tion by supporting timely and valid information exchange (design premise 5) without any
impediments (design premise 6), ensuring effective coordination (design premise 7), actors
are enabled to create, compare, update, and change their frames of reference.
Moreover, we demonstrated in Chapter 2 that all Sensemaking properties are reflected
in these premises for designing IS. In Chapter 5 we provided suggestions through simple
measures how the Sensemaking properties can be better supported by IS in the humani-
tarian needs assessment process.
Research question 4. How does communication play a role in the Sensemaking pro-
cesses of humanitarian actors in a crisis environment?
The answer to the fourth research question is derived from Chapter 3. In this chapter we
found that humanitarian actors in the DRC engage in eight different Sensemaking commu-
nication activities to reach individual understanding of the crisis situation: (1) noticing,
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(2) updating, (3) inquiring, (4) triangulating, (5) verifying, (6) reflecting, (7) enacting, and
(8) interpreting. Moreover, we found that humanitarian crisis actors continuously create
and maintain an infrastructure, mostly informal and personal-based, for these Sensemaking
communication activities.
Research question 5. How can information systems support Sensemaking in humani-
tarian crisis response from a communications perspective?
The answer to the fifth research question is derived from Chapter 3. In this chapter we
found that humanitarian crisis actors are in need of different types of support depending
on the purpose of communication, and identified three types of media for supporting the
Sensemaking communication activities: (1) scanning media, (2) triangulating media, and
(3) one-to-one media. These types of media will support humanitarian crisis actors’ Sense-
making by supporting both institutional information and communication exchanges and
exchanges in informal, personal networks.
Research question 6. Can we measure group Sensemaking attainment in humanitarian
crisis response?
The answer to the sixth research question is derived from Chapter 4. In this chapter we
established a reliable scale to measure group Sensemaking attainment in humanitarian crisis
response, consisting of five survey items representing (1) the effective use of social resources,
(2) the flow of the group process, (3) the elaboration on initial situation awareness, (4) the
control of the situation, and (5) the perceived comprehensibility.
Research question 7. How are Sensemaking and information sharing related to each
other in humanitarian crisis response teams?
The answer to the seventh research question is derived from Chapter 5. In this chapter
we found that both information sharing and Sensemaking are information processing con-
structs. Sensemaking is shown to have a significant effect on the type of information that
is discussed in a team: Sensemaking attainment positively affects the focus on unique in-
formation in team discussions. Moreover, it appeared that a large amount of information
sharing on its own does not automatically lead to a high performance, but that Sensemak-
ing is a significant mediating factor, which largely determines success or failure in these
cases.
Research question 8. Does Sensemaking attainment influence performance in human-
itarian crisis response teams?
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The answer to the eighth research question is derived from Chapter 5. In this chapter we
found that higher group Sensemaking attainment results in better team performance. Ad-
ditionally, as the answer to research question 7 already stated, we have found Sensemaking
to be the determining factor for high team performance when information sharing is high.
6.2 Answer to the Problem Statement
Problem statement. To what extent can we lay the foundations of Sensemaking Sup-
port Systems for humanitarian crisis response?
The answer to the problem statement is based on the answers to the eight research questions
discussed in the previous section. This allows us to formulate three general foundations of
Sensemaking Support Systems for humanitarian crisis response.
The first foundation is a more advanced understanding of Sensemaking in humanitarian
crisis response. It consists of (1) an in-depth exploration of what needs to be supported in
humanitarian crisis response – Sensemaking – and (2) making this process more explicit.
With respect to the first part, our research demonstrates that Sensemaking is about the in-
terpretive aspect of information processing, namely how crisis actors construct and choose
a frame of reference for interpreting information. Sensemaking is characterized by seven
properties, all verified to be present in information processing behavior in crises. Further-
more, we demonstrated that Sensemaking is of crucial importance in humanitarian crisis
response. With respect to the second part, we provided a detailed overview of the different
types of Sensemaking communication activities that are undertaken by humanitarian crisis
actors. Finally, we tested the relationships between Sensemaking and information load as
well as Sensemaking and information sharing.
The second foundation is the advancement towards Sensemaking support by IS. We
provided suggestions for each of the seven Sensemaking properties. We demonstrated that
seven DERMIS design premises should form a backbone for the design of SSS. Moreover,
we provided guidelines on how to support humanitarian crisis response actors in their
Sensemaking communication activities to reach an individual understanding. Finally, we
tested the effect of two GSS settings on Sensemaking.
The third foundation is the introduction of how to measure Sensemaking attainment
in groups. As we have exemplified in an experimental study, the measurement of group
Sensemaking attainment enables researchers and practitioners to use Sensemaking as inde-
pendent or dependent variable in studies, e.g., to estimate the impact of IS on Sensemaking
as well as Sensemaking on performance. Therefore, it provides the means for optimal de-
sign, robust development, and solid testing of SSS.
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6.3 Future Research
The limitations of this research as well as its implications for research and practice have
been provided in the previous chapters. This dissertation, just like the research and ideas
on which it is based, should not be perceived as an end on itself, but rather as a means
and as a starting point of multiple research paths. Below we provide suggestions.
Future research could use our foundations to further explore how information systems,
organizational structures, and policies affect Sensemaking. Research should determine how
the best Sensemaking conditions are created, depending on the context, the Sensemaking
purpose, and the actors involved. This research is relevant in (humanitarian) crisis response
as well as in other domains, such as (IT-)auditing, marketing, criminal intelligence analysis,
and public governance.
In this study we took into account two out of seven specific properties of Sensemaking:
social and ongoing. Future studies should extend the concept of Sensemaking to measure
and identify the effect of the other Sensemaking properties on information processes and
performance.
The role of information overload is important in humanitarian crisis response and merely
touched upon in this dissertation. Many of our respondents indicated that they daily
receive an abundance of information when responding to a crisis, far more than they can
possibly process. Future research could more extensively examine the role of information
overload on Sensemaking, and investigate how SSS can provide means for actors to deal
with this information processing burden.
In our research we mainly focused on response to sudden-onset crises. In future (hu-
manitarian) crisis response studies, research could be directed at examining the role of
Sensemaking and information overload in slow-onset crises and more complex emergencies.
Future research could link the role of Sensemaking to other well-established and rele-
vant literature. For instance, researchers could explore the influence of established teams
versus ad-hoc teams and the implication of experts in a team versus novices on information
sharing, Sensemaking and performance. The needs assessment procedures at the Triplex
exercise were designed to be used by ad-hoc teams of novices, which seems to be coun-
terproductive according to well-established Sensemaking literature. This highlights the
importance of a shared frame of reference, which established groups have already devel-
oped.
In the light of the importance of Sensemaking in group decision making, previous
(hidden profile) research designs could be adapted to re-examine this mediating effect. For
example, the influence of group size on information sharing has shown to be insignificant
(e.g., Mennecke, 1997). However, group size is expected to affect social Sensemaking.
Future research could be directed at incorporating our findings into an emergency
management wide “continuous auditing” process (Turoff et al., 2004). By having made
decision making and particularly Sensemaking processes more explicit, it is in principle
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Barents Rescue 10/19/2007 Saariselkä OSOCC 1
Exercise 10/20/2007 Ivalo OSC 1
10/20/2007 Ivalo Medical team 1
10/21/2007 Saariselkä LEMA 1
Forest fires 12/12/2008 Lisbon Portuguese Forest Services 2
in Portugal 12/13/2008 Lisbon ANPC 2
02/29/2008 Brussels EC, Environment DG 1
02/29/2008 Brussels EU Council, Civil Protection Unit 1
EUPM 04/08/2008 Sarajevo EUPM 1
in BiH 04/08/2008 Sarajevo EUPM, EU Coordination Office 1
04/08/2008 Sarajevo EUPM, Security Dept. 1
04/08/2008 Sarajevo EUPM, Public Information Dept. 1
04/08/2008 Sarajevo EUPM, Public Information Dept. 1
04/09/2008 Sarajevo EC, Department Police Projects 1
04/09/2008 Sarajevo EUFOR 1
04/09/2008 Sarajevo EUSR 1
04/10/2008 Sarajevo Canton Sarajevo Police Dept. 3
04/10/2008 Sarajevo OSCE 1
04/10/2008 Sarajevo OSCE, Security Cooperation Dept. 2
04/11/2008 Sarajevo Populari 1
The DRC’s 08/08/2007 Kinshasa ASF 1
ongoing crisis 08/08/2007 Kinshasa SIDA 1
08/08/2007 Kinshasa MSF Belgium 1
08/09/2007 Kinshasa Save the Children 1
08/09/2007 Kinshasa Oxfam GB 1
08/09/2007 Kinshasa ICRC 2
08/10/2007 Kinshasa UNFPA 1
08/10/2007 Kinshasa UNDP 1
08/10/2007 Kinshasa OCHA 1
08/10/2007 Kinshasa WFP 1
08/10/2007 Kinshasa UNICEF 3
08/13/2007 Kinshasa Belgian Embassy 1
08/13/2007 Kinshasa MONUC 1
08/13/2007 Kinshasa ECHO 1
08/13/2007 Kinshasa CRS 2
08/14/2007 Kinshasa WHO 1
08/14/2007 Kinshasa DFID 2
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Survey items related to the statements on social Sensemaking, ongoing Sensemaking, and
Sensemaking outcome. After each item we mention the “itemID” and refer to the match-
ing statement from the previously discussed theory which the respective item is aimed at
measuring. Please note that the headers of the sections (Social Sensemaking, Ongoing
Sensemaking, and Sensemaking Outcome), the itemIDs and the references to the state-
ments were not visible to the respondents. They were only presented the survey items on
their screen in this order, six at a time.
Social Sensemaking
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
It was easy to fall back on my team members for information, questions, feedback, and reflection
[itemID = social1; statement 1 in Subsection 4.2.1]
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
The use of the communication medium ([radio/chat]) encouraged me to discuss with my team
members
[itemID = social2; statement 2 in Subsection 4.2.1]
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
After the group discussion had started, I sometimes felt isolated when trying to solve the case
[itemID = social3; statement 3 in Subsection 4.2.1]
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
There was a lot of discussion in the team
[itemID = social4; statement 4 in Subsection 4.2.1]
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
I would have wanted to discuss more than we actually did
[itemID = social5; statement 5 in Subsection 4.2.1]
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
All my team members actively participated in the experiment
[itemID = social6; statement 6 in Subsection 4.2.1]
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
We were critically comparing different pieces of information to each other
[itemID = social7; statement 7 in Subsection 4.2.1]
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
My team members were not always carefully considering my information inputs
[itemID = social8; statement 8 in Subsection 4.2.1]
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
We focused on the contrary views within the team
[itemID = social9; statement 9 in Subsection 4.2.1]
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Ongoing Sensemaking
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
The decision making process in our group was smooth and continuous
[itemID = ongoing1; statement 10 in Subsection 4.2.2]
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
I did not always understand what my team members were thinking or doing
[itemID = ongoing2; statement 11 in Subsection 4.2.2]
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
I did not always have a chance to contribute to the discussion when I wanted to
[itemID = ongoing3; statement 12 in Subsection 4.2.2]
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
Our team paid extra attention to situations in which our expectations or beliefs were disconfirmed
[itemID = ongoing4; statement 13 in Subsection 4.2.2]
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
It was not always easy to focus the group’s attention to the issues I wanted to discuss
[itemID = ongoing5; statement 14 in Subsection 4.2.2]
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
Our team managed to translate the starting situation, in which there were many unclarities, into
a situation in which it was more understandable what was going on
[itemID = ongoing6; statement 15 in Subsection 4.2.2]
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
We managed to react swiftly to the unclarities to create a more understandable picture of the
situation
[itemID = ongoing7; statement 16 in Subsection 4.2.2]
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
We continuously updated our actions and interpretations according to new information
[itemID = ongoing8; statement 17 in Subsection 4.2.2]
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
During the group discussion, when new information was brought up, I was trying to analyze and
understand the situation myself before sharing my thoughts with my team members
[itemID = ongoing9; statement 18 in Subsection 4.2.2]
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Sensemaking Outcome
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
In our team, we had a good idea of which direction to follow
[itemID = outcome1; statement 19 in Subsection 4.2.3]
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
In our team, we had a good understanding of the uncertainties we faced
[itemID = outcome2; statement 20 in Subsection 4.2.3]
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
In our team, we were able to develop a coherent story of what was going on
[itemID = outcome3; statement 21 in Subsection 4.2.3]
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
In our team, it was hard to build a common idea of what was happening
[itemID = outcome4; statement 22 in Subsection 4.2.3]
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
In our team, we updated and developed our initial sense of the situation
[itemID = outcome5; statement 23 in Subsection 4.2.3]
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
In our team, we experienced at some point a total lack of meaning of what was happening
[itemID = outcome6; statement 26 in Subsection 4.2.3]
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
In our team, we stuck to one view of what was happening
[itemID = outcome7; statement 24 in Subsection 4.2.3]
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
In our team, our grasp of what was happening sometimes began to loosen
[itemID = outcome8; statement 27 in Subsection 4.2.3]
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
In our team, we were resourceful in the face of setbacks
[itemID = outcome9; statement 25 in Subsection 4.2.3]
Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) Neutral (3) Disagree (4) Strongly Disagree (5)
© © © © ©
In our team, we had the feeling of order, clarity, and rationality
[itemID = outcome10; statement 28 in Subsection 4.2.3]
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Interrater reliability is a measure for the relative consistency of responses among raters
(Bliese 2000, p.354), and non-independence is the degree to which responses from individ-
uals in the same group are influenced by and depend on the group membership (Bliese,
2000). Both interrater reliability and non-independence are important criteria for aggrega-
tion, as they indicate whether individuals within a group can meaningfully indicate their
group’s behavior.
Both interrater reliability and non-independence are most commonly estimated by the
Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) 1 (Shrout and Fleiss 1979; Bartko 1976; McGraw
and Wong 1996). The ICC(1) is based on the one-way random effects Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) in which the groups are treated as the random effect. ICC(1) is estimated when
one is interested in understanding the interrater reliability among multiple groups rated by
a different set of individuals on an interval measurement scale, such as Likert-type scales
(LeBreton and Senter, 2008). ICC(1) is defined as
ICC(1) =
MSB −MSW
MSB + (k − 1)MSW
, (A.1)
where MSB is the Mean Square Between groups, MSW is the Mean Square Within groups,
and k is the group size. The value of ICC(1) indicates the effect size, i.e. the percentage of
variance explained. ICC(1) values can be interpreted either as the level of consensus and
consistency one would expect if an individual is randomly selected and his or her scores
were compared to the mean score obtained from the sample of individuals (LeBreton and
Senter, 2008), or and can be interpreted as the extent to which individual responses were
affected by their group membership (Bliese, 2000).
The accompanying F-test tests the hypothesis:
H0: MSB - MSW = 0
(The between-group variance is equal to the within-group variance)
against the alternative hypothesis:
H1: MSB - MSW > 0
(The between-group variance is greater than the within-group variance)
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As the trait which IRT is aimed at measuring is latent, i.e. not known, IRT uses the
unweighted total score on the items in a test to estimate Θ. For polytomous items, in our
case based on a 5-points Likert scale, the answer categories of the items need to have a
meaningful order representing increasingly higher levels of the latent trait. The test score





with Xi = 0, 1, . . . ,m for all i = 1, . . . , k items. This means that an item has m+1 ordered
answer categories. The higher the latent trait value Θ of a group, estimated by X+, the
higher the probability of correctly answering an item that measures Θ.
Because polytomous items have more than two response options, these scoring prob-
ability on these items are indicated with multiple response functions, called ISRFs. The
ISRF is defined as (Sijtsma and Molenaar, 2002, p.119):
Pih(Θ) = P (Xi ≥ h|Θ), (A.3)
with index h indicating polytomous item scores and h = 0, . . . ,m; and i = 1, . . . , k. This
equation gives the probability of scoring at least h on item i. Because h = 0 leads to a
probability of 1 for each Θ, which is not informative about item functioning, each item
with m+ 1 answer categories has m meaningful ISRFs.
Quality indices for MHM scales
There are three types of quality indices for MHM scales: The scalability coefficient Hi for
each item, the scalability coefficient Hij for all item pairs, and the scalability coefficient
H for all k items simultaneously. The scalability coefficient Hi of item i can be defined as










with rest score R(i) representing the sum score across the k − 1 other items. This item
scalability coefficient can be interpreted as an index for the steepness of the slope of the
ISRFs, indicating the strength of the association of item i with the other k − 1 items in
the scale and the degree of discrimination with which item i can separate low and high Θ
values. The MHM implies 0 < Hi ≤ 1.
Similarly, the scalability coefficient Hij for all item pairs represents the extent to which
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The MHM implies 0 ≤ Hij ≤ 1.
Finally, the scalability coefficient H for all k items simultaneously is defined as (Sijtsma











The scalability coefficient H is the weighted mean of all Hi values, and can be interpreted
as the discrimination index for accuracy of person ordering by means of X+ on the latent
trait Θ. The MHM implies 0 < H ≤ 1.
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Appendix E: Data Transformation to Group Sum
Categories
Transformation of the five items for analysis: From 13 categories according to the group
sum, to 10 categories in which the lowest group sum teams are aggregated.
Table A.1: Original categories according to the group responses
Group Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency




3 4 2 1
4 4 1 4
5 9 3 4
6 4 2 1 4 3
7 10 2 4 9 1
8 10 5 2 7 5
9 2 8 16 13 10
10 1 17 15 4 19
11 9 6 5
12 1 4 4
Table A.2: New response categories with the lowest group sum teams aggregated into the lowest
response category
Response Group Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency
category sum social5 ongoing1 outcome5 outcome8 outcome10
0 0-3 8 3 1
1 4 4 1 4
2 5 9 3 4
3 6 4 2 1 4 3
4 7 10 2 4 9 1
5 8 10 5 2 7 5
6 9 2 8 16 13 10
7 10 1 17 15 4 19
8 11 9 6 5
9 12 1 4 4
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social5 ’I would have wanted to discuss’
ongoing1 ’The decision making process in’
outcome5 ’In our team, we updated and de’
outcome8 ’In our team, our grasp of what’














PRINT=FULL ORDERED PPLUS PMIN PEST GUTTMAN *
[|030 Univariate frequencies and item means for entire group (n=48)]
Item Mean Values
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
social5 2.98 8 4 9 4 10 10 2 1 0 0
ongoing1 6.12 0 1 3 2 2 5 8 17 9 1
outcome5 6.54 0 0 0 1 4 2 16 15 6 4
outcome8 4.19 3 4 4 4 9 7 13 4 0 0
outcome10 6.40 1 0 0 3 1 5 10 19 5 4
[Analysis 1 |040 Matrix of H values per item pair]
Items




outcome10 0.34 0.47 0.83
outcome5 0.12 0.26 0.62 0.60
Number of items in matrix : 5
Total number of H-values : 10
Total number of negative H-values: 0
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[Analysis 1 |042 Matrix Z(g,h)]
Items




outcome10 2.05 2.95 5.40
outcome5 0.74 1.67 3.97 3.88
[Analysis 1 |044 Overview final scale]
for scale tested, Number of Items: 5
n = 48 Scale coefficient H = 0.46 Scale Z = 9.02
Item coefficients
Item Label Mean ItemH Z
social5 I would have wanted to discuss 2.98 0.32 3.97
outcome8 In our team, our grasp of what 4.19 0.44 5.64
ongoing1 The decision making process in 6.12 0.56 7.12
outcome10 In our team, we had the feelin 6.40 0.56 6.96
outcome5 In our team, we updated and de 6.54 0.39 4.98
[Analysis 1 |100 Summary per item for check of monotonicity]
Minimum violation = 0.03 Significance level= 0.05 Minimum group size= 10
ItemH #ac #vi #vi/#ac maxvi sum sum/#ac zmax #zsig crit
social5 0.32 30 4 0.13 0.12 0.39 0.0131 0.31 0 47*
ongoing1 0.56 17 2 0.12 0.11 0.18 0.0109 -0.19 0 25
outcome5 0.39 17 3 0.18 0.08 0.20 0.0119 -0.23 0 37
outcome8 0.44 24 2 0.08 0.20 0.30 0.0125 0.66 0 43























[Analysis 1 |110 Details per itemstep for check of monotonicity]
Minimum violation = 0.03 Significance level= 0.05 Minimum group size= 10
social5 I would have wanted to discuss
Restscore Frequencies per Proportions of positive
Group Low High N item value Mean responses per itemstep
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 >= 1 >= 2 >= 3 >= 4 >= 5 >= 6 >= 7 >= 8 >= 9
1 5 - 19 10 3 1 3 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 2.10 0.70 0.60 0.30 0.30 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 20 - 22 10 3 1 1 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 2.20 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.30 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 23 - 26 11 0 1 3 1 3 2 0 1 0 0 3.55 1.00 0.91 0.64 0.55 0.27 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.00
4 27 - 33 17 2 1 2 1 4 5 2 0 0 0 3.59 0.88 0.82 0.71 0.65 0.41 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00
#ac #vi #vi/#ac maxvi sum sum/#ac zmax group #zsig
Itemstep >= 1 4 1 0.25 0.12 0.12 0.0294 0.27 3 4 0
Itemstep >= 2 6 1 0.17 0.09 0.09 0.0143 0.00 3 4 0
Itemstep >= 3 6 0
Itemstep >= 4 6 0
Itemstep >= 5 6 1 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.0167 0.00 0 0 0
Itemstep >= 6 1 0
Itemstep >= 7 1 1 1.00 0.09 0.09 0.0909 0.31 3 4 0
Itemstep >= 8 0
Itemstep >= 9 0
Itemtotal 30 4 0.13 0.12 0.39 0.0131 0.31 0 47
ongoing1 The decision making process in
Restscore Frequencies per Proportions of positive
Group Low High N item value Mean responses per itemstep
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 >= 1 >= 2 >= 3 >= 4 >= 5 >= 6 >= 7 >= 8 >= 9
1 4 - 16 13 0 1 3 1 1 2 1 3 1 0 4.54 1.00 0.92 0.69 0.62 0.54 0.38 0.31 0.08 0.00
2 17 - 20 10 0 0 0 1 0 3 4 2 0 0 5.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.90 0.60 0.20 0.00 0.00
3 21 - 23 13 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 8 3 0 6.92 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.92 0.85 0.23 0.00
4 24 - 29 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 1 7.42 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.50 0.08
#ac #vi #vi/#ac maxvi sum sum/#ac zmax group #zsig
Itemstep >= 1 0
Itemstep >= 2 0
Itemstep >= 3 0
Itemstep >= 4 1 0
Itemstep >= 5 3 0
Itemstep >= 6 3 0
Itemstep >= 7 6 1 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.0179 0.08 1 2 0
Itemstep >= 8 4 1 0.25 0.08 0.08 0.0192 -0.19 1 2 0
Itemstep >= 9 0























outcome5 In our team, we updated and de
Restscore Frequencies per Proportions of positive
Group Low High N item value Mean responses per itemstep
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 >= 1 >= 2 >= 3 >= 4 >= 5 >= 6 >= 7 >= 8 >= 9
1 2 - 14 11 0 0 0 1 2 2 4 2 0 0 5.36 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.73 0.55 0.18 0.00 0.00
2 15 - 20 13 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 5 3 0 6.69 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.92 0.62 0.23 0.00
3 21 - 24 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 2 0 6.82 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.64 0.18 0.00
4 25 - 29 13 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 3 1 4 7.15 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.92 0.62 0.38 0.31
#ac #vi #vi/#ac maxvi sum sum/#ac zmax group #zsig
Itemstep >= 1 0
Itemstep >= 2 0
Itemstep >= 3 0
Itemstep >= 4 0
Itemstep >= 5 4 1 0.25 0.08 0.08 0.0192 -0.12 3 4 0
Itemstep >= 6 4 1 0.25 0.08 0.08 0.0192 -0.12 3 4 0
Itemstep >= 7 6 0
Itemstep >= 8 3 1 0.33 0.05 0.05 0.0163 -0.23 2 3 0
Itemstep >= 9 0
Itemtotal 17 3 0.18 0.08 0.20 0.0119 -0.23 0 37
outcome8 In our team, our grasp of what
Restscore Frequencies per Proportions of positive
Group Low High N item value Mean responses per itemstep
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 >= 1 >= 2 >= 3 >= 4 >= 5 >= 6 >= 7 >= 8 >= 9
1 4 - 19 10 1 2 4 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 2.10 0.90 0.70 0.30 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 20 - 21 11 1 2 0 1 3 2 1 1 0 0 3.64 0.91 0.73 0.73 0.64 0.36 0.18 0.09 0.00 0.00
3 22 - 24 12 1 0 0 1 1 1 6 2 0 0 5.17 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.83 0.75 0.67 0.17 0.00 0.00
4 25 - 31 15 0 0 0 1 3 4 6 1 0 0 5.20 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.73 0.47 0.07 0.00 0.00
#ac #vi #vi/#ac maxvi sum sum/#ac zmax group #zsig
Itemstep >= 1 3 0
Itemstep >= 2 3 0
Itemstep >= 3 3 0
Itemstep >= 4 6 0
Itemstep >= 5 3 0
Itemstep >= 6 3 1 0.33 0.20 0.20 0.0667 0.66 3 4 0
Itemstep >= 7 3 1 0.33 0.10 0.10 0.0333 0.24 3 4 0
Itemstep >= 8 0
Itemstep >= 9 0























outcome10 In our team, we had the feelin
Restscore Frequencies per Proportions of positive
Group Low High N item value Mean responses per itemstep
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 >= 1 >= 2 >= 3 >= 4 >= 5 >= 6 >= 7 >= 8 >= 9
1 5 - 15 12 1 0 0 2 0 3 4 2 0 0 4.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.75 0.75 0.50 0.17 0.00 0.00
2 17 - 20 12 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 4 0 1 6.25 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.75 0.42 0.08 0.08
3 21 - 23 12 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 8 2 0 6.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.83 0.17 0.00
4 24 - 28 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 3 3 7.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.50 0.25
#ac #vi #vi/#ac maxvi sum sum/#ac zmax group #zsig
Itemstep >= 1 0
Itemstep >= 2 0
Itemstep >= 3 0
Itemstep >= 4 2 1 0.50 0.08 0.08 0.0417 0.00 0 0 0
Itemstep >= 5 3 0
Itemstep >= 6 3 0
Itemstep >= 7 6 0
Itemstep >= 8 3 0
Itemstep >= 9 2 1 0.50 0.08 0.08 0.0417 0.00 0 0 0
Itemtotal 19 2 0.11 0.08 0.17 0.0088 0.00 0 20
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Illustrative interpretation of the results
The second step in the MHM scale analysis is to calculate the ISRFs based on the rest
score groups. MSP5 also presents graphs of the ISRFs for all items if there are violations
of monotonicity, i.e. if one or more of the ISRFs for each item show a decrease in the
proportions of positive responses for higher rest score groups. All five items have such
local decreases in the ISRFs. Numerically this can be seen in the “details per itemstep for
check of monotonicity” on the pages in landscape page layout. For each item it can be first
seen that it shows increasing mean values for higher rest score groups. Second, however,
each item shows that there are instances in which a higher rest score group had a lower
score for that specific item. For example, if we observe the results for social5, we see that
rest score group 3 consists of 11 teams who scored between 23 and 26 on the other four
items. One of these teams scored 7 on social5, leading to a proportion of 0.09 of positive
responses for item step ≥ 7. None of the 17 teams from rest score group 4, scoring between
27 and 33 on the other four items, however scored 7 or higher for social5. This is in contrast
to the monotonicity assumption, as we would expect that teams scoring higher on the other
four items, which measure the same latent trait, should have a higher proportion correct
score for the fifth item. This is a so-called “Guttman error” (Guttman, 1950). Next it is
therefore shown that there is one violation of monotonicity for itemstep ≥ 7 (#vi = 1),
which is a maximum violation of 0.09 (maxvi), but when tested for significance (with α =
0.05) it shows that this violation is not significant (there are no significant violations, as
can be seen in the last column “#zsig”). It is probably not significant because the mean
score on social5 of rest score group 4, which is 3.59, is larger than the mean value of rest
score group 4 on social5 (3.55). When observing the violations for all five items, we can see
that none of them exhibit a significant violation of monotonicity. The summary per item
for check of monotonicity can be consulted in last section before the landscape page layout
starts. There is manifest monotonicity in our data as there are no significant decreases in

















Appendix G: Hidden Profile Item Distributions
Table A.3: Hidden profile item distributions for the two information load conditions
Low information load condition High information load condition
Item Category District Alpha Bravo Charlie District Alpha Bravo Charlie
A1+ Health Norktown 1 1 1 Norktown 1 1 1
A1– Health Norktown 0 0 1 Norktown 0 0 1
A2+ Water, sanitation and hygiene Norktown 1 1 1 Norktown 1 1 1
A2– Water, sanitation and hygiene Norktown 0 1 0 Norktown 0 0 1
A3+ Food and nutrition Norktown 1 1 1 Norktown 1 1 1
A3– Food and nutrition Norktown 1 0 0 Norktown 1 0 0
A4+ Shelter and non-food items Norktown 1 1 1 Norktown 1 1 1
A4– Shelter and non-food items Norktown 1 0 0 Norktown 1 0 0
A5+ Logistics, access and security Norktown 0 1 0 Norktown 1 1 1
A5– Logistics, access and security Norktown 1 0 0 Norktown 0 1 0
A6+ Protection Norktown 1 1 1
A6– Protection Norktown 0 1 0
A7+ Water, sanitation and hygiene Norktown 1 0 0
A7– Water, sanitation and hygiene Norktown 0 0 1
A8+ Food and nutrition Norktown 0 1 0
A8– Food and nutrition Norktown 1 1 1
A9+ Shelter and non-food items Norktown 0 1 0
A9– Shelter and non-food items Norktown 0 0 1
A10+ Logistics, access and security Norktown 0 0 1 Norktown 1 0 0
A10– Logistics, access and security Norktown 1 0 0 Norktown 1 1 1
A11– Health Norktown 1 0 0 Norktown 1 0 0
A12– Water, sanitation and hygiene Norktown 0 0 1 Norktown 0 1 0
A13– Shelter and non-food items Norktown 0 1 0 Norktown 0 0 1
A14– Logistics, access and security Norktown 0 0 1
A15– Food and nutrition Norktown 0 0 1

















Table A.3 – continued from previous page
Low load condition High load condition
Item Category District Alpha Bravo Charlie District Alpha Bravo Charlie
B1+ Health Petersted 0 1 0 Grotti 1 1 1
B1– Health Petersted 1 1 1 Grotti 1 1 1
B2+ Water, sanitation and hygiene Petersted 1 1 1 Grotti 1 0 0
B2– Water, sanitation and hygiene Petersted 0 0 1 Grotti 1 1 1
B3+ Food and nutrition Petersted 0 0 1 Grotti 1 1 1
B3– Food and nutrition Petersted 1 1 1 Grotti 0 1 0
B4+ Shelter and non-food items Petersted 0 0 1 Grotti 0 1 0
B4– Shelter and non-food items Petersted 0 1 0 Grotti 1 1 1
B5+ Logistics, access and security Petersted 1 1 1 Grotti 1 1 1
B5– Logistics, access and security Petersted 0 1 0 Grotti 1 0 0
B6+ Protection Grotti 1 1 1
B6– Protection Grotti 1 1 1
B7+ Water, sanitation and hygiene Grotti 1 1 1
B7– Water, sanitation and hygiene Grotti 1 1 1
B8+ Food and nutrition Grotti 1 0 0
B8– Food and nutrition Grotti 0 0 1
B9+ Shelter and non-food items Grotti 1 1 1
B9– Shelter and non-food items Grotti 1 0 0
B10+ Logistics, access and security Petersted 0 1 0 Grotti 0 1 0
B10– Logistics, access and security Petersted 0 0 1 Grotti 1 1 1
B11– Health Petersted 0 1 0 Grotti 0 1 0
B12– Water, sanitation and hygiene Petersted 1 0 0 Grotti 1 0 0
B13– Shelter and non-food items Petersted 0 0 1 Grotti 0 1 0
B14– Logistics, access and security Grotti 0 1 0
B15– Food and nutrition Grotti 1 0 0
C1+ Health Grotti 1 0 0 Petersted 1 1 1
C1– Health Grotti 1 1 1 Petersted 1 0 0
C2+ Water, sanitation and hygiene Grotti 1 0 0 Petersted 0 1 0

















Table A.3 – continued from previous page
Low load condition High load condition
Item Category District Alpha Bravo Charlie District Alpha Bravo Charlie
C2– Water, sanitation and hygiene Grotti 1 1 1 Petersted 1 1 1
C3+ Food and nutrition Grotti 1 1 1 Petersted 0 0 1
C3– Food and nutrition Grotti 0 1 0 Petersted 1 1 1
C4+ Shelter and non-food items Grotti 1 0 0 Petersted 0 0 1
C4– Shelter and non-food items Grotti 1 1 1 Petersted 1 1 1
C5+ Logistics, access and security Grotti 1 1 1 Petersted 0 0 1
C5– Logistics, access and security Grotti 0 0 1 Petersted 1 1 1
C6+ Protection Petersted 0 0 1
C6– Protection Petersted 1 1 1
C7+ Water, sanitation and hygiene Petersted 1 1 1
C7– Water, sanitation and hygiene Petersted 0 1 0
C8+ Food and nutrition Petersted 1 1 1
C8– Food and nutrition Petersted 1 1 1
C9+ Shelter and non-food items Petersted 1 1 1
C9– Shelter and non-food items Petersted 1 1 1
C10+ Logistics, access and security Grotti 1 1 1 Petersted 1 1 1
C10– Logistics, access and security Grotti 1 1 1 Petersted 1 1 1
C11+ Health Grotti 1 0 0 Petersted 0 0 1
C12+ Water, sanitation and hygiene Grotti 0 0 1 Petersted 0 0 1
C13+ Shelter and non-food items Grotti 0 1 0 Petersted 1 0 0
C14+ Logistics, access and security Petersted 1 0 0
C15+ Food and nutrition Petersted 0 1 0
a “+” indicates a positive information item;
a “–” indicates a negative information item;
a “1” indicates the possession of the information item by the respective team member;
a “0” indicates that the respective team member did not possess the respective information item.
(i.e. three times “1” indicates a common information item, while one “1” and two times “0” indicates a unique information item)
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data mining. In B. Van de Walle and B. Carlé (Eds.), Proceedings of the 2nd International
ISCRAM Conference, Brussels, Belgium, pp. 143–145.
Stake, R. E. (2005). Qualitative case studies. In N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.),
Handbook of Qualitative Research: Third Edition, pp. 443–466. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage Publications.
174 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Starbuck, W. H. and F. J. Milliken (1988). Executives’ perceptual filters: What they notice
and how they make sense. In D. Hambrick (Ed.), The Executive Effect: Concepts and
Methods for Studying Top Managers, pp. 35–65. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Stasser, G. (1988). Computer simulation as a research tool: The discuss model of group
decision making. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 24 (5), 393–422.
Stasser, G. (1992). Information salience and the discovery of hidden profiles by decision-
making groups: A ”thought experiment”. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes 52 (1), 156–181.
Stasser, G. (1999). The uncertain role of unshared information in collective choice. In
L. Thompson, J. Levine, and D. Messick (Eds.), Shared Knowledge in Organizations,
pp. 49–69. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Stasser, G. and Z. Birchmeier (2003). Group creativity and collective choice. In P. Paulus
and B. Nijstad (Eds.), Group Creativity, pp. 85–109. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press.
Stasser, G. and D. Stewart (1992). Discovery of hidden profiles by decision-making groups:
Solving a problem versus making a judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology 63 (3), 426–434.
Stasser, G. and W. Titus (1985). Pooling of unshared information in group decision mak-
ing: Biased information sampling during discussion. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 48 (6), 1467–1478.
Stasser, G. and W. Titus (1987). Effects of information load and percentage of shared infor-
mation on the dissemination of unshared information during group discussion. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology 53 (1), 81–93.
Stasser, G. and W. Titus (2003). Hidden profiles: A brief history. Psychological In-
quiry 14 (3 and 4), 304–313.
Sutcliffe, K. M. (2001). Organizational environments and organizational information pro-
cessing. In F. M. Jablin and L. L. Putnam (Eds.), The New Handbook of Organizational
Communication, pp. 197–230. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Sutcliffe, K. M. and K. E. Weick (2008). Information overload revisited. In G. P. Hodgkin-
son and W. H. Starbuck (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Organizational Decision Mak-
ing, pp. 56–75. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tabachnick, B. G. and L. S. Fidell (2007). Using Multivariate Statistics (Fifth Edition).
Boston, MA: Pearson.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 175
Thomas, J. B., S. M. Clark, and D. A. Gioia (1993). Strategic sensemaking and organi-
zational performance: Linkages among scanning, interpretation, action, and outcomes.
Academy of Management Journal 36 (2), 239–270.
Turoff, M., M. Chumer, S. R. Hiltz, R. Klashner, M. Alles, M. Vasarhelyi, and A. Kogan
(2004). Assuring homeland security: Continuous monitoring, control & assurance of
emergency preparedness. Journal of Information Technology Theory and Application
(JITTA) 6 (3), 1–24.
Turoff, M., M. Chumer, B. Van de Walle, and X. Yao (2004). The design of a dynamic
emergency response management information system. Journal of Information Technology
Theory and Application (JITTA) 5 (4), 1–36.
Turoff, M. and S. R. Hiltz (2009). The future of professional communities of practice. In
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